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It is impossible, given the character of this book, for me to identify all the 
intellectual debts that I have accumulated in writing these essays. Edito-
rial assistance is quite another matter. No one has helped me more than 
my wife, Norma Wukasch Luebke, who through the years generously 
and graciously has given me the benefit of her professional expertise. I 
am also pleased to remember the considerable encouragement and edito-
rial advice that I have received from Kathleen Neils Conzen, Roger 
Daniels, Walter D. Kamphoefner, James M. Bergquist, and Robert E. 
Knoll. The University of Nebraska-Lincoln, especially its Department of 
History and Center for Great Plains Studies, has assisted my work in 
ways too various to list here. I acknowledge all this help with much 
gratitude. 
My thanks also go to the editors and publishers of the following 
materials for permission to reprint all or parts of my essays here: 
Chapter 1: "The Immigrant Condition as a Factor Contributing to 
the Conservatism of the Lutheran Church - Missouri Synod." Concordia 
Historical Institute Quarterly 38 (April 1965): 19-28. 
Chapter 2: "The German-American Alliance in Nebraska, 1910-
1917." Nebraska History 49 (Summer 1968): 165-85. 
Chapter 3: "Legal Restrictions on Foreign Languages in the Great 
Plains States, 1917-1923." In Languages in Conflict: Linguistic Accultur-
ation on the Great Plains, edited by Paul Schach, 1-19. Lincoln: Univ. of 
Nebraska Press, 1980. 
Chapter 4: "The Germans." In Ethnic Leadership in America, edited 
by John Higham, 64-90. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1978. 
This article appears here under the title "German-American Leadership 
Strategies Between the World Wars." 
Chapter 5: "German Immigrants and American Politics: Problems 
of Leadership, Parties, and Issues." In Germans in America: Retrospect 
and Prospect, edited by Randall M. Miller, 57-74. Philadelphia: German 
Society of Pennsylvania, 1984. 
Chapter 7: "Images of German Immigrants in the United States and 
Brazil, 1890-1918: Some Comparisons." In America and the Germans: 
xii Germans in the New World 
An Assessment of a 300-Year History, 2 vols., edited by Frank Trommler 
and Joseph McVeigh, 1: 207-20. Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1985. 
Chapter 8: "The German Ethnic Group in Brazil: The Ordeal of 
World War 1." Yearbook of German-American Studies 18 (1983): 255-67. 
Chapter 9: Sections I, II, VI, and VII of this essay are modified from 
pp. 387-96 and 403 in my essay "Ethnic Minority Groups in the Ameri-
can West." In Historians and the American West, edited by Michael P. 
Malone, 387-413. Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1983. Much new 
material has been added. 
Introduction 
The study of German immigrants and their descendants in America has 
not attracted the attention of many professional historians. Even though 
the Germans are one of the most important and arguably the largest of 
ethnic groups in the United States, their history has been neglected, most 
persistently perhaps by German Americans themselves. Reasons for this 
are easy to identify. 
First, to be of "German origin" is itself a vague and imprecise 
concept. German-speaking immigrants have come to America not only 
from Germany, but also from Austria, Hungary, Russia, Rumania, 
Yugoslavia, Switzerland, and France. Germany as a political entity was 
founded only in the latter part of the nineteenth century. German lan-
guage and culture, which is much more important as a basis for ethnic 
consciousness than is country of origin, has never been congruent with 
German nationality. 
Second, few ethnic groups in America have been as varied in 
religious belief, political persuasion, socioeconomic status, occupation, 
culture, and social character as the German are, despite persistent historic 
stereotypes to the contrary. Generalizations about the Germans are inevi-
tably hazardous and sure to be disputed. Because they have been so 
diverse, German Americans have displayed limited unity and no great 
interest in a common history, at least by comparison to other ethnic 
groups, such as Poles, Irish, or Norwegians. Their tendency to cultural 
amnesia has been greatly augmented in the twentieth century by two 
World Wars in which Germany was identified as a great and evil adversary. 
For many persons, thoughtless propaganda and the legacy of Hitlerian 
horrors transformed German identity in this country; it became a source 
of social discomfort, something they preferred to ignore. 
My own interest in the history of Germans in America was origi-
nally generated by a desire to understand that segment of immigrant 
society from which I sprang. Even though my paternal great-grandfather 
emigrated a century before I was born, my family's ties to German 
immigrant culture, especially Lutheranism, remained intimate. My mater-
nal grandfather was a clergyman in the Lutheran Church-Missouri 
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Synod, as were assorted uncles and grand uncles, cousins and second 
cousins; my father was a teacher in the synod, as were two older brothers 
and other uncles and cousins. It was a matter of course that I should 
follow the same path. I attended the appropriate Lutheran college and 
later served as a teacher in several Lutheran parish schools, a Lutheran 
high school, and another Lutheran college. German Lutheranism in America 
was a small world. It seemed self-contained; its influence was pervasive. 
It needed to be understood. 
Received wisdom within the Lutheran Church - Missouri Synod 
suggested that its history was the lengthened shadow of leaders whose 
fearless dedication to reine Lehre -the pure doctrine promulgated by 
Martin Luther-carried the church through a series of fierce theological 
battles to attain its present magnitude. When I had enrolled in a doctoral 
program at the University of Southern California in the late 1950s, I had 
an opportunity to study the history of the Missouri Synod-the ethnic 
institution I knew best - and to place it in the social context provided by 
the assimilation process that all immigrant institutions must experience. 
I perceived a history that differed from the one I had been taught. 
My reading of history, buttressed by personal experience, led me to 
conclude that a sociohistorical interpretation offered far more understand-
ing than the traditional emphasis on leaders, theology, and institutional 
change did.1 The Missouri Synod, despite its congregational polity, seemed 
dominated by its clergy. This elite, unlike its rank-and-file members, 
emigrated primarily for religious reasons and naturally sought to use 
every means at hand to preserve the doctrinal character of the church in 
the American environment. This they perceived as a threatening milieu 
whose assimilative powers seemed irresistible. Reacting defensively, they 
established programs of German-language maintenance founded on an 
institutional structure of parochial schools, teachers colleges, and theo-
logical seminaries, all buttressed by an effective printing and publishing 
agency. A by-product of such a closed system was a heightened self-
consciousness, an uncompromising isolationism, and a determination to 
do battle with the enemies of the True Faith. These enemies included the 
proponents of puritanical moralism, revivalism, rationalism, Wesleyan 
emotionalism, Catholicism, Masonry, socialists, Forty-eighters, atheists, 
and sometimes fellow Lutherans of other synods. The product of this 
initial study, revised and amended, is the first article included in this 
book. It bears the unwieldy title of "The Immigrant Condition as a Factor 
in the Conservatism of the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod." 
In 1961 I accepted an appointment to the faculty of Concordia 
College in Seward, Nebraska, a teacher-education institution of the Mis-
souri Synod. I transferred my doctoral studies in history to the University 
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of Nebraska, where I worked with Professor James C. Olson, whose 
principal interests were in the history of Nebraska, Indians, and the 
American West. But I continued with ethnic history and now turned to 
the political acculturation of the German ethnic group in Nebraska 
during the last two decades of the nineteenth century. 
As I undertook my dissertation research, I quickly discovered that 
there were no useful patterns for me to follow in the writings of earlier 
historians of the Germans in America, if I were to avoid the pitfalls of 
elitism and the morass of filiopietism. Instead, I turned to Lee Benson, 
who had demonstrated that ethnicity and religion were capable of 
explaining political behavior on a local level more effectively than socio-
economic factors could. 2 Samuel P. Hays's several articles on the social 
analysis of political history were especially revealing to me. 3 The work 
of both historians was enormously helpful as I sought to conceptualize 
the problem and to develop an appropriate methodology for its solution. 
The result was a pioneering effort in the application of coefficients of 
correlation and other methods of quantification to the solution of a 
historical problem. In 1969 this work was published in revised form as 
Immigrants and Politics: The Germans of Nebraska, 1880-1900 (Lincoln: 
Univ. of Nebraska Press). 
In my view, the key to understanding ethnic political behavior lay 
in assimilation theory. It seemed to me that at a given time and place an 
immigrant's voting behavior was likely to be correlated closely with the 
frequency and quality of interpersonal contacts with members of the host 
society. Thus, for example, a German immigrant in Nebraska who resided 
in a city or town and who was employed in a craft, business, or profes-
sion that involved many contacts with Anglo-American society would be 
more likely to vote Republican in the late nineteenth century than would 
a German farmer living in the relative isolation of the countryside. 
Ethnocultural divergence from the norm could be expected to diminish as 
the assimilation process ran its course, except when issues such as 
prohibition, women's suffrage, Sabbatarianism, and the regulation of 
parochial schools achieved salience among the immigrants. The basic 
method used to reveal this relationship was the correlation of manuscript 
census data (which recorded the entire voting population on a township 
and ward level) with voting data (also on a township or precinct level). 
My research in German voting behavior led me to an interest in the 
effect of World War I on the German ethnic community in the United 
States. One of the striking aspects of German-American organizational 
life, I discovered, was that the Germans were very slow, compared to 
other ethnic groups, to organize themselves on a national scale for any 
common purpose, political or otherwise. I found no unified German-
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ethnic organization or association in the late nineteenth century-the 
National German-American Alliance was not organized until 1901. 
Although there was at least one useful book on this institution, almost 
nothing had been published on its state branches. The second article in 
this book, "The German-American Alliance in Nebraska, 1910-17/' is 
the product of my investigation, on the state leveL into the institutional 
life of the Alliance, which was at best an ill-starred venture whose brief 
life ended when the United States went to war with Germany. Entirely 
conventional in concept and method, this article represents no new 
exercise in the methodology of ethnic history, but it led me directly to a 
consideration of the problem posed by World War Ifor American citi-
zens of German birth or descent. 
I wished to understand better why people, both immigrants and the 
native-born, behaved as they did when their government went to war 
with the ancestral homeland of one of its largest ethnic groups. But before 
I could analyze the events in the domestic war of 1917 and 1918 against 
German language and culture, I needed to study the structure of the 
German-American community and to understand how it was perceived 
by American society in the decades before the war. Again my debt to 
Samuel P. Hays was clear: He taught that systematic history required the 
study of social structure before specific events or a series of events could 
be analyzed adequately.4 This approach demanded that the diversity of 
German America be taken into account; further, this approach assumed 
that the several components of this subsociety were affected variously by 
the events of the war. It was an interpretation that was nonquantitative in 
method, but it nonetheless emerged from the modes of thought and 
method that governed my earlier study of political behavior. In my view, 
there was no need to identify fools and culprits or to praise stalwart 
heroes and martyrs, even though there was no dearth of such figures on 
either side. The product of this research was my second book, Bonds of 
Loyalty; German Americans and World War I (DeKalb: Northern Illinois 
Univ. Press, 1974). It was a full-scale effort to understand that most 
unfortunate chapter in the history of German America. 
Unfortunately the war on German language and culture did not 
end on Armistice Day in 1918. In fact, the most restrictive laws 
intended to curb the use of and instruction in the German language 
were enacted by legislatures, mainly in western states, in 1919 and 
1921. The history of their enactment and of the legal battles they 
engendered is treated in "Legal Restrictions on Foreign Languages in 
the Great Plains States, 1917-23." That such laws were declared un-
constitutional by the United States Supreme Court in 1923 should be 
instructive to contemporary advocates of new restrictive legislation 
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aimed primarily at Spanish-speaking persons concentrated in California, 
Texas, Florida, and elsewhere. 
Like the article that precedes it, "German-American Leadership 
Strategies between the World Wars" is an extension of my study of the 
impact of World War I on the German-American community. Early in 
1975 while I was engaged in research as a Fulbright fellow in the Institut 
fur Auslandsbeziehungen in Stuttgart, West Germany, John Higham 
asked me to prepare a paper on German-American leadership for a 
symposium at Johns Hopkins University. Because, in my opinion, there 
has been no effective, visible leadership among the Germans in the 
United States since the beginning of World War II, I felt obliged to 
consider this topic during the period between the world wars. No effort is 
made here to analyze the social characteristics of ethnic leaders, the ways 
in which they differ from the commonalty of the group, or the relation-
ships between the two. Instead, I concentrated on strategies that emerged 
during the two decades, as leaders sought to help the German-American 
community recover from the social and psychological ravages wrought 
upon them by World War 1. At first, prominent voices advocated the 
exercise of political power, much as they had before the war. Following 
the election of 1928, it became clear that such a plan could never succeed, 
and a new generation of leaders urged that politics be abandoned in favor 
of the pursuit of cultural goals. This approach was aborted by the onset 
of the Great Depression and. the rise of the American Nazis, whose 
strategy of blood and tactics of violence were offensive to the majority of 
German Americans. 
The tricentennial commemoration of the first settlement of German 
immigrants in the New World in 1983 was the occasion for writing a 
broadly synthetic view of "German Immigrants and American Politics: 
Problems of Leadership, Parties, and Issues," prepared for presentation to 
the German Society of Pennsylvania. In the first part of this essay, I 
return to the question of ethnic political leadership. In my view, the type 
of leadership represented by the distinguished and famous Carl Schurz 
could not attain substantial ethnic-group political goals, given the hetero-
geneity of the German-American ethnic group and the realities of the 
American political system. On the other hand, politicians had the poten-
tial for accomplishing much for their constituencies, both ethnic and 
native, provided that they were willing occasionally to sacrifice ethnic 
ideals in favor of party loyalty. The essay reviews the changing relation-
ships of German Americans, chiefly in the nineteenth century, to the 
several political parties and the issues, usually ethnocultural, that had 
salience for them. In the twentieth century, German-American concerns 
shifted to questions of foreign policy; such issues seem to have dominated 
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the voting behavior of citizens of German heritage, at least when it can be 
identified in the decades since World War II. At the same time, German 
ethnic leadership seems to have vanished. 
The next series of articles in this book expands the focus of inquiry 
from the United States to comparisons with the history of Germans who 
chose to immigrate to other lands-in this case, to Brazil. While working 
in the collection of materials on Auslanddeutsche in the Stuttgart Institut 
fur Auslandsbeziehungen in 1974, I began a study of German immigra-
tion to Brazil in order to compare the experiences of German Brazilians 
in World War I with those of their cousins in the United States. This work 
eventually culminated in the publication of Germans in Brazil: A Com-
parative History of Cultural Conflict during World War I (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1987). My interest in comparative history 
resulted in several related studies, three of which are included here. 
The first is "Patterns of German Settlement in the United States and 
Brazil, 1830-1930." Although the two streams of immigration were 
similar in motivation, in social and cultural characteristics, and in the 
kinds of ethnic institutions that were created, the differences in the two 
receiving societies and their physical environments were pronounced. In 
Brazil the German immigrants tended to create more exclusive, concen-
trated, rural colonies in which ethnic language and culture could be more 
readily sustained than in the United States. My purpose here is not to 
pursue some quantitative methodology, but rather to compare systemati-
cally patterns of German settlement in the two countries by contrasting 
time and rate of immigration, causes and sources of emigration, social 
characteristics of immigrants, land laws, occupational structures, and the 
like. The essay was originally prepared for a symposium on comparative 
aspects of the history of migration organized by Rudolph J. Vecoli and 
sponsored by the Immigration History Research Center at the University 
of Minnesota in 1986. 
Comparisons of the United States with Brazil are also at the heart of 
the next essay, "Images of German Immigrants in the United States and 
Brazil, 1890-1918." Here the focus is on how German immigrants were 
perceived in the two countries and on how these images contributed to 
the potential for cultural conflict. There are variations, of course, in the 
stereotypes that developed in the two countries, but the Germans gener-
ally were well received in both. Immigrant perceptions of the host socie-
ties were also important. In Brazil the social distance between the 
immigrants and the host society was greater and the German sense of 
cultural superiority was keener than in the United States; the potential for 
cultural conflict was therefore correspondingly increased. This essay was 
originally prepared for a conference held in Philadelphia in 1983 in 
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commemoration of the tricentennial of German immigration to America; 
it draws extensively upon both Bonds of Loyalty and Germans in Brazil. 
World War I provided the occasion for the release of hidden ten-
sions in both Brazil and the United States. Although the war in Europe 
commenced in 1914, both the United States and Brazil entered the 
conflict only in 1917. In both countries the long period of neutrality 
provided opportunities for the incubation of ethnic tensions. When war 
was finally declared, both countries understandably displayed much 
hostility against the Germans in their respective populations. In Brazil, 
where the German ethnic population posed virtually no threat to national 
security, the reaction was unusually severe compared to the United States 
and was climaxed by two series of anti-German riots in several major 
Brazilian cities. Originally prepared for presentation to the American 
Historical Association in 1982, "The German Ethnic Group in Brazil: 
The Ordeal of World War I" is a highly condensed version of Germans in 
Brazil. 
Two historiographical essays form the final part of the book. The 
first, "Turnerism, Social History, and the Historiography of European 
Ethnic Groups in the United States," interprets the concepts and methods 
that American historians of immigration have used since Frederick Jackson 
Turner opened the field early in our century. My purpose here is to 
suggest, first, that even though Turner's celebrated frontier thesis tended 
to have an inhibiting effect on the practice of immigration history, the 
methodology he espoused still remains useful today. Second, Oscar Handlin 
shifted attention from Turner's environmental forces to the processes of 
social change that emerge from the interaction between immigrants and the 
receiving society. Third, advocates of the social analysis of ethnopolitical 
history laid the foundations for effective comparative analysis in immi-
gration studies. Since then the field has expanded in many directions, but 
many of the best studies continue to pursue questions relating to social 
history. Some have been informed by pluralist concepts, others by inquiry 
into the relationships between ethnicity and class, and at least one synthetic 
interpretation- John Bodnar's Transplanted: A History of Immigrants in 
Urban America (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985)-tran-
scends both developments. Still others focus on international migration 
as a social process and in doing so employ a methodology that, like 
Turner many decades ago, incorporates the environmental variable. The 
essay concludes with a discussion of ethnic history conceived as the 
interaction over time of cultural variables with social and physical 
environments. Although this article evolved out of a paper originally 
prepared for a seminar sponsored by the American Association for State 
and Local History, it has been extensively revised and expanded here. 
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The concluding essay sharpens the focus by emphasizing research 
and publication on the German experience. Written specifically for this 
collection, it offers an interpretation of three centuries of German-American 
history as based on some of the best research conducted in this field 
during the past two decades. The structure of the essay emerges from the 
hard data of immigration-who came when for what reasons, where and 
how they settled, and why. The emphasis is primarily on social factors, 
immigrant institutions, and the relationships of German-Americans to 
national affairs. The essay concludes with commentary on topics that, in 
my view, call for further development. Special attention is given to 
churches of German immigrant origins, the topic with which this collec-
tion of essays begins. 
The last two essays summarize the enormous changes that have 
taken place in the conceptualization and methodology of immigrant 
or ethnic group history in the United States in recent decades. A 
half century ago, this field was dominated by Turnerian thought; pre-
eminent among historians of German immigrants in America was Carl F. 
Wittke, who counted Turner among his professors at Harvard University. 
A mere glance at the body of Wittke's work, but especially at his 
synthesis We Who Built America (1939; rev. ed. Cleveland: Western 
Reserve University Press, 1964), reveals what has transpired. His em-
phasis, even as late as 1964, remained on the contributions of immi-
grant peoples to America's greatness. The immigrants were so numerous 
and so influential, Wittke's title announces, that they could claim that 
America was the fruit of their labors. They had left the confining 
precincts of Europe for the freedom of America's vast frontiers. There 
the immigrants were transformed by environmental forces, both physical 
and social, into buoyant, energetic, innovative, pragmatic, and demo-
cratic Americans. But unlike Turner's frontiersmen, they were not stripped 
entirely of their culture. Much of it remained to contribute to that which 
is quintessentially American. 
In some respects the new immigration history contrasts strongly 
with the old. Whereas the traditional was assimilationist and stressed the 
cultural contributions of the newcomers, the new is more often pluralist 
and focuses on cultural conflict. The old tended to describe individual 
accomplishment and, drawing upon readily available sources such as 
letters, speeches, diaries, and other qualitative sources, was unintentionally 
elitist; the new analyzes the relationships of the ethnic group (i.e., the 
masses of ordinary people of limited skills in communication) with 
elements of the receiving society, including other ethnocultural collectivities. 
It uses quantitative sources, such as census manuscripts, tax lists, city 
directories, voting data, and other public records. Whereas traditional 
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immigration history tended to perceive unity or homogeneity within an 
ethnic group, the new analyzes diversity and internal variation. 
The new historians of immigration have often used the concepts 
and methods of the social sciences. This derives partly from their need to 
analyze social structures as necessary background for understanding 
historical events. Such an approach was uncommon among traditionalist 
historians of an earlier time, who more often sought to explain the causes 
and consequences of specific historical events without fair consideration 
for the social setting. 
In my own case, I discovered early on that extensive reading in 
traditional studies of German-American history provided me with few 
tools to analyze immigrant political behavior in a systematic way on a 
local level or to analyze voter data comparatively. I therefore turned to 
sociologists and political scientists for help; later I was attracted to the 
concepts and methods of cultural geographers and anthropologists. Scholars 
in those disciplines may well abjure any apparent relationship between 
their work and mine. But in adapting some of their ideas I have intended 
to supplement rather than to replace traditional concepts and methods in 
immigration history. 
All of the previously published essays presented here are essentially 
in their original form. I have corrected mistakes that have come to my 
attention and have made minor revisions. In most cases they were pub-
lished in journals not widely distributed or in books with titles that, for 
entirely appropriate reasons, tended to obscure the content of my articles 
and their relationship to immigration history. They are unified by a style 
of thought or point of view that seeks to transcend filiopietism and to 
find the place of German immigrants in the broad context of social 
history. Collected in the format of this book, they may make a contribu-
tion to the history of Germans in the Americas that was not possible 
when published separately. 
NOTES 
1. Two books were especially illuminating to me. They were Oscar 
Handlin, The Uprooted: The Epic Story of the Great Migration that Made the 
American People (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1951), of which a revised and 
enlarged edition was published in 1973 by Little, Brown; and H. Richard Niebuhr, 
The Social Sources of Denominationalism (New York: Henry Holt, 1929). 
2. I refer here especially to Benson's Concept of Jacksonian Democracy: 
New York as a Test Case (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1961) and his extended 
essay "Research Problems in American History," in Common Frontier of the Social 
Sciences, ed. Mirra Komarovsky (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1957), 113-83. 
xxii Germans in the New World 
3. At that time I was able to draw upon Hays's "Social Analysis of 
American Political History," Political Science Quarterly 80 (September 1965): 
373-94, and his "History as Human Behavior," Iowa Journal of History 58 (July 
1960): 193-206. Since then these and other essays have been anthologized in 
American Political History as Social Analysis (Knoxville: Univ. of Tennessee 
Press, 1980. 
4. See especially Hays's essays "New Possibilities for American Political 
History" (1968), pp. 115-16, and "A Systematic Social History" (1971), pp. 
146-50 and passim, both published in American Political History as Social 
Analysis. 
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%e Immigrant Condition as a 1'actor 
Contributing to the Conservatism of the 
Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod 1 
In the twenty-five years that have passed since this article was written, the 
Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod has undergone wrenching changes that have 
intensified its conservative character. This essay is reprinted here because it 
continues to illuminate the sociohistorical sources of contemporary developments 
in the Missouri Synod, even though other variables have increased in importance 
as the immigration phase fades in the collective memory. More than that, however, 
it makes the point, often overlooked by immigration historians, that ethnicity can 
be made to serve the interests of religion, not merely the reverse. In other words, 
religion must be taken seriously and on its own terms. This is not to suggest that 
all immigrant churches have reacted to the processes of assimilation in the same 
way as did the Lutheran Church - Missouri Synod. 
In its present form the article is only slightly modified from what was 
published in 1965. A more extensive revision-one that would treat substance-
would compromise its unity and integrity. For that reason my revision consists 
only of a few corrections, editorial modifications, and the omission of some 
notes, a paragraph, and an occasional phrase. 
Today [i.e., circa 19601 more than one-half century after its immi-
grant phase came to an end, the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod has 
begun to examine its nineteenth-century antecedents with increasing 
interest and sophistication. The kind of corporate self-knowledge that 
may be gained through objective historical inquiry has long been obscured 
by popular, filiopietistic histories and biographies that rarely transcended 
the obvious, and seldom placed the church and its leaders in the sociaL 
economic, politicaL and cultural surroundings from which men and 
institutions are inseparable. A number of professionally competent studies 
have been produced, but generally the Missouri Synod has not given 
systematic or comprehensive study to its history as a religious institution 
of an immigrant people. 
The reasons for this failure are complex but can be explained 
partially by the fact that the founders of the Lutheran Church-Missouri 
Synod (but not its rank-and-file membership) emigrated to America 
primarily for religious reasons and that they raised up walls of isolation, 
intentionally and otherwise, to protect the church in its immigrant 
condition. Its modern conservative character bears witness to the extra-
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ordinary success of their enterprise. It is the purpose of this essay to 
provide a summary view of the church as a nineteenth-century immigrant 
institution by broadly synthesizing the ideas of several historians and 
applying them to the Missouri Synod. Frankly interpretive and frag-
mentary in scope, it is intended to stimulate questions rather than to 
provide answers. 
Among the most perceptive analyses of the hopes and fears, the 
aspirations and disappointments of immigrant peoples is The Uprooted 
by Oscar Handlin. 1 The author follows the typical experiences of immi-
grants who left their European homes, most often in peasant villages, to 
settle in a new, strange, and often bewildering land. Handlin shows how 
attitudes and thought patterns contributed to religious rigidity, and how 
many immigrants became much more conservative than did their fellows 
who remained in Europe. 
According to this interpretation, religion became the chief support to 
the newcomers as they were forced to adjust to the new circumstances in 
America, as they struggled to save something of the old, familiar ways. Cut 
loose from the moorings of peasant life, the immigrants found that religion 
alone seemed to survive the transfer to the United States. Their problem 
was to reconstruct their way of religious life in the new environment. 
Accustomed to the unquestioned status of established churches with their 
universality, hierarchy, old buildings, ancient rituals and traditions, they 
found the diversity of religious affiliations and the accompanying compe-
tition difficult to understand. There was also the disturbingly unfamiliar 
and oppressive problem of financial support. The latitudinarianism of 
American religious life also represented a threat to the establishment of the 
immigrant church. Americans seemed to believe that salvation was a 
matter of ethical conduct, that any faith or none at all might lead to it. 
But to many an immigrant, salvation was the reward of faith and suffering, 
not of good behavior. Hence the newcomer felt that religious institutions 
had to be protected from this and other debilitating American notions. 
The only way to guarantee the survival of the immigrant church lay in a 
complete transfer of the old religious system to the New World, not merely 
in theology, but in language and customs as well. Thus the immigrant 
condition led to an aggressive defense of the old pattern, an intolerance of 
change, and a conservatism more firm than that of the homeland. 2 
Among the major American Protestant denominations, the Lutheran 
church is clearly a product of these general circumstances. Despite an 
essential uniformity in doctrine, the several groups emigrating from 
regions where the Lutheran church was established, whether Germany, 
Sweden, Norway, or Denmark, all insisted upon their own church 
organizations. As H. Richard Niebuhr pointed out in his study of 
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denominationalism, each group was dissatisfied with the varieties of 
Lutheranism that had preceded it, diluted, as they seemed to be, with 
American ideas and attitudes. 3 
Of the major divisions remaining in American Lutheranism today, 
the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod is one of the most conservative 
and perhaps the most dynamic. To what extent did the immigrant condi-
tion contribute to the indelible stamp of conservatism that the church 
acquired during its formative period in the nineteenth century and has 
carried to the present day? 
The origins of the Missouri Synod are inextricably bound up with 
the Saxon Germans, numbering more than six hundred, who immigrated 
as a colony to Missouri via New Orleans in 1839. In contrast to the vast 
majority of German immigrants, these Saxons left the Old World for the 
New largely for religious reasons rather than for economic ones. They 
were part of the "Old Lutheran" protest against the forced union of 
Lutheran and Reformed congregations in the state church of Saxony. 
Having endured governmental persecution for their nonconformity, they 
followed the advice of their spiritual guide, Martin Stephan, to pool their 
resources for a colonization venture in America. 
The social characteristics of the group are striking. Fully 45 percent 
of the total were female; average age was twenty-five. The group included 
eight pastors, eleven candidates for the ministry, five teachers, nine 
merchants, a lawyer, a doctor of medicine, the curator of the Saxon state 
archives, and other professional persons. A mere 14 percent could be 
classified as peasants, while 61 percent were craftsmen or mechanics. The 
common treasury was the equivalent of more than $80,000. 4 Not a band 
of impoverished peasants fleeing economic constrictions, these Saxons 
were the products of urban, middle-class culture, and their highly edu-
cated leaders were committed to theological principles much more rigid 
and orthodox than those of the state church from which they fled. 
Shortly after the Saxons arrived in St. Louis and established their 
main colony in rural Perry County, the community was torn by strife. 
Stephan had succeeded in creating an episcopacy with himself as bishop. 
Shortly thereafter his world crashed about him as he was accused of 
adultery. Quickly deprived of his office, Stephan was exiled from the 
settlement and transported across the Mississippi River to Illinois. 
Meanwhile, the Saxons became thoroughly distressed over fear that the 
colony, having banished its bishop, was now without a religious bond-
that in the sight of God the group no longer constituted a part of the 
Kingdom of Grace. Out of this crisis emerged the commanding figure of 
C. F. W. Walther, who advanced congregationalism as a new principle 
from which the status of the Saxons within the Christian church could be 
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rationalized. Under Walther, who came to dominate the group by virtue 
of his exceptional ability and personality, the Saxons became totally 
committed to a congregational polity, with no small results for their 
continued religious conservatism.5 
Walther and his followers then investigated existing Lutheran synods, 
hoping to find an organization with which they might affiliate. The older 
groups, they felt, were tainted with liberalism and rationalism. Of the 
synods that were strongly German in character, only the Ohio Synod 
operated in the West. But it also was suspect because it was an outgrowth 
of the older, unionistic Pennsylvania Ministerium. Walther then decided 
to publish a church paper, Der Lutheraner, which he dedicated to the 
principles of conservative Lutheranism and distributed widely among 
German Lutheran immigrants throughout the country. He called for the 
creation of a new Lutheran synod founded on confessional and congrega-
tional principles. This was accomplished in 1847 when the German 
Lutheran Synod of Missouri, Ohio, and Other States was organized in 
Chicago, with Walther as its first president. 
According to Handlin, the peasants' religion was the one pillar that 
remained steadfast in support of their crumbling house of culture. In the 
case of the founders of the Missouri Synod, it seems that the opposite was 
true-German culture with all its trappings was used to perpetuate the 
theological conservatism. In this case, to paraphrase Richard Niebuhr, 
religion supplied the energy, the goal, and the motive of the movement 
whereas cultural factors supplied the occasion and determined the form 
taken by the religious dynamic. 
Thus for the confessional German Lutheran immigrant "the faith of 
the church [was] its greatest treasure and raison d'iUre; contamination 
of that faith [was] the church's greatest pitfall."6 The Lutheran leaders 
believed, therefore, that every effort had to be made to preserve doctrinal 
purity in the alien and hostile American environment. Religious iso-
lation was imperative; social and cultural isolation would also contribute 
mightily to the preservation of the faith. 
Fundamental to such a program of isolationism was the develop-
ment of an educational system. In the same year that the Saxons arrived 
in Missouri, they took steps to found a preparatory school that would 
serve to train future pastors. By 1900 the Missourians maintained two 
large seminaries and a half dozen preparatory schools modeled on the 
German Gymnasium. In addition, two colleges were founded to guaran-
tee a supply of teachers for the parochial schools that the synod urged 
every local congregation to maintain. These elementary schools in turn 
supplied students for the preparatory schools, thus completing the circle. 
With this closed system the synod defended itself against the greatest 
- , 
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threat to its religious isolationism. Its colleges and seminaries flourished 
in a world apart from the mainstream of American Protestant Christianity. 
Gradually young Sraduates, indoctrinated into a theological synthesis 
formulated by Luther and crystalized by Walther, replaced their elders in 
positions of leadership, untouched by revivalism, rationalism, the Social 
Gospet or whatever else characterized the religious environment at a 
given moment. 
It is no doubt true that when the Missourians established their schools 
they were also expressing a sense of cultural superiority common to many 
German immigrants of the nineteenth century. Remembering their own 
training in the schools and universities of Germany, many of the church's 
leaders felt contempt for what passed for public education in the Midwest 
at that time. Stilt they were more interested in perpetuating a religious 
pattern than a cultural one. 7 For a time it was a constitutional provision of 
the synod that a congregation's admission to membership was conditioned 
upon the establishment and maintenance of a parish school. Walther reveals 
the importance he placed on them: "God grant that our German Lutheran 
Church may retain the gem, its parochial school! For most assuredly, 
humanly speaking, above everything else, the future of our church in 
America is dependent upon it. ... The further careful fostering of our 
parochial schools is and wi,!l remain, after the public ministry, the principal 
'means of our existence and continuance."8 
Another weapon used to ward off Americanization was the Ger-
man language. In this the Missouri Synod was no different from other 
German religious groups. The language of the schools, the theological 
source books, and the worship services was always German. Here cul-
tural waters ran deep. Even those Germans who -were not religiously 
inclined often harbored a great love for Luther's translation of the Bible 
and for their incomparable heritage of chorales.9 Such sentiments natu-
rally slowed the process of Americanization. The entrenchment of the 
native tongue was abetted also by extreme congregationalism, a polity 
that facilitated organization along ethnic lines. 
By the end of the nineteenth century English still had not made 
many inroads. The clerical prejudice against it remained strong; many 
pastors feared that genuine Lutheranism could not thrive in an English-
speaking congregation. Here and there such parishes had been founded in 
the face of opposition by prominent synodical leaders, who publicly 
declared such doings dangerous. This hostility was augmented by the fact 
that English-speaking congregations saw no need for parochial schools 
and did not establish them.1° 
Given the synod's educational system and the role of the German 
language, the need for a denominational publishing house became obvious. 
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Textbooks, theological journals, publications for the laity, hymnbooks, 
and other worship materials, all in German, were needed to preserve 
immunity against the latitudinarianism and liberalism of American 
Christianity. By 1869 the synodical printing establishment was a reality; 
it went on to become a leader among religious publishers. 
To many of the nineteenth-century German immigrants, the church's 
unusual emphasis on theological creed was not of great importance. A'fo _ 
Marcus Hansen has pointed out, "The important thing was a place 
existed where the mother tongue was spoken, where one's compatriots 
gathered from miles around, where customs were familiar."ll Around the 
nucleus of the congregation developed musical organizations, social groups, 
insurance funds, and even cooperative merchandising agencies. Moreover, 
the average layman was willing to surrender to the pastor's preeminence 
in theological matters, both in dogma and in practice, and to follow his 
leadership. Hence, even though all power was theoretically vested in the 
congregation of laymen, it was actually the clergy who determined the 
conservative pattern of the church. 
Unlike the European state church system, the American concept of 
the separation of church and state fostered a spirit of competition among 
the churches, and competition promoted particularity. In Europe the 
established churches enjoyed a virtual monopoly; in the United States 
they had to compete actively for the loyalty of members and for their 
position in the new and alien society. This generated a high degree of 
self-consciousness and emphasized the peculiar characteristics of each 
denomination. Agreements with competitors were minimized, disagree-
ments stressed.12 For this reason the history of the Lutheran church in 
America, especially when recounted by its own members, appears to be 
little more than one dogmatic dispute after another. Because of its origins 
and early history, the Missouri Synod was always one of the most 
vigorous and uncompromising of the disputants. Walther always adhered 
strictly to his principle-"No Union without Unity" -no partnership 
without fellowship in principle. Not regarded as quibbling or unwarranted 
polemic, theological warfare was believed to contribute to the strength of 
the church, its inner unity, and its ministry,13 With other Lutherans there 
was at least communication; they were seeking others of like mind to do 
battle against the enemies of the true faith. But other denominations were 
quite beyond the pale of fellowship; indeed, they were usually the enemy. 
The self-imposed separation of Lutheranism from other branches of 
Christianity may be observed in what it opposed. With its historic 
emphasis on sola fide, the Lutheran church reacted negatively to the 
moralism common to American Protestantism. The Puritan heritage, 
which tended to make religion a matter of right behavior, was manifested 
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in Sabbatarianism, temperance movements, and other reformist tendencies, 
all of which had little appeal for the German Lutheran immigrant. 
Rationalism, which pervaded the older Protestant denominations, was 
likewise repellent. This, after all, is what many of the synod's founding 
fathers had fled from in Germany. 
But there was also a strong antiritualist tendency. Some synodical 
leaders believed that liturgical practices made undesirable sensory appeals; 
this, they argued, helped to account for the prominence of Roman Catholi-
cism among false churches. At the same time, emotionalism was espe-
cially repugnant to the immigrant German Lutheran pastor, for it was the 
Methodist frontier missionary, his chief competitor for the immigrant, 
who made extensive use of revivalist techniques. The result was that 
Missouri Synod Lutheranism was often spare, austere, and sternly 
intellectual. 
The confessional Lutheran also placed the Masonic orders, the Odd 
Fellows, and other lodges and secret societies within the religious context. 
Opposition to these organizations unquestionably stemmed from theo-
logical concerns, yet the Missourians recognized that the appeal of the 
lodges was essentially social and economic. The solution was therefore to 
fight fire with fire. As early as 1853 an earnest plea was made to all 
synod members and congregations to establish Christian indigent and 
disability benefit plans, thereby neutralizing the "ever-increasing grasping 
seduction of the secret societies."14 
Moving from the religious environment to the larger sphere of 
American society, it becomes apparent that here too the German immi-
grant church had experiences that tended to intensify its isolationism. 
Caught up in the complex pattern of conflict between native and foreign 
groups, the churches often received the brunt of chauvinist fears and 
suspicions. As Richard Niebuhr expressed it, "The newcomers were mostly 
poor, they were often illiterate, sometimes thriftless, always different in 
language and customs."lS Hostility was a natural result as the sense of 
superiority possessed by the native-born population found opportunity 
for expression. Assertion by one group evoked a corresponding self-
assertion in the other, and ultimately a more deeply rooted sense of 
solidarity and self-consciousness. The Saxons in Missouri felt a strong 
nativist disapproval after they arrived in St. Louis.16 The Know Nothing 
uproar of the 1850s was essentially an anti-immigrant movement. 
In the face of such tensions the clergy were often anxious to remove 
the sources of friction. Many immigrants led undisciplined lives in the 
free, individualistic society of the United States. The restraints of family 
and tradition common to village life in Europe were no longer binding, 
and the immigrants discovered that their mores by no means coincided 
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with those of Puritan America. Thus when the first missionary to an 
immigrant group arrived in his new community, he automatically found 
himself in the vanguard of a reform movement, a clean-up campaign. 
Irrespective of his past personal inclinations, he 'ras more or less forced 
by circumstances to forbid pastimes and pleasures among his parishioners 
that the traditions of his early theological traiJ,1ing had condoned. I7 
Among these were the beer drinking and dancing that were common to 
wedding festivities, picnics, and other occasions. Usually the stand taken 
by the church in these matters was governed by local conditions, although 
in 1875 one district convention of the Missouri Synod heard a set of 
formal propositions against operating and visiting saloons. I8 
This tendency to shift toward a sterner conservatism in practice was 
intensified by the characteristics of the clergymen themselves. A shortage 
of pastors was perennial, and often German-American communities 
appealed to the mother country for men to counterbalance the frequent 
tendency toward intemperance and all sorts of social misery. But the state 
churches of Europe were unable to respond. If help was to come it had to 
be undertaken by benevolent associations and individuals. Pastors who 
were prepared to offer themselves for service in the difficult, primitive 
conditions of the American West tended to be men of greater zeal and 
standards of conduct than were their fellows who remained within the 
comfortable security of a state church.19 In the case of the German 
Lutheran synods, this tendency is particularly evident in the large num-
ber of men sent to America by Wilhelm Loehe of Neuendettelsau and 
after 1870 by Friedrich Brunn of Steeden.20 
Sometimes the government was added to the Lutheran list of hostile 
groups or agencies. This could flow from any legislation that might affect 
the church negatively. The Missouri Synod was particularly sensitive 
about its parochial schools. When, for example, the Wisconsin legislature 
enacted a law requiring written reports on attendance, enrollment, 
curriculum, and language of instruction to be submitted annually to the 
district superintendent of schools, the Lutheran outcry was unrestrained. 
German Lutherans were never known for active participation in political 
affairs, yet their response to this threat included a mobilization of public 
opinion and of votes so thorough that the Republican party, which had 
sponsored the measure, was thoroughly beaten in the subsequent election 
of 1890. The offending law was thereupon repealed. 
Contacts of still another variety tended to emphasize the particu-
larity and conservatism of the German Lutherans. These were with the 
so-called Forty-eighters, for whose radical politics, freethinking religion, 
'and nationalist sentiments they had no sympathy whatever. Although 
there was little ground for their fears, the church fathers imagined their 
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own positions of leadership in the German-American community men-
aced by these dynamic, culture-conscious refugees of the revolutions of 
1848.21 
Thus no matter which way he turned, the German Lutheran immi-
grant leader saw potential hostility and harassment. He saw it in fellow 
Germans such as the Forty-eighters, in fellow Lutherans such as clergy of 
the Ohio Synod, in fellow Protestants such as the Methodists, and in 
fellow Christians such as the Catholics; he saw it in lodges and secret 
societies, in the native-born American population, and sometimes even in 
the government. Such threats, real or imaginary, produced a self-
consciousness of high intensity. Only an uncompromising conservatism, 
it was believed, could possibly preserve the religious identity of the 
group. Every possible social, cultural, and theological weapon was to be 
wielded in the battle for survival. 
As the nineteenth century drew to a close, the size and character of 
the immigration from Germany underwent a significant change. The 
numbers were decreasing and few of the later arrivals were attracted by 
"Missourianism." This meant that growth from this source virtually 
ceased, and as it did, the church's fifty-year history as an immigrant 
institution gradually terminated. The process of Americanization, so 
long delayed, began to transform the external features of the synod, even 
as its obvious German traits faded. 
Yet its heart remained untouched. The church owed its origins to 
theological conservatism; its half-century of experience as an immigrant 
institution enhanced this tendency. Today, more than another half cen-
tury later, the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod continues to be charac-
terized by its historic religious isolationism, but it is now coupled with 
activity totally adapted to the American environment. 
EPILOGUE 
In 1969, four years after this essay was published, the historical course of 
the Lutheran Church - Missouri Synod was altered fundamentally by the election 
of Jacob A. O. Preus as its president. For at least three decades the leadership of 
the synod had been vested in men of moderate temperament who were nonethe-
less thoroughgoing theological conservatives. But they recognized that the synod 
had been transformed during the preceding half century from an immigrant 
institution into an American Protestant denomination. They modernized the 
church as an institution and they made certain limited accommodations in the 
direction of communication and cooperation with other Lutheran bodies. 
Not surprisingly, this gradual movement evoked cries of anguish, begin-
ning in the late 1930s, from ultraconservative clergymen who fervently believed 
that the adherence of the Missouri Synod to its traditional doctrinal positions 
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was being abandoned by its leaders. Stiffened by a mindset that derives from 
convictions of infallibility, the synod's internal critics sustained a drum-fire 
attack, largely by means of privately financed periodicals, on the synodical 
leadership, its boards, and theologians for what they understood to be a 
betrayal of God's Truth. They were uncompromising apologists for a seventeenth-
century theology, tempered in the nineteenth century in the American forge 
of the immigrant condition and hammered into shapeG\ by C. F. W. Walther 
and Franz Pieper, among others. A revered theologian of great power, Pieper 
had served the synod either as president or as its leading dogmatician at 
Concordia Seminary in St. Lo~is from 1887 (when C. F. W. Walther died) 
to his own death in 1931. 
The climax of this movement came in 1969 when the ultraconservatives 
engineered the election of Jacob A. O. Preus, a young, attractive clergyman of 
Norwegian antecedents. In my view, Preus's election represents the triumph of the 
siege mentality I have described as rooted in immigrant experience. But the event 
must not be divorced from national affairs. Preus, like Richard M. Nixon, who 
took office in the same year, owed his election in part to the keen distress felt at 
that time by conservatives of all kinds, political and otherwise, as they watched 
American students, stimulated by racial injustices and the tragedies wrought by 
the Vietnam War, indulge themselves in their usually well-intentioned but none-
theless destructive excesses. 
A second major event in the synod's traditionalist revolution occurred in 
1974. To Preus and his supporters, the fountainhead of theological error was to 
be found in the faculty of Concordia Seminary, then presided over by John 
Tietjen, a moderate. In the view of the ultraconservatives, Tietjen was protecting 
teachers of false doctrine and he, like them, had to be removed from office. After 
many months of maneuvering, Tietjen was suspended from his office in January. 
His dismissal was followed by a strike of students and a majority of the faculty. In 
an act of quintessential folly, they symbolized their protest by marching off 
campus, leaving the institution in the hands of a minority of conservative 
professors eager to follow the directives of a conservative seminary board. The 
champions of tradition had won the field without having to convict a single 
professor of heresy. 
Since that time the Lutheran Church - Missouri Synod has been unswerving 
in its reactionary course. It has suffered a considerable brain drain, as many men 
and women of talent in the institutional structures of the synod have sought more 
congenial environments elsewhere. True academic freedom does not exist in its 
colleges and seminaries. The synod has endured considerable financial problems, 
although it is arguable whether they are due to doctrinal strife. Jacob Preus has 
retired from the synodical presidency; he has been succeeded by Ralph Bohlmann, 
a conservative professor who had replaced John Tietjen as president of Concordia 
Seminary. In short, the history of the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod since 
1965 seems to validate the notion that its history as an immigrant institution, 
coupled with the unique character of its leadership from Stephan and the Saxons 
to Preus and the traditionalists, helps to explain its enduring conservatism. 
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It is a curious fact that even though America is a nation of immigrants, 
the development and influence of non-English-speaking immigrant groups 
and their institutions have been largely ignored in our national and state 
histories. Through the decades, the number of newcomers has been immense 
and their political and sociocultural impact great. In Nebraska, for example, 
approximately forty percent of the total population in 1910 was of foreign 
stock.1 Even though these people participated intelligently and extensively 
in the political and economic affairs of the state, their group goals, interests, 
and institutions remain unassessed and frequently misunderstood. 
Ever since the frontier of settlement swept across the Great Plains, 
the largest single ethnic group in Nebraska has been German. In 1910 
approximately 20 percent of the state's inhabitants, or about one-half of 
all the foreign-born and their children, were of German origin. Although 
the largest proportion of them lived in rural areas, especially in the 
northeastern part of the state, significant numbers were also found in 
Omaha, Lincoln, and in smaller cities such as Grand Island, Columbus, 
Norfolk, and Nebraska City.2 In their adjustment to the new and unfamil-
iar American way of life, German immigrants, like other ethnic groups, 
were drawn together by their common language, heritage, and problems. 
Gradually they became aware of themselves as a cultural minority with a 
surprising measure of potential power in economic, political, and socio-
cultural matters. 
Thus the immigrants went about building a society of their own 
within American society. Its strength was drawn largely from the number 
and effectiveness of the institutions, both formal and informal, that they 
created. In the rural areas, the churches were easily the most important. 
In the cities, however, the Germans successfully established a variety of 
social, cultural, economic, and political organizations.3 One of the most 
important of these, one which effectively combined political and cultural 
goals, was the German-American Alliance of Nebraska, founded in 1910 
as a branch of the National German-American Alliance. Representing as 
many as one hundred lodges, singing societies, and other organizations, 
the Nebraska Alliance sought valiantly to unify the German community 
in the state and to speak for it, particularly in politics. 
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It was not an easy task. Despite the centripetal force of language 
and culture, the Germans were not at all as solid a block as native 
Americans perceived them to be. Roman Catholics in particular formed a 
subgroup with their own loyalties, organizations, and publications. 
Moreover, the Lutherans and other Protestant groups each formed their 
separate camps. Taken together, these three elements, which were strongest 
in rural areas, became known as Kirchendeutsche. They were commonly 
hostile, not only to each other, but to a fourth group, the so-called 
Vereinsdeutsche, whose associations were primarily with societies and 
clubs. Usually urban dwellers, the latter customarily drew heavily on 
German immigrants who were culturally rather than religiously oriented. 4 
"Possessed by an almost missionary eagerness to propagate and spread 
their particular Weltanschauung/' Heinz Kloss has observed, "[ they] 
looked upon Americans as spiritually dormant worshippers of the golden 
calf. They looked upon themselves and others of German stock as the 
leaven that would bring about the spiritual awakening and maturing of 
the Yankee loaf."s Each of the groups tended to be suspicious of the 
others and cooperation was rarely effected among them. 
The founders of the German-American Alliance of Nebraska were 
largely from the liberal, more secularly minded segment of the German 
community. Prominent among them were Dr. Hermann Gerhard of 
Lincoln, a propagandist and founder of a German colony in Texas; 
Christian A. Sommer of Lincoln, advertising manager of the Lincoln 
Freie Presse and member of the Unitarian church; Fred Volpp of Scribner, 
a banker, Democratic state senator, and member of several lodges; John 
Mattes, Jr., of Nebraska City, a long-time Democratic member of the 
state legislature who was associated with both brewing interests and the 
German-language press; and Carl Rohde of Columbus, a Republican, a 
Lutheran, and a member of several lodges who was engaged in the liquor 
business. 6 But the organizing genius and guiding spirit of the Nebraska 
Alliance was its first and only president, Valentin J. Peter of Omaha. 
Born in Bavaria in 1875, Val Peter came to America at fourteen 
years of age. Very early in life he became associated with the German-
American newspaper business in Peoria and Rock Island, Illinois. In 1907 
he moved to Nebraska, became the publisher and editor of the Omaha 
Tribune, consolidated it with several other German-language newspapers 
of the state, and converted it into a widely circulated and influential 
daily. A member of the Elks and a variety of German social and benevo-
lent organizations, Peter was also a devoted member of the Roman 
Catholic church? The German-American Alliance of Nebraska, largely a 
product of his determined efforts, naturally was given extensive publicity 
in his newspaper. 
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The bond between the Nebraska organization and its parent, the 
National German-American Alliance, was close. Founded in 1901 in 
Philadelphia by Dr. Charles J. Hexamer, the Nationalbund, as it was 
often called, was originally established to further cultural objectives. It 
was part of a surge in organizational strength and expansion that charac-
terized the German ethnic community in America during the two or three 
decades preceding World War 1. Very quickly, however, the national 
organization acquired a reputation as being interested in little else than 
opposition to the prohibition movement. It was transformed into an 
ethnically based counterorganization to the Anti-Saloon League. When 
prohibition threatened a certain state or locality, the National Alliance 
would take steps to organize state and local branches, which in turn 
became politically active, attempting to form and lead public opinion, 
approving candidates for public offices, and marshalling "the German 
vote" in behalf of the antiprohibition cause.S 
So it was also in Nebraska, where prohibition had a venerable 
history as a political issue. Throughout the 1880s and climaxing in the 
election of 1890 when a prohibition amendment to the state constitution 
appeared on the ballot prohibition had been a divisive force, chiefly on 
an ethnoreligious basis.9 The basic regulatory law was still the Slocumb 
Act passed in 1881, which combined local option with high license fees. 
Although the enemies of prohibition had fought the Slocumb law bitterly 
when it was enacted, they were now its champions, even though more 
than half the state had voted itself dry by 1909.10 Having lain dormant as 
a major political issue since its defeat in 1890, prohibition was reintroduced 
in 1907 during the progressive administration of Republican Governor 
George L. Sheldon, who unsuccessfully pushed for a county option law 
to replace the local option provision of the Slocumb Act. By shifting the 
option from incorporated cities and villages to the county, prohibition 
was presumably made easier because rural voters could participate in 
making the decision. Sheldon's support for county option unquestion-
ably contributed to his defeat in 1908 by the Democratic candidate, 
Ashton C. Shallenberger, who enjoyed widespread support among Ger-
man and Bohemian voters,11 
During Shallenberger's administration, two developments served to 
complicate the situation for the Democrats. First, Governor Shallenberger 
chose to sign a bill that forbade the sale of alcoholic beverages after eight 
0' clock in the evening. Having thereby alienated his German support, he 
subsequently declared himself to be in favor of a county option bill,12 
The second major development was that prohibition gained an influential 
adherent in the person of William Jennings Bryan, who had just failed for 
the third time to win the presidency of the United States. For two decades 
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Bryan had benefited from German support even though he had always 
been personally dry. Now, however, he suddenly became "the arch enemy 
of das Deutschtum. "13 In the past there had never been much question 
about where the Democratic party in Nebraska stood on the question of 
prohibition. But with the defection of Shallenberger and Bryan, the 
historic identification of the Democracy with "personal liberty" and as 
the friend of the immigrant was placed in jeopardy. By May 1910, it was 
obvious to the leaders of the German community that immediate and 
drastic steps had to be taken if their group interests were to be preserved. 
The result was a remarkable feat of organization, achieved in time for the 
primary election in August and the general election in November 1910. 
During those months, the Nebraska branch of the National· German-
American Alliance was conceived, born, and put to work. 
Correspondence between Val Peter and Dr. Hexamer of the National-
bund ensued. At Peter's request, Hexamer invited the Omaha Plattdeutscher 
Verein to assume leadership in the organization of a state branch,14 The 
first step was to create an alliance of the German societies of Omaha and 
its vicinity. This was accomplished on May 29, 1910, when Peter was 
chosen president of the new Centralsverband of Omaha. This organization, 
in turn, passed a resolution calling for the founding of a statewide 
alliance during the great German music festival that was scheduled for 
the latter part of July,15 Thus at each step the base for the state alliance 
was broadened. As thousands of German citizens of Nebraska converged 
upon Omaha for the Sangerfest, they would be exposed to the goals and 
objectives of the German-American Alliance. More than that, the plan 
permitted distinctly political goals to be cloaked in German culture,16 
While the music festival dominated the scene in Omaha and won 
effusive praise in the English-language press,17 the German-American 
Alliance of Nebraska was quietly organized on July 20, 1910. One 
hundred and fourteen delegates representing fifty-four organizations were 
present. Val Peter was duly elected president, although there was some 
sentiment in favor of Dr. Hermann Gerhard of Lincoln, who then became 
first vice president. John Mattes was chosen corresponding secretary, and 
Sen. Fred Volpp became treasurer,18 With the exception of Gerhard, each 
held his office throughout the life of the Nebraska Alliance. 
As an active churchman, Peter was interested in bringing the 
Kirchendeutsche also into the fold. Despite repeated invitations, however, 
the churches tended to keep their distance. No more than two or three 
church organizations participated. On the other hand, the presence of the 
Bier Brauer Unterstiitzungsverein19 was perhaps more significant. Gen-
erally the membership of the Nebraska Alliance came from culturally 
oriented societies, singing groups, and farmer organizations. Approximately 
18 Germans in the New World 
one-third of the membership came from German lodges affiliated with the 
Order of the Sons of Hermann. The close bond between the two is revealed 
by the fact that several of the new officers of the Nebraska Alliance were 
also leaders in the state organization of the Sons of Hermann.20 
After adopting several resolutions, including one that severely 
condemned county option and prohibition generally, the Alliance swung 
into action.21 A mere three weeks separated the organizational meeting 
from the primary election slated for August 16,1910. Every effort had to 
be made to prevent Governor Shallenberger's renomination and to secure 
the election of Mayor James C. Dahlman of Omaha as the Democratic 
candidate for governor. Dahlman was as wet a candidate as the Demo-
crats had ever had, and as the son of German immigrants, he was 
especially attractive to the Alliance.22 United States Representative Gil-
bert Hitchcock, the publisher of the Omaha World-Herald, also received 
enthusiastic endorsement. As a candidate for the United States Senate, 
Hitchcock was much preferred over Bryan's candidate, Richard Metcalfe. 
Both Dahlman and Hitchcock wooed the German vote. While Dahlman 
declared himself to be "heart and soul against fanaticism and nativism 
(Fremdenhasz)," Hitchcock made much of his two years in Germany as a 
student and insisted that he had always opposed prohibition and county 
option.23 Meanwhile, the Nebraska Alliance screened and approved other 
candidates for lesser offices on the basis of their stand on county option. 
The open primary, which Nebraska had adopted in 1909, was 
another avenue for political action by the Alliance. Since the law permit-
ted a voter to cast his ballot for any candidate of any party, the executive 
board explained to German voters in a widely distributed statement how 
it was possible for "liberal" Republicans to fight the fanatics in their own 
party by voting for Dahlman and Hitchcock.24 A great migration of wet 
Republicans occurred on election day, especially in Omaha, with the 
result that Mayor Dahlman successfully, although narrowly, defeated 
Governor Shallenberger for the Democratic nomination.25 
During the' next three months, the Nebraska Alliance employed a 
variety of tactics to achieve its political goals. It exploited German Day 
festivities in Lincoln, set for October 6 and 7, 1910, by scheduling its first 
annual convention to meet·at the same time and place. It supplied visitors 
at the festival with "foaming liquid refreshments" as well as badges 
picturing Abraham Lincoln and James C. Dahlman side by side. The 
resolutions passed by the convention were endlessly reprinted in the 
German-language press. The necessity of German unity and cooperation 
was repeatedly emphasized in order to advance the German spirit and 
German liberty and to frustrate xenophobic intolerance and puritanical 
fanaticism. A headquarters for political action was set up in Omaha. 
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Several prominent members of the organization, including John Mattes 
and Otto Leptin, the second vice president, worked full time as campaigners, 
agitators, and organizers of local alliances in the smaller cities of the 
state. German Day festivals were organized in other communities, including 
Falls City and Hastings. Circulars in both the German and English 
languages were printed and distributed which explained the position of 
the Alliance and which endorsed candidates of either party who were 
acceptable to the Alliance. Efforts were also made to enlist the support 
of other ethnic groups, notably the Czechs, by organizing separate 
branches for them in the Personal Liberty League. Participation in the 
Alliance's activities by the German churches and pastors was repeatedly 
encouraged. Val Peter even proposed the creation of German citizens' 
clubs in every German settlement, especially where the local churches 
refused to give official support to Alliance policies. 26 
The results of the election of 1910 provided a temporary respite for 
the German-American Alliance in Nebraska. A majority of Democrats 
and/or opponents of county option were elected to the state legislature. 
Gilbert Hitchcock won the preferential vote for United States senator. But 
"Mayor Jim" Dahlman went down in defeat, a victim, perhaps, of his 
opponents' efforts to identify him as the tool of the liquor interests. 
To say that "the German vote floated on an ocean of beer/' as some 
have observed, or to describe the Democratic campaign of 1910 as "an 
assault upon the very life of our state [by] a great debauching and 
o'erweening brewery trust/' as the new Republican governor, Chester H. 
Aldrich, declared in his inaugural address, is to misunderstand the immi-
grant mind in politics. 27 Prohibition was more than an issue to most 
German voters. It was the political symbol of a general clash of cultures 
that confronted many immigrants as they adjusted to American society. 
Prohibition was cut from the same cloth as Sabbatarian legislation, 
governmental control of German parochial schools, objections to German-
language instruction in public schools, women's suffrage, initiative, 
referendum, or any other device that promised to smooth the path for 
xenophobic legislation under the aegis of reform. 28 The native American 
had little understanding of the importance that the mother tongue and 
mother culture had for immigrant psychology. Thus Governor Aldrich 
could dismiss "personal liberty" as a "specious and deceptive" ploy of the 
beer barons. But it mattered little to a German Lutheran pastor, who was 
possibly an abstainer himselt how much of Dahlman's campaign fund 
came from the breweries. The important thing for him was that prohibi-
tion was a type of legislation that threatened the Ger~an life-style and 
value system. His parish schoot he had ample reason to suspect could be 
next on the nativistic reformer's list. 
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Shortly after the new legislature convened in January 1911, a bill 
was introduced by Rep. O. H. Moody of Ansley, a Republican, that 
specified that every child of school age was required to attend a public 
school at least three months of every year unless he attended a private or 
parochial school in which instruction was in English. At the same time, 
the bill required parochial and private schools to keep records of atten-
dance and to supply monthly reports to the county superintendents of 
schools. Represented by John Mattes, the German-American Alliance 
lobbied effectively against the bill. Moreover, officials of the Lutheran 
and Catholic churches testified against it at an open hearing. In the end, 
the legislative committee to which the bill had been assigned voted 
almost unanimously to table it. 29 For the moment the threat had passed; 
but it reminded Germans of the unsuccessful attack on their schools in 
1890, and it presaged the bitter fight of the post-World War I era when 
defenders of parochial school education went the full route to the United 
States Supreme Court to protect their rights.3D 
In 1912 the political activity of the German-American Alliance in 
Nebraska was relaxed compared to the contest of two years earlier. It 
gave full support to the gubernatorial candidacy of Democrat John 
Morehead, partially because his opponent, the Republican incumbent 
Chester H. Aldrich, was a leader of the "fanatical faction" of his party, as 
Val Peter described it. The initiative and referendum had been endorsed 
by both parties and therefore was sure to become law. The Germans were 
highly suspicious of these measures because they fully expected the 
prohibitionists to convert them into powerful weapons of intolerance.31 
According to Val Peter, the only recourse was a systematic program of 
political education. If local Vereine would conduct seminars for the 
discussion of issues and voting, he asserted, the threat posed by the 
initiative and referendum could be met. 32 When the ballots were counted 
in 1912, John Morehead was victorious. Moreover, friends of "personal 
liberty," mostly Democrats, were in control of both houses of the 
legislature.33 
Although politics dominated the first years of the Nebraska Alliance, 
its founders had a much broader conception of what its activities ought 
to have been. They were aggressively conscious of their cultural heritage, 
and they wished to preserve it and promulgate it in dynamic ways. At the 
same time, they were totally loyal to America and its political institutions. 
They wished to assist and to lead their fellow German-Americans to 
higher levels of citizenship and civic responsibility.34 Convinced that 
their maintenance of German language and culture was not incompatible 
with being thoroughly American in outlook, they epitomized their senti-
ments in the expression "Germania our Mother, Columbia our Bride."35 
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It was not necessary, they believed, for a man to forsake his mother in 
order to be loyal to his bride. 
The Alliance pursued a variety of projects that were not directly 
related to politics. Among these was a sustained effort in behalf of 
forestation in the Sand Hills of Nebraska. Originally motivated by a 
desire to attract German immigrants to settle on unsold school lands, the 
project was sparked by Carl Rohde of Columbus. Rohde and his commit-
tee persuaded the legislature to pass a resolution authorizing the gover-
nor to appoint a commission to investigate the feasibility of forestation 
and to submit a comprehensive plan of action to the legislature.36 Rohde 
was subsequently appointed chairman of the commission. Hampered by 
the legislature's failure to appropriate funds, the commission relied on the 
financial assistance of the Alliance. Finally, when the commission submit-
ted its plan in 1917, the legislature was no longer interested. The exigen-
cies of war caused the project to fade and die.37 
Perhaps the most active arm of the Nebraska Alliance was its 
school committee, headed by Christian A. Sommer of Lincoln. During 
the years preceding American entry into World War I, Sommer worked 
ceaselessly for German language maintenance. He succeeded in having 
high-quality German literature placed in public libraries. He pressured 
the finance committee of the legislature to recommend a $1,000 increase 
in the appropriation for the State Traveling Library so that additional 
German and other foreign language books could be circulated. Sommer 
also propagandized the Alliance members to build their home libraries of 
German literature and got himself appointed as a member of the State 
Library Commission by Gov. John Morehead. Other activities of the 
school committee included efforts to initiate and improve German-language 
instruction in the public schools of the state. The introduction of new 
textbooks was encouraged, and stipends were offered for teachers attend-
ing a seminar in Milwaukee sponsored by the National German-American 
Alliance. 38 
But Sommer's most impressive accomplishment came with the pas-
sage of the Mockett law in 1913. This legislation, a mild reflection of 
similar laws enacted years earlier in Indiana, Kansas, and other states,39 
required authorities to inaugurate foreign language instruction on an 
elective basis in urban schools if the parents or guardians of fifty pupils 
above the fourth grade requested it. Not more than five hours each week 
and not less than one period per day was to be devoted to the language 
instruction.4o 
Sommer had planned his strategy with Teutonic thoroughness. 
First, he courted the support of J. E. Delzell, the state superintendent of 
public instructioIi, as well as several city and county superintendents of 
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schools. Next, he persuaded the foreign language department of the 
University of Nebraska, along with a conference of German teachers, to 
lend their aid. After legal counsel had been secured to draft a law in 
proper form, a brochure entitled Der deutsche Unterricht in den offentliche 
Schulen Nebraskas41 was prepared and distributed. Similar materials in 
English outlined arguments in favor of the proposed legislation. Both 
were sent to pastors, teachers, and editors. Sommer then proceeded to 
line up the support of other ethnic groups, notably the Czechs, Swedes, 
and Danes. Anticipating nativist opposition in the legislature, he got one 
of the most distinguished Anglo-American members of the House of 
Representatives, John H. Mockett, Jr., of Lincoln to introduce his bill. 
These tactics, combined with discreet lobbying, led to an easy victory in 
both houses. The law went into effect on July 17,1913.42 
Although many communities instituted German-language instruc-
tion in conformance with the Mockett law, opposition was not unexpected. 
The Nebraska City school board, in particular, found technicalities to 
justify its failure to comply with parental requests. With the aid of the 
Alliance, the case eventually reached the Supreme Court of Nebraska, 
where in 1916 the Mockett law was upheld. 43 
The German-American Alliance continued vigorously to pursue its 
political goals in 1914. As in previous elections, attention centered on the 
races for the governorship and the legislative seats. This was because the 
success or failure of attempts to enact prohibition, women's suffrage, or 
compulsory school legislation depended largely on the attitudes of the 
men who held these offices. 
German fears regarding the new initiative law were validated in 
1914 when it was used to place women's suffrage on the ballot. Inevi-
tably the Alliance worked against it. Strongly worded resolutions con-
demning it were adopted in the annual convention. Women's suffrage 
was a degrading thing, the Germans thought, and not at all a progressive 
measure. To them it was a menace to the home; it threatened to take wife 
and mother from her proper place and make her a contestant in the 
political arena.44 On election day in 1914, women's suffrage was defeated 
by a relatively narrow margin of ten thousand votes and John Morehead 
was returned to the governor's mansion for another term. 
From its very beginning, the tragedy of World War I cast a pall over 
the Nebraska Alliance. All parades and festivities were .cancelled at the 
annual meeting in 1914, held in Columbus shortly after hostilities had 
begun. A deep sympathy for das Vaterland was apparent as speakers 
frequently made references to pledges of loyalty and financial assistance 
to Germany. Always sensitive to public opinion, the delegates resolved to 
do all .in their power to correct the false impression they believed the 
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English-language press was giving the public regarding Germany and its 
part in the war. Meanwhile, contributions for the German Red Cross 
began to flow into the Alliance treasury. Eventually they totaled more 
than twenty thousand dollars. Fearing an Allied monopoly of the war 
news, the executive committee transmitted a letter to Pres. Woodrow 
Wilson and Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan protesting the 
closing of a German short-wave radio station in the United States. 45 
As publisher of the Omaha Tribune, Val Peter fed his readers a 
steady diet of passionate partisanship for Germany. In this he was no 
different from the editors of hundreds of other German-language publica-
tions in America. Motivated by deeply felt bonds of culture and kinship 
and by what they conceived to be elements of justice and fair play, they 
sought to balance the prejudices that to their minds characterized the 
English-language press. 46 "Both here and abroad/' Peter assured the 
Alliance delegates in 1915, "the enemy is the same! perfidious Albion! 
Over there England has pressed the sword into the hands of almost all the 
peoples of Europe against Germany. In this country it has a servile press 
at its command, which uses every foul means to slander everything 
German and to poison the public mind."47 
By 1915 it was apparent that an easy German victory was not 
in the offing and that the European conflict had become a war of attri-
tion. German Americans accordingly focused their ethnic intensities 
upon the hated war loans and the shipments of arms and munitions 
to the Allied powers. As they drifted away from the American consensus, 
the members of the Nebraska Alliance fervently expressed their emo-
tions in a pack of resolutions, all the while asserting their loyalty to 
America, a sentiment that, indeed, was genuine. One of these resolutions 
is quoted at length: 
As loyal American citizens, loving our adopted country and anxious 
for its future, we deprecate the enormous proportions attained by 
our trade in arms and ammunition. We believe that this hideous and 
wicked traffic should be stopped by law, and we commend both 
Nebraska senators, and those of our representatives in Congress who 
supported measures to that end in the last session. The trade in arms 
and ammunition is directly abhorrent to all believers in the Christian 
code of ethics, and to all human beings born with heavenly compas-
sion in their hearts. It is building up in this peaceful country a 
military industry greater and more dangerous than any that has 
heretofore existed in any country of Europe. That industry, rich and 
powerful and greedy for continued profits, will prove a dangerous 
influence for fastening militarism upon us here in the United States. 
Because the arms and munitions which we export are used to kill the 
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brothers, cousins, and other kin of millions of American citizens, the 
trade is creating bitter division along racial lines among our own 
people and threatening the homogeneity of citizenship which is 
essential to our nation's future greatness. Because it will be used to 
wipe out lives and property and to ruin the prosperity of our best 
customers, this commerce threatens our own future prosperity. Our 
profits lie in Europe's peace. Our security is linked with Europe's 
security. We feel it is our duty to God and to a Christian civilization 
to do nothing to prolong this frightful war and everything in our 
power to shorten it. In the presence of the awful tragedy in which the 
lands of our forefathers are plunged-a tragedy which can only 
mitigate-we brand as base and abhorrent the arguments that are 
urged to justify our active aid in prolonging and making more 
murderous and more destructive this appalling war.48 
The position of the Nebraska Alliance on the European war remained 
largely unchanged during 1916. The partisanship of the Omaha Tribune 
for the German cause continued unabated or, perhaps, more shrill than 
before. Val Peter regularly published chauvinistic editorials ground out 
by the erstwhile first vice president of the Alliance, Dr. Hermann Gerhard, 
who mercilessly castigated President Wilson for his allegedly pro-Allied 
policies. Insisting that American behavior was anything but neutral, the 
Alliance cleverly identified its position with that of the founding fathers 
of the Republic, who shunned all entangling alliances and presumably 
pursued a policy of strict neutrality. Demands were made for a policy 
that defended American lives and American interests with equal firmness 
and justice for both sides. Better protection was needed, the Alliance 
asserted, for American mail, for American commerce in noncontraband 
commodities, and for American merchants discriminated against by 
blacklists. 49 
As anti-German sentiment built up during 1916, the Alliance seemed 
to broaden its range of interest. Among the resolutions passed at the 
annual convention were several that were in no way related to traditional 
German-American interests. Motions favoring the construction of an 
adequate highway system, the erection of a new state capitol, improve-
ment in the salaries of public school teachers, and the establishment of 
local lending libraries were all supported by the delegates. 50 Perhaps 
these resolutions were intended to screen the Alliance's unpopular stands 
on neutrality, war loans, munitions, and prohibition. 
Perhaps the most significant development for the Alliance in 1916 
was the new level of cooperation and participation that the Kirchendeutsche 
gave its activities and endeavors. 51 The impending crisis of war with the 
fatherland, together with portents of defeat in domestic political matters, 
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served to unite the Nebraska Germans as never before. Val Peter had 
never relaxed his efforts to bring the church Germans into the Alliance. In 
1916 he sent personal representatives to the conventions of the Evan-
gelical Synod of North America and the Iowa Synod Lutherans. Both 
groups responded by sending official delegations to the 1916 convention 
of the Alliance. Other pastors also accepted special invitations to attend. 
All of them, ministers and priests, were made honorary members of the 
Alliance and were granted full rights of speaking and voting in the 
convention. 52 
The last great political effort of the Nebraska Alliance was made in 
1916, when prohibition once more dominated state politics. Under Bryan's 
leadership, the dry faction within the Democratic party experienced 
continued growth. Keith Neville, a young, wealthy cattleman new to 
politics, was advanced as an acceptably wet candidate to head off the 
gubernatorial ambitions of Charles W. Bryan, the younger brother of the 
Great Commoner. Along with Senator Hitchcock and Edgar Howard, 
the candidate for lieutenant governor, Neville received strong backing 
from the German-American Alliance. Even though the Democrats won 
the governor's chair and swept both houses of the legislature in the 
November election, German hopes were dashed as the prohibition amend-
ment won a surprisingly large majority of votes.53 
The Nebraska Alliance endorsed no presidential candidate in 1916, 
disillusioned as it was with President Wilson's foreign policy. Dr. Hexamer 
of the national organization, however, came out for the Republican 
candidate, Charles Evans Hughes, as did Val Peter in the Omaha Tribune. 
Not unexpectedly, the heavily German counties of northeastern Nebraska, 
traditionally Democratic strongholds, followed through with majorities 
for Hughes.54 
The election of 1916 ushered in a series of events that was nothing 
less than traumatic for the German-American Alliance. All of the things 
it had fought for since 1910 were lost during the months that followed. 
Prohibition had been first. That it became law without the aid of women's 
suffrage was no comfort. Next came the declaration of war against 
das Vaterland on April 6, 1917. Its impact upon the spirit of the German 
community was incalculable. Yet within the month, the Nebraska legisla-
ture enacted the law to implement the prohibition amendment.55 Shortly 
thereafter it created the Nebraska State Council of Defense.56 Fortunately, 
the Germans could not know at that time the indignities that awaited 
them under that agency's authority. 57 Even the German books that 
Christian Sommer and his committee had placed in the State Traveling 
Library became the subject of an investigation by the legislature. Indeed, 
Sommer was forced to resign his post on the State Library Commission. 58 
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And while an attack on the Mockett law was repulsed by the legislature 
of 1917,59 Governor Neville requested its repeal in a special session 
called for March 26, 1918. In his message to the legislature, Neville 
branded it "vicious, undemocratic, and un-American."60 The Senate, 
presided over by the Alliance's John Mattes, dutifully acquiesced in a 
unanimous vote, as the House also concurred, eighty-two to eleven. 61 All 
this, ironically enough, was at the hands of a governor whose election the 
German-American Alliance had supported and a legislature that was 
decidedly Democratic in composition. 
In the wave of intolerance for all things German that swept across 
the land in the wake of war, it was inevitable that the German-American 
Alliance of Nebraska died quietly and unlamented. The loyalty of Ger-
man citizens throughout the state naturally was questioned. It could not 
have been otherwise, considering the incessant defense of Germany by 
editors, clergymen, and other leaders of the ethnic community. Native-
born Americans, government officials or members of the State Council of 
Defense could not be expected to have had a genuine understanding of 
the role of immigrant language and culture in our society. Yet for the 
majority of the members of the German-American Alliance, German 
ethnicity was of a traditional, nonideological character. It was a part of 
the countless, mindless acts of everyday life. It was emotional, not 
rational. Germany was a symbol of spiritual and cultural values, not of 
specific nationalist or ideological goals of the German imperial govern-
ment. 62 Indeed, many of the Germans had emigrated to America in order 
to escape them. Thus American ethnic minority groups, Germans in 
particular, had historically been received with tolerance and good humor. 
Frictions and misunderstandings were both expected and overlooked. 
The German-American Alliance could be founded in Nebraska and be 
allowed to participate freely and effectively in the political affairs of the 
state. Many native Nebraskans did not like it, but there were few who 
were prepared to deny the Germans the right to so participate. 
But with the outbreak of war in 1914, the circumstances began to 
change. Native Americans began to perceive an ideological character in 
the activities of the Alliance, the editors of the German-language press, or 
the Lutherans with their parish schools. The fact that this perception was 
largely in error made no difference. Emotional attachment for Germany 
increasingly seemed incompatible with loyalty to the United States of 
America. Inevitably the Alliance, essentially an institution for political 
action, met its demise. Whatever value it had had as an agency to 
mitigate the process whereby German immigrants could be absorbed into 
American society had disappeared, like water in sand. 
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Lega{ ~strictions on 
!Foreign Languages in the 
great Plains States, 1917-23 3 
A major effect of World War I on American social history was that 
it focused attention on the nation's apparent difficulty in assimilating the 
millions of immigrants and their children who had streamed to the United 
States during the preceding two decades. The national mood, darkened 
by fears and resentments of long standing and deepened by systematic 
wartime propaganda, favored the adoption of stringent laws limiting the 
use of foreign languages, especially in the schools. During the war itself, 
restrictions were usually extralegal and often the consequences of intense 
social pressure recklessly applied. After the war, however, many state 
legislatures enacted measures that were highly restrictive. The denouement 
of the movement came in 1923 when the United States Supreme Court 
declared one of these laws, Nebraska's Siman Act, to be unconstitutional. 
Laws regulating the use of languages in the United States evolved in 
the latter half of the nineteenth century. Before then English was so 
preponderant in usage that its official adoption seemed superfluous in 
most states. Louisiana, which became a state in 1812, was an early 
exception because of its large French-speaking population. After the Civil 
War, when the number of non-English-speaking immigrants increased 
greatly, many states passed laws regulating the publication of legal notices 
in languages other than English. These were generally permissive rather 
than restrictive. Similarly, a few states legalized the practice of conducting 
public school in languages other than English. Such laws usually legiti-
mized what was happening informally. When the population of a school 
district was solidly German, which was often the case in those years, the 
locally elected school board was likely to hire a German teacher who 
would instruct the children in the German language, or in both German 
and English, irrespective of what the statutory provision might have 
been. Thus a Kansas law of 1867 permitted instruction in the German 
language when "freeholders representing fifty pupils" demanded it. 
Although German was specified in some laws, the provisions usually 
applied to all foreign tongues, even though German Americans were 
nearly always responsible for the enactments and were their chief 
beneficiary. 1 
The mere passage of such laws invigorated opposition among guard-
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ians of Anglo-American traditions who insisted that English be the 
language of instruction in the public schools. California was the first 
to shift to this ground. Kansas followed in 1876, and three years later 
the Dakota territorial legislature directed that English be used exclusively 
in its schools. By 1890 the language issue dominated political debate 
in Wisconsin, where the famous Bennett law of 1889 made atten-
dance in public or private schools compulsory for children and defined 
a school as one in which the common subjects were taught in the English 
language. Similar legislation was enacted in Illinois. Opposition in 
Catholic and German Lutheran quarters was massive and effective; 
in both states the restrictive laws were repealed in the early 1890s. 
Nevertheless, the trend continued elsewhere. In 1897 an Iowa law 
provided that all instruction in the public schools was to be in English, 
except in the teaching of foreign languages, and Louisiana specified 
in its constitution of 1898 that English was to be the language of its 
schools, save in its French districts. 2 
A fairly consistent pattern of legislation emerged during the decade 
before World War I, as European immigration reached its highest levels in 
the nation's history. At least seven states, including Texas (1905), Mon-
tana (1907), and Colorado (1908), obliged teachers to use English 
exclusively in their instruction. When Oklahoma and New Mexico were 
admitted as states in 1907 and 1912, English-language provisions were 
written into their constitutions, although in the latter case the needs of 
the large Spanish-speaking population were recognized. Other states 
again tied instruction in English to compulsory attendance and to text-
book laws. None of these measures prohibited the teaching of foreign 
languages as subjects, since they were aimed primarily at the use of 
foreign languages as media of instruction.3 
Support for laws specifying English as the language of instruction in 
the public schools often came from persons who lacked confidence in the 
nation's assimilative powers. They were eager to support any number of 
programs that promised to Americanize the immigrant. Too many immi-
grants had come in too short a time, they thought. In 1910, when the 
total population of the United States was 92 million, 23 percent of the 
nearly 13 million foreign-born persons ten years of age and over were 
unable to speak English. 4 
Additional support for restriction came from champions of public 
school education who saw private and parochial schools as obstacles to 
their improvement programs. Parents who objected to reform measures, 
they argued, could always withdraw their children and enroll them in 
private church schools. One-room parochial schools with pastors as 
teachers and with much instruction in a foreign language were not 
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uncommon in the Great Plains states during the prewar years. Of all the 
ethnoreligious groups, the German Lutherans were most deeply commit-
ted to this kind of education and were therefore most frequently criticized 
for the inadequacies, such as they were, of their schools. Naturally, they 
felt threatened by the movement to specify English as the language of 
instruction, believing that laws restricting their own schools were next on 
the agenda, as they had been in Wisconsin and Illinois in 1889. They 
feared similar legislation in North Dakota, where in 1910 and 1920 bills 
were introduced to restrict instruction to English in all schools, public 
and private, and in all subjects except religion. Determined opposition 
from immigrant churches contributed to the defeat of both these bills. In 
Wisconsin in 1912 another bill, denounced as a "second Bennett law," 
which aimed to improve the quality of education in parochial schools, 
was also defeated. 5 
While the movement for restriction seemed to be the dominant 
theme during this period, counterpoint of a different spirit could also be 
heard. Several states enacted laws that specifically authorized public 
school instruction in a non-English tongue, usually at the behest of 
well-organized ethnic associations of nonreligious character. For example, 
Colorado in 1908 permitted German or Spanish to be taught when 
requested by the parents or guardians of twenty or more pupils. Similarly, 
a Nebraska statute of 1913 required the request by parents of fifty or 
more pupils for instruction to be given in any modern European language 
for one hour per day above the fourth grade. Unlike the Colorado 
measure, which served the needs of pupils deficient in English-language 
skills, the Nebraska law was partly intended to provide English-speaking 
pupils with an opportunity to study a foreign language. More importantly, 
however, it enabled a minority of German-American citizens in a given 
school district to secure formal instruction for their children in the 
mother tongue. Known as the Mockett Act, this measure had been 
lobbied through the state legislature by the Nebraska branch of the 
National German-American Alliance. No friend of ethnic parochial schools, 
the Alliance aggressively sought to broaden the influence of German 
language and culture in the public school system.6 
Thus by the time World War I broke out in 1914, several separate 
trends in the regulation of foreign languages could be discerned. First, 
there were laws that provided a legal basis for instruction in foreign 
languages as a practical measure in communities dominated by non-
English-speaking people; second, there was an opposite trend that favored 
laws to establish English as the language of the schools; and third, some 
states passed laws that made foreign-language instruction possible for 
English-speaking pupils. 
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The war in Europe placed severe strains on America's heterogene-
ous society during the period of United States neutrality, which extended 
from August 1914 to March 1917. There was a natural tendency for 
persons of Anglo-American heritage to sympathize with Britain and her 
allies, just as citizens with German antecedents often felt an emotional 
bond with their ancestral homeland. Inevitably the events of the war 
intensified loyalties and diminished tolerance for cultural diversity? 
Many German-American citizens, especially those who advocated 
programs of ethnic cultural maintenance, were tempted to indulge in 
extravagant partisanship for Germany. They staged rallies and bazaars 
for the German Red Cross; they bombarded their representatives in 
Washington with strongly worded letters and telegrams; German-language 
newspapers published intemperate editorials attacking the president for 
what were perceived as pro-Allied policies. While the opinions of these 
more vocal groups were not necessarily representative of the masses of 
German Americans, they were believed to be by dominant Anglo-American 
elements of the society. In the German-American view, it was in the 
interest of the United States to stay out of the conflict completely. That 
meant no loans to belligerents on either side, no shipments of war 
materiel, and no travel by American citizens on the ships of nations at 
war. In President Wilson's opinion, such policies would ultimately work 
to the advantage of Germany and therefore were unneutral and un-
American. In a series of public statements, Wilson questioned the patriotism 
of German-American leaders whose understanding of the American inter-
est differed from his own, although he never specified them by name or 
even by ethnicity. 
Meanwhile, British propaganda had begun to portray Germany as a 
land of barbarians at war against western civilization, Kaiser Wilhelm as 
a merciless, grasping tyrant, and his soldiers as butchers of innocent 
women and children. By 1915 a "hate Germany" campaign was well 
under way in the United States. German Americans became resentful and 
fearful as their language and culture were disparaged and things German 
became objects of hatred. 
When the United States declared war on Germany in April 1917, 
President Wilson emphasized that the enemy was the imperial govern-
ment of Germany, not the German people, their language, or their 
culture. But in the frantic effort to mobilize the country's resources for 
war, such distinctions were lost to many minds. Rumors of German-
American subversion flitted about, and many Americans succumbed to 
the fear that the country was swarming with spies. 
A variety of government agencies and private organizations contrib-
uted to the growing anti-German hysteria. The Committee of Public 
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Information created a national mood of aggressive patriotism as it attacked 
dissent as disloyalty, extolled British culture, and fostered hatred for 
Germany. Meanwhile, the American Protective League organized a mas-
sive program to search out domestic espionage. The National Security 
League and its offshoot, the American Defense League, spread a virulent 
strain of superpatriotism and intensified the anti-German hysteria through 
indiscriminate attacks on German-American churches, schools, societies, 
and newspapers, describing them as inhibitors of assimilation and as 
agents of a worldwide Teutonic conspiracy. 
Both organizations made special war on the German language. By 
eliminating German-language instruction from the elementary and sec-
ondary schools, the American Defense League proclaimed, the nation 
could destroy the means by which the kaiser and his henchmen were 
seeking to pervert American youth. One of its pamphlets, "Throw Out 
the German Language and All Disloyal Teachers," illustrates the logic of 
superpatriotism: "Any language which prod~ces a people of ruthless 
conquestadors [sic] such as now exists in Germany, is not a fit language 
to teach clean and pure American boys and girls." The Germans, accord-
ing to this tract, were "the most treacherous, brutal and loathsome nation 
on earth .... The sound of the German language ... reminds us of the 
murder of a million helpless old men, unarmed men, women, and children; 
[and] the driving of about 100,000 young French, Belgian, and Polish 
women into compulsory prostitution."s The American Defense League 
also encouraged the public burning of German-language books. 
Superpatriotic politicians and newspaper editors joined in the cry. 
In Lincoln, Nebraska, a newspaper began a campaign, ultimately successful, 
to remove a thousand German-language books from the collection of the 
State Library Commission. Richard Metcalfe, a political lieutenant of 
William Jennings Bryan, broadcast unconfirmed tales, soon repeated 
across the nation, about teachers in German Lutheran schools in Nebraska 
who whipped pupils who dared to speak English during recess periods.9 
Many educators lent their authority to the war on German-language 
instruction in the schools. The most moderate argued that foreign-language 
instruction had to end because the heterogeneous mass of American 
society could be welded together only by means of English as the com-
mon national tongue.10 In an address delivered to the National Education 
Association (NEA), the dean of the University of Minnesota College of 
Education asserted that subversive Germans expected to achieve their 
nefarious goals "by having German teachers teaching German ideals 
through the German language" in American schools. l1 Another educator 
announced that the German language was "lacking in euphony" and 
therefore "savors of the animalistic and does not induce a certain polish 
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and refinement essential to civilized people." There should be no place for 
the German language in our schools, he insisted, because it upholds a 
philosophy that "prides itself in its inhumanity [that] murders children, 
rapes women, and mutilates the bodies of innocent men."12 With compa-
rable logic, a retired United States admiral insisted that German-language 
instruction be dropped because the textbooks glorify German things and 
German men who have shown themselves to be "arrogant, domineering, 
treacherous, dishonest, mendacious, scheming, unscrupulous, without 
honor, cruel, and murderous."13 
The National Education Association also supported the campaign. 
Through one of its commissions the NEA condemned "the practice of 
giving instruction in a foreign tongue" as "un-American and unpatriotic." 
Although it was silent on classes in which students were taught to speak a 
foreign language, the NEA urged that "every legitimate means, both state 
and federal, be used" to make English the language of instruction in all 
public and private schools.14 
The clamor was in fact much ado about very little. The campaign 
was directed chiefly against German-language instruction in the first 
eight grades. Yet few school systems offered instruction in any foreign 
language at that level. The United States Bureau of Education compiled 
statistics in autumn 1917 on the question. The data revealed that in only 
19 of 163 cities of twenty-five thousand plus were such classes offered.15 
In secondary schools, however, relatively few German-language 
classes had been dropped, although enrollments had decreased significantly. 
A Literary Digest poll of school superintendents conducted early in 1918 
showed that only 149 of 1,017 respondents reported discontinuation of 
German-language classes. Many individual comments were published in 
the article, and most reflect the closed-mindedness and intolerance fostered 
by war propaganda. A superintendent in Grafton, North Dakota, offered 
a minority view when he replied that "to drop German as a language-
study because we are at war with Germany would be indicative of that 
sort of stupidity and lack of vision that we believe is native in the 
Prussian intellectual atmosphere." Few of the educators quoted agreed 
with the calm assessment of Philander P. Claxton, the United States 
commissioner of education, who opposed the elimination of German-
language instruction on the secondary school level. The United States is 
not at war with the German language, he wrote in a widely publicized 
letter, and "the fewer hatreds and antagonisms that get themselves embedded 
in our institutions and policies, the better it will be for us when the days 
of peace return."16 
State councils of defense also shared in the fight to eliminate "the 
enemy language" from the public schools. Shortly after war had been 
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declared, President Wilson urged each state government to form a com-
mission to coordinate food and fuel production and conservation, mobili-
zation of labor, sanitation, Americanization programs, and other aspects 
of the war effort on the state and local level. All states eventually 
complied, although the councils varied greatly in name, structure, and 
authority. Subordinate county councils of defense were also created and 
the various functions farmed out to committees of unpaid civilian 
appointees. In some states, especially in the West, state councils of 
defense were granted sweeping powers, sometimes of doubtful constitu-
tionality. Public attention was most often attracted to the zealous manner 
in which some councils performed their duties relative to patriotism, 
Americanization, or disloyalty. 
The councils of defense for the several Great Plains states each 
joined in the anti-German campaign. Most issued orders or requests in 
1918 to eliminate German-language instruction in the schools. But in 
some states the councils of defense went much further, banning the use of 
the German language in church services, parochial schools, public meet-
ings of all kinds, and even on the telephone. German-language newspa-
pers were also attacked. The principal argument for suppressing the 
language was that the country, for the sake of unity, had to Americanize 
its foreign-born citizens and that continued use of the German language 
kept the immigrant "subservient to the Hohenzollern autocracy."17 
The Nebraska State Council of Defense was one of the most active 
and influential of the several commissions established in the plains states. 
Its activities were guided by men who were thoroughly imbued with 
superpatriotic sentiments; it had the consistent support of influential 
newspapers, most notably the Lincoln Star, whose publisher himself 
became a member of the council. Bothered by the alleged failure of 
Nebraskans to support the war effort with appropriate enthusiasm, the 
state council in July 1917 conducted an investigation into the loyalty of 
the strong German element in the state. Leaders of the several German 
Lutheran synods were singled out for special attention and were broadly 
accused of disloyal behavior. Subsequent meetings of the council with 
Lutheran church officials moderated the antagonism a little, yet it is clear 
that the council deliberately sought to focus public indignation on the 
German Lutherans and their continued strong attachment to their ances-
trallanguage and culture.Is 
The Nebraska council took several steps in the development of its 
policy to curb foreign languages in the churches. On December 12,1917, 
the counciL relying on the force of public opinion rather than on law, 
banned the teaching or use of foreign languages in all private and denomi-
national schools of the state. Church services in foreign languages, however, 
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continued to be seen as a problem, and on June 8, 1918, the council 
issued a proclamation requesting that the ban on German be extended to 
all means of communication to the fullest possible extent. "All sermons 
and public speeches should be exclusively in the English language/' the 
council ordered, "but where there are old people who cannot understand 
the English language and it is deemed necessary to give instruction in a 
foreign tongue, all publicity should be avoided in such instruction." Two 
months later the council clarified its ruling regarding religious instruction 
in German. Sunday schools were to be conducted in English, the council 
decreed, as should all religious services. The old people who could not 
understand English, according to this directive, could have the sermon 
briefly summarized for them in the foreign language shortly before or 
after the regular services. The regulation, still without force of law, 
applied equally to religious meetings in Swedish, Danish, Czech, and 
other languages in use in Nebraska, as well as to German.19 
The records of the Nebraska council reveal that very few clergymen 
were willing to risk the wrath of adverse public opinion, which had been 
so effectively marshalled by the council. The Reverend John Gerike, a' 
pastor of a rural Missouri Synod Lutheran congregation near Crete, 
Nebraska. was a courageous exception. He coolly informed the council 
that his congregation had voted to continue German services "until a law 
is passed forbidding the use of it."20 But most church leaders, while 
objecting to the action as illegal and unfair, urged a willing conformance 
for the sake of harmonious public relations. 
Other state councils pursued similar courses with similar results. In 
Montana, where the use of the German language in the pulpit was also 
forbidden, a few congregations fearfully suspended all public worship. In 
South Dakota, where the state council was empowered to act in any way 
"not inconsistent with the constitution and laws of South Dakota ... 
which are necessary and proper for public safety/' the ethnic conflict was 
as sharp as in Nebraska. On February 22, 1918, even before it had 
statutory authority to do so, the South Dakota council ordered the first 
statewide ban in the nation on German-language instruction in all public 
schools from the elementary grades through the universities. Its Order 
No.4, which went into effect on June I, 1918, prohibited the use of the 
German language at all public gatherings, including church meetings, and 
the ban on German-language instruction was extended to private and 
church-related schools. A subsequent order "prohibited the use of the 
enemy's language in public conversation except in cases of extreme 
emergency." 21 
In Kansas the state council acted with moderation and understanding, 
compared to its counterparts in most other Great Plains states. Although 
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the Kansas council was thoroughly committed to its program to make the 
English language "universally understood and habitually used by all 
citizens," it carefully avoided the harsh and autocratic methods employed 
in neighboring states. This was due largely to the efforts of Martin 
Graebner, a clergyman and professor at Saint John's College, a Lutheran 
institution in Winfield, who had been placed in charge of the foreign-
language problem in the state. A sensitive and knowledgeable man, 
Graebner successfully enlisted the voluntary support and cooperation of 
German-'speaking organizations and communities in the state. 22 
On the local level, however, county councils of defense were often 
less circumspect than the state councils and tended to ignore the complexi-
ties of their tasks. A county council, for example, dictated in one instance 
which members of a German Lutheran church could attend German-
language services and which could not. In Oklahoma, the Major County 
Council of Defense brusquely asserted that because "God Almighty 
understands the American language, address Him only in that tongue." In 
Nebraska, the Dixon County Council of Defense resolved on May 10, 
1918, that all persons should abstain from the use of the German lan-
guage at all times and in all places, including church and home, and,"that 
the reading of German-language papers should immediately be discontinued 
by all who are to be considered loyal Americans." Two weeks later the 
Hall County, Nebraska, council resolved "that in this hour of our nation's 
greatest peril brought upon us by the murderous and ruthless Hun," all 
instruction in German in every school in the county, public and parochial, 
should stop and that all German schoolbooks be removed from every 
school. It requested further that the Anzeiger-Herold (Grand Island) 
cease publication at once; that the Liederkranz and the Plattdeutscher 
Vereen, two social organizations, change their names to English, rewrite 
their constitutions in English, and conduct all organizational activities in 
English; and that "the use of the German language in public and private 
conversation, .. be discontinued." The resolution was larded with such 
pornographic phrases as "brutal hordes of German ravishers and mur-
derers." The council also declared its belief that Germany had "forfeited 
all claims to be classed among the civilized nations of the world."23 
In their zeal to promote ria true spirit of patriotism," county coun-
cils of defense fostered disrespect for law. In South Dakota, when church 
officials protested an interpretation of the state council's Order No.4, the 
Douglas County Council of Defense replied that it did not care what the 
state councilor the state or federal judiciary had said; it simply would not 
tolerate preaching in the German language. 24 
A mob spirit took over in some communities. German Americans 
were subjected to threats, intimidations, beatings, tar-and-featherings, 
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flag-kissing ceremonies, and star chamber proceedings in council of 
defense meetings. Their homes and buildings received liberal applications 
of yellow paint as a symbol of disloyalty.25 In Texas a German Lutheran 
pastor was whipped after he allegedly continued to preach in German 
after having been requested not to by the Nueces County Council of 
Defense. In South Dakota a county council of defense itself became the 
object of mob threats when it met to consider the question of granting 
permits to pastors of German churches to give synopses of their sermons 
in German at the close of English-language services. In Nebraska a 
German Lutheran pastor of a church in Papillion was beaten by a mob; in 
Riverdale another was hanged in effigy and given three days to leave 
town. Schools and churches were ransacked for German-language books.26 
In South Dakota, Yankton high school students were praised for having 
dumped their German-language textbooks into the Missouri River as 
they sang the "Star-Spangled Banner." The burning of German-language 
books as parts of superpatriotic exercises occurred in Oakland, Hooper, 
and Grand Island, Nebraska. In Boulder, Colorado, a German-book-
burning rally was sponsored by the University of Colorado preparatory 
school. Early in September 1918, the Lutheran parochial school in 
Herington, Kansas, was destroyed by fire by superpatriots.27 
In both Kansas and South Dakota German-speaking Mennonite 
and Hutterite pacifists suffered grievous persecution. Superpatriots 
condemned them not merely because of their tenacious retention of the 
language, but also because of their refusal on religious grounds to accept 
military service or to buy war bonds. In Collinsville, Oklahoma, a 
Mennonite named Henry Reimer was strung up by a mob on April 19, 
1918. Police persuaded the would-be executioners to cut him down 
before he died, on the promise that he would be given a trial by the 
county council of defense the next day. In Kansas vigilantes besieged 
rural families at night, firing pistol shots into the air and scattering 
written threats and warnings about the yard. In Newton a mob intimi-
dated the students of the Mennonite Bethel College and displayed a sign 
that read, "Germans: speak the language of a civilized nation. The Hun 
language will be barred even in Hell." By the summer of 1918 some of the 
most conservative Mennonites of the Great Plains states decided that 
their status within the United States had become intolerable, and well 
over fifteen hundred persons resettled in the Canadian prairie provinces 
of Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba. The largest numbers came 
from Oklahoma and South Dakota, although others fled from Kansas, 
Nebraska, and Minnesota.28 Many Hutterites from South Dakota also 
emigrated, starting in 1918. Within a few years all but one of their 
agricultural colonies in the state had been abandoned. 
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Most of the restrictions placed upon the usage of foreign languages 
during the war were extralegal. Even though the council of defense 
pronouncements were widely heeded, they were not legally binding. 
They were supported by the force of public opinion and by the threat of 
mob action. Some local governments passed city ordinances against 
speaking German in public places. Although unenforceable, such local 
measures were not often challenged. The attorney general of Nebraska 
gave it as his opinion that a proposed ordinance to forbid the speaking of 
a foreign language on the streets of Campbell, Nebraska, would be 
invalid because the legislature had never granted villages of the state such 
authority. He also implied that the ordinance would be unnecessary 
because "prudence and public policy" would soon prompt immigrants to 
desist from the use of the native tongue. 29 Had state legislatures generally 
been in session in 1918, many restrictive laws would have been passed. 
As it was, the governors of several states called special sessions to 
consider such legislation. 
The most extreme of the wartime measures was enacted by the 
Louisiana legislature, which made it unlawful for any teacher or profes-
sor in any public or private institution at any level to teach the German 
language to any pupil or class.30 A more moderate restriction was enacted 
in South Dakota. In this case the legislature forbade instruction by means 
of any foreign language in the public elementary schools of the state; it 
applied the same restrictions to public secondary schools and colleges, 
except for foreign languages as subjects; and finally, in the private schools 
and colleges of the states, the restrictions 'a]so applied, "except for foreign 
and ancient languages and religious subjects." In other words, South 
Dakota legislators, in contrast to the state's council of defense, made an 
explicit accommodation to its ethnoreligious minorities. 31 
In Nebraska the governor called a special session of the legislature 
to enact a sedition law and to repeal the Mockett language law of 1913, 
which he now denounced as "vicious, undemocratic, and un-American." 
By its repeal, the legislature removed the provision that school districts 
had to offer foreign-language instruction upon the request of the parents 
of fifty pupils. The legislature then approved the request by the Nebraska 
State Council of Defense that no foreign languages be taught in the 
elementary grades. 32 It also enacted a sedition law that enhanced the 
power of the state council of defense by requiring publishers of all 
materials in any foreign language to file copies with the council, along 
with English translations, as required by the federal Espionage Act. More 
significantly, enemy aliens were forbidden from acting "as lecturer, priest, 
preacher, minister, teacher, editor, publisher, or educator" without first 
filing an application and obtaining a permit from the Nebraska State 
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Council of Defense. One senator courageously but ineffectively denounced 
the act as "an insidious attack on the right of free speech and religious 
liberty." He was outraged by the provision that, as he said, made "our 
lawful and constitutional authorities subservient and subordinate to the 
council of defense, whose members are not elected, nor answerable to the 
people."33 
The signing of the armistice on November 11, 1918 ended the war 
against Germany, but the war against German language and culture in 
the United States continued with scarcely any diminution. Just days 
before the fighting ceased, the voters elected new legislatures, which went 
into session in January 1919. Many of the new lawmakers were more 
determined than ever to impose linguistic uniformity upon the American 
people. Certain journalists and politicians continued to exploit popular 
fears. Gustavus Ohlinger, for example, continued to attack German-
language instruction in American schools as he had during the war. In his 
view it was the keystone of subversion, just as the German-language 
press was the archenemy of Americanization. Before long twenty-one 
states enacted new laws relating to foreign languages in the elementary 
schools. Among them were the Great Plains states of Colorado, Kansas, 
Nebraska, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and South Dakota. All enactments 
specified English as the medium of instruction, and all except the New 
Mexico measure applied to all schools, public, private, and parochial,34 
The passage of these new restrictive laws of 1919 was also due in 
part to proposed federal legislation known as the Smith-Towner bill, 
introduced in Congress in October 1918. One section of this bill specified 
that no state was to share in the apportionment of federal funds unless it 
"shall have enacted and enforced laws requiring that the basic language 
of instruction in the common-school branches in all schools, public and 
private, shall be the English language only." Yet many legislatures went 
beyond the requirement of the still-pending Smith-Towner bill and 
prohibited entirely the teaching of foreign language up to and including 
the eighth grade.35 
The Kansas measure was forthright and unyielding: "All elementary 
schools in this state, whether public, private or parochial, shall use the 
English language exclusively as the medium of instruction." Oklahoma's law 
was nearly as blunt. South Dakota enacted a new law that listed the subjects 
that had to be taught in English; religion was not listed and therefore could 
be taught in German in parochial schools. Colorado used a similarly 
devious method to make English the language of instruction without 
touching religious education. New Mexico managed to specify English as 
the language of instruction in its public elementary schools, but made 
Spanish reading a mandatory subject for Spanish-speaking pupils.36 
Foreign Languages in the Great Plains States 43 
It was Nebraska's language law, however, that gained broader sig-
nificance because it was ultimately declared unconstitutional by the 
United States Supreme Court in 1923. Sponsored by Sen. Harry Siman, it 
was one of several bills introduced early in the 1919 session to restrict the 
use of foreign languages in the state. Sentiment in favor of restriction was 
especially strong because of publicity given the recommendations of 
Nebraska's Americanization Committee, which had been appointed by 
Gov. Keith Neville to take the language issue out of the hands of the 
Nebraska State Council of Defense. Neville, in his address to the legisla-
ture as outgoing governor, had also called for a ban on foreign-language 
instruction in order, as he put it, to guarantee that Nebraska would be 
American in language, thought, and ideals. But Neville also favored a 
provision that would have specifically exempted religious instruction 
from the ban.37 
By 1919 the ethnic churches, principally the body known today as 
the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, no longer objected to legislation 
requiring English in their schools, so long as the directive did not apply to 
religious instruction. Their acquiescence was partly an acceptance of 
political reality, but it was also a matter-of-fact recognition that in most 
parochial schools English was commonly used except in religion classes. 
The language laws of several neighboring states, including Iowa, South 
Dakota, and Colorado, explicitly applied to secular subjects only. Several 
lawmakers with Lutheran and Catholic connections tried in committee to 
amend the Siman bill similarly, but Siman and the majority were ada-
mant despite editorials in leading state newspapers urging moderation.38 
One lawmaker's response distills the intolerance of the time: "If these 
people are Americans, let them speak our language. If they don't know it, 
let them learn it. If they don't like it, let them move. It is a good thing to 
learn. I would be ashamed to face my boy, when he returns from France, 
if I voted for this amendment [to authorize specifically the use of foreign 
languages for religious instruction in parochial schools] and had to tell 
him that I had done nothing to crush Kaiserism in this country."39 
Other supporters of the Siman bill favored the closing of all paro-
chial schools in the state. Some were motivated by a deeply rooted 
religious prejudice. For them the language bill was a ready and popular 
preliminary step toward the diminution of Catholic power in the United 
States. That the Siman bill would also work contrary to the interests of 
the German Lutheran synods was merely an unfortunate but unavoidable 
consequence of their commitment to parochial schools.40 
Gov. Samuel McKelvie signed the Siman bill into law on April 9, 
1919. Overwhelmingly approved in both houses of the legislature, the 
measure made it a misdemeanor "to teach any subject to any person in 
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any language other than the English language ... in any private, denomi-
national, parochial or public school." The restriction applied only to the 
first eight grades.41 
Shortly after the passage of the Siman law, officials of the Nebraska 
District of the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod sought an injunction 
against the enforcement of the act on the ground that it was an unconsti-
tutional infringement upon religious liberty. This action was guided by 
Arthur Mullen, a prominent Irish Catholic lawyer of Omaha, who arranged 
to have a Polish Catholic parish of South Omaha join the Lutherans as 
petitioner. The district court judge issued the injuction, but the attorney 
general immediately appealed to the Nebraska State Supreme Court.42 
After much controversy and public debate, the Nebraska Supreme 
Court on December 26, 1919, denied the injunction and upheld the 
Siman Act. This tribunal understood the measure, not as an unconstitu-
tional interference with religious liberty, but as an effort within the police 
power of the state to treat the language problem that had developed in 
the country because of the World War. Fearful perhaps of constitutional 
objections, the court added that the law did not prevent instruction of or 
in foreign languages outside regular school hours. 43 
This ruling by no means settled the matter. Some parochial schools, 
acting on the cue from the judiciary, arranged their daily schedules so 
that courses taught in foreign languages, chiefly religion, were offered 
before or after regular school hours.44 Inevitably such steps were per-
ceived as evasions of the law by the superpatriotic advocates of language 
uniformity and champions of public-school education; during the next 
two years they continued to push hard for new restrictive laws. 
It was not until 1921 that state legislatures were again in session 
and able to respond to the continued agitation for language restriction. 
Five states, including South Dakota and Nebraska, thereupon enacted 
new laws. In Nebraska the Siman Act was replaced by the even more 
stringent Reed-Norval Act, signed info law on April 14, 1921. This 
measure forbade all instruction in foreign languages in public and private 
schools at all times, thereby closing the loophole noted earlier by the 
Nebraska Supreme Court. Ironically, the bill was originally introduced 
by Sen. Richard Norval of Seward to weaken the restrictions of the 
Siman Act. But in committee other senators, acting under strong pressure 
from the American Legion, wrote additional restrictions into the bill, 
leaving Norval no alternative but to disavow the legislation that bore his 
name.45 
Shortly after the passage of the Reed-Norval Act, officials of the 
Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod sought an injuction against its enforce-
ment just as they had in the case of the Siman Act. This suit was quickly 
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appealed to the Nebraska Supreme Court, which on April 19, 1922, 
again upheld the constitutionality of the law forbidding the use of foreign 
languages in elementary schools. 46 
Meanwhile the famous Nebraska v. Meyer case was on its way to 
the United States Supreme Court. This litigation involved the teacher of a 
one-room parochial school maintained by Zion Lutheran Church of rural 
Hampton, in Hamilton County, the pastor of which was Carl F. Brommer, 
the president of the Nebraska District of the Lutheran Church-Missouri 
Synod. In January 1920, shortly after the Nebraska Supreme Court had 
observed in its decision of December 26,1919, that the Siman Act did 
not prohibit foreign-language instruction outside regular school hours, 
Zion congregation declared its official schools hours to be from 9 :00 to 
12 :00 in the morning and from 1 :30 to 4 :00 in the afternoon. It further 
directed the teacher, Robert Meyer, to conduct a class in religion in the 
German language from 1:00 to 1:30 P.M. each afternoon. Attendance 
was technically voluntary. On May 25,1920, the county attorney appeared 
at the school while Raymond Parpart, a youngster in the fourth grade, 
was reading aloud in German the Old Testament story of Jacob's Ladder. 
Several days later Meyer was charged in the Hamilton County Court 
with having violated the Siman language law.47 
Meyer's trial was conducted on December 13,1920. The transcript 
reveals that the county attorney tried to blur the distinction between 
religious instruction in the German language and language instruction in 
which pedagogical materials happened to be religious. Meyer unquestion-
ably was engaged in the former, but the jury was more likely to convict if 
the latter were the case. Further, the prosecution succeeded in convincing 
the jury that the announced starting time of 1:30 P.M., rather than 1:00 
P.M. was a subterfuge to circumvent the law. Meyer was thereupon 
convicted and fined twenty-five dollars. With the support of church 
officials, he refused to pay and began his appeal. 48 
The Nebraska Supreme Court heard the case more than a year later, 
in February 1922. In the meantime the legislature had replaced the Siman 
Act with the Reed-Norval Act, although this did not alter the judicial 
proceedings. By a four-to-two vote the court decided against Meyer and 
upheld the constitutionality of the language law. Writing for the majority, 
Justice Leonard Flansburg asserted that permitting resident foreigners to 
educate their children in the language of their native land was inimical to 
the safety of the state. Justice Charles B. Letton, in a dissenting opinion, 
called the Siman Act a product of crowd psychology. He declared that 
foreign-language instruction was not harmful to the state and that the 
Siman Act was an arbitrary exercise of police power that interfered with 
the fundamental right of parents to control the education of their children. 49 
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Another year passed before the United States Supreme Court heard 
the Meyer case. The Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod had decided to 
couple its suit (Evangelical Lutheran Synod v. McKelvie) with Meyer's 
and to place them both in the hands of Arthur Mullen. Meanwhile other 
litigation over Iowa and Ohio language laws (Iowa v. Bartels and Ohio v. 
Pohl), each of which involved teachers in Lutheran parochial schools, 
had been appealed to the Supreme Court and were heard during the fall 
session of 1922.50 
Mullen's reading of legal precedent convinced him that to base his 
case on the First Amendment would be fruitless, since it applied to the 
federal government, but not to state governments. He decided instead to 
argue that the Fourteenth Amendment embraces religious liberty also 
when it prohibits state government from abridging privileges of United 
States citizens or depriving them of life, liberty, or property without due 
process of law. Mullen submitted a brief to the court in October 1922 and 
presented oral arguments in February 1923.51 
The United States Supreme Court delivered its decision on June 4, 
1923. The majority opinion, written by Justice James McReynolds, declared 
the Siman Act to be unconstitutional interference with Meyer's right "to 
teach and the right of parents to engage him so to instruct their children." 
Moreover, the court observed that no emergency had "arisen which 
renders knowledge by a child of some language other than English so 
clearly harmful as to justify its inhibition with the consequent infringe-
ment of rights long freely enjoyed." The Iowa and Ohio rulings were, of 
course, also reversed. 52 
Although the Meyer decision ended restrictive language laws among 
the states, the related issue of private and parochial school education 
continued until 1925, when the United States Supreme Court struck 
down an Oregon law requiring all children between the ages of eight and 
sixteen to attend public school. This act, championed by an alliance of 
the Ku Klux Klan and several Masonic bodies, was overturned in the 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary decision. 
Both the suit and the judicial ruling drew upon the precedents of the 
Meyer case.53 
Thus the Supreme Court of the United States brought to an end the 
movement to impose legal restrictions on the use of foreign languages. 
Although the trend had originated in the prewar period, it had been 
strengthened greatly by war-born fears of German subversion in America 
and anxiety over the nation's capacity to absorb its millions of foreign-
born citizens. The climax of the movement came in 1919 during the six 
months following the armistice. Drawing support from diverse elements 
in the population-superpatriots, xenophobes, champions of public-school 
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education, and later such organizations as the American Legion and 
Masonic orders-the advocates of language restriction were especially 
strong in the states of the Great Plains. Every legislature in this region 
enacted some sort of restriction on foreign languages from 1918 to 1921. 
Ethnic churches, whose interests were most directly and most adversely 
affected by the movement, immediately turned to the courts for redress. 
Although state tribunals were unresponsive to their constitutional argu-
ments, the federal judiciary ruled in their favor and thereby clarified and 
enlarged American freedom. 
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Strategies r.Bet'UJeen tfie Wor[({ Wars 4 
In 1928, midway between the two world wars, H. L. Mencken 
observed that with few exceptions the leaders of the Germans in America 
were an undistinguished and unintelligent lot, a collection of mediocrities, 
most of whom had something to sell. The few national German ethnic 
organizations still in existence, he noted, were led by entirely unimportant 
men. Moreover, the leaders of German immigrant churches were non-
entities, unknown to the general public. The blame for this lamentable 
dearth of leadership, in Mencken's view, rested upon the German Ameri-
cans themselves, who displayed an unfortunate tendency to follow infe-
rior men. As Catholics they are slaves of their priests, he said; as Protestants 
they are slaves of their pastors; and when they leave the church they 
become slaves of the first political buffoon they encounter. During World 
War 1, in Mencken's -judgment, they had turned almost instinctively to 
fools for leadership. 1 
Mencken's surpassing skill in verbal hatchetry tends to overshadow 
the perceptive qualities of his analysis. Although he was a prisoner of his 
elitist prejudices, Mencken described circumstances that were typical of 
most immigrant groups in America. The vast majority of persons had 
emigrated in search of a better life. Coming from the lower classes of 
Europe, they were culturally backward persons who inevitably devoted 
their energies in America to material advancement. This worked against 
the emergence of wise and able leaders. When an educated and cultured 
person attempts to lead the apathetic masses of immigrants, Mencken 
wrote, he quickly becomes discouraged and succumbs to despair as his 
place is taken by demagogues, self-servers, and other third-rate noisemakers. 
Yet, because of World War I, the experience of Germans in America 
was qualitatively different from that of any other immigrant group. The 
largest non-English-speaking group in the country, the Germans had 
already begun to arrive in the eighteenth century. They prospered in this 
country and were well received. They were proud of their language and 
culture; while many Germans assimilated with remarkable speed, others 
labored mightily to erect a complex of institutions that served to sustain 
ethnic culture. When German immigration dropped off sharply at the 
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end of the nineteenth century, ethnic leaders sought to inhibit the inevi-
table disintegration of the group by espousing a new cultural chauvinism. 
Later, when Germany experienced its early successes in World War I, the 
leaders of German America were encouraged to exploit the kaiser as a 
symbol around which to rally the group, thereby bolstering a consider-
able financial investment in ethnic newspapers and a variety of other 
business establishments. An unprecedented measure of support seemed to 
unify the German Americans and to stimulate their leaders ever more 
boldly to flaunt partisanship for Germany. At the same time this behav-
ior was infinitely offensive to persons whose emotional attachments were 
with the Allies. The advocates of the Allied cause, led by Pres. Woodrow 
Wilson and other champions of English culture, began to attack German-
American leaders as disloyal and un-American. Unsure of the capacity of 
American society to assimilate ethnic diversities, they began a war on 
German culture in America as early as 1915. The German Americans, 
however, saw themselves as entirely loyal to the United States. In their 
view, strict neutrality was in the nation's best interest, whereas Wilson's 
policies would lead to war. That nonintervention worked to Germany's 
benefit was as incidental as the fact that Wilson's understanding of the 
national interest served to aid the Allies.2 
The entry of the United States into the war in 1917 radically altered 
the circumstances of German Americans. Behavior that had been legal in 
the neutrality period was now tantamount to treason, and most persons 
of German birth or descent, regardless of citizenship, were suspected of 
nurturing some measure of loyalty for Germany. Although the spirit of 
oppression was not uniformly felt across the country, the German-American 
community generally experienced much persecution. Superpatriots deline-
ated a new, narrowed conception of loyalty and demanded conformity 
from everyone. A fierce hatred for everything German pervaded the 
nation. German cultural symbols were debased; instruction in the lan-
guage was practically eliminated in the schools; the use of the German 
language was restricted on the state and local levels; and German-language 
newspapers were harassed and censored. Gradually suspicion escalated 
to threats of violence, to forced sales of government war bonds, to liberal 
applications of yellow paint to churches, schools, and monuments, to 
vandalism, book-burnings, flag-kissing, tar-and-feather ceremonies, and, 
in one case, the lynching of an innocent German alien. 
The German-American community was devastated by these events. 
For the majority of the seven million persons of German stock in the 
United States at that time, German ethnicity had become a source of 
social discomfort or deprivation. Countless families ceased conversing in 
the German language. Name changes were common among persons, 
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businesses, and societies. Thousands stopped subscribing to German-
language newspapers and periodicals. Memberships in ethnic organiza-
tions of all kinds plummeted. As a group, the German Americans were 
embittered, disillusioned, and demoralized, unsure of what appropriate 
behavior should be. For most of them, ethnicity had lost its savor. The 
injustices of World War I remained imprinted upon their memories, and 
they were eager to express their resentment in the polling booths. But 
above all they wanted to prevent a recurrence of the persecution. They 
were convinced that this could be accomplished best by avoiding obvious 
displays of German ethnicity. Few were ready to respond to a leader who 
promised to solve the problems of the Germans as an ethnic minority 
group. The majority were not interested in the promotion of ethnic 
consciousness or in the political defense of das Deutschtum. 
At the core of the German ethnic group, however, were persons 
whose commitment to ethnicity was primary. They were convinced that 
the problems of the Germans in the United States were due to past 
failures of ethnic leadership. They believed that German Americans had 
been insufficiently aggressive during the prewar years, especially in politics, 
and that if German-American citizens would participate vigorously in 
political affairs at all levels their power would be such that no one would 
dare trample upon their rights. The most prominent of these ethnic 
chauvinists was George Sylvester Viereck, the notorious propagandist of 
Germany's cause during the neutrality period of 1914-17. In September 
1919, a time when German Americans still suffered from sporadic 
superpatriotic violence, Viereck published an editorial on German ethnic 
leadership in his periodical, the American Monthly, as he had renamed 
the Fatherland of the prewar years. Noting that the Germans were a 
numerous and powerful force in American politics, he observed that they 
were now floundering for the want of a national leader. The need, he 
wrote, was for a new Carl Schurz, a man whose record of loyalty and 
service to the nation was impeccable, someone above envy and petty 
intrigue who could combine the wrangling and conflicting subgroups of 
German Americans and lead them by inspiring word and courageous 
deed out of the wilderness of war to a promised land of respect and 
honor. He should have financial independence and mastery of the English 
language, announced Viereck, and he must not be a recent immigrant or a 
newspaper man. As a possibility, Viereck mentioned Charles Nagel, who 
was well known among German Americans as the secretary of commerce 
in former President Taft's cabinet. But judging from his subsequent 
behavior, Viereck had himself in mind as the new leader of his ethnic 
group.3 
Viereck's editorial evoked a variety of responses over the next 
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several months. Most reveal how deeply German Americans were wounded 
by the humiliations of the war period and how earnestly they desired a 
restoration to their former status. Moreover, most respondents called for 
some form of political organization as the means to unite the group and 
to articulate its goals. The names of many persons were naively suggested 
as potential leaders in these letters, which collectively demonstrate a 
shallow understanding of the German ethnic group, its characteristics, 
and its relationships to the larger American society. 4 
The fact was that there was no possibility of a national leader 
arising who would fit the mold that Viereck described. The Germans in 
America never had had one in the past, not even the revered Schurz. This 
was because they were so diverse socially, economically, culturally, and 
politically that there was no common interest strong enough to bind them 
together. They were as heterogeneous as the nation itself, with its rich 
and poor, its educated and undereducated persons, its urban and rural 
divisions, its occupational range from unskilled laborers to mighty indus-
trialists and financiers. The Germans included people who organized 
their lives around religious values and those who were secular-minded; 
there were pietists and ritualists, Catholics and Protestants, Democrats 
and Republicans. 
Unlike blacks, Chicanos, or the Japanese, the Germans had no 
serious social or economic problems to unite them in a struggle against 
oppression. They had never been discriminated against in a serious way 
except during the World War I era, and even then it had not been 
universal or uniform. When the Germans had been persecuted it was 
chiefly because of the tenacity with which they clung to their language 
and culture. Even though German language and culture were not in fact 
as uniform as they appeared, their defense was the only foundation upon 
which a potential leader could base his appeal. Because it was in the 
economic interest of the press to emphasize ethnic unity and cultural 
maintenance and because leaders had no choice but to stress it in their 
speeches, sentiment in favor of nurturing the German language and 
culture appeared to be strong. Yet it was rarely capable of overcoming the 
centrifugal forces of personal or subgroup interest. 
The inadequacy of ethnicity as a cohesive force was due also to 
the fact that the Germans, in their physical, linguistic, and cultural 
characteristics, were close to Anglo-American norms. Indistinguishable 
in appearance from dominant elements of American society, they were 
persons of Christian heritage who spoke a language closely related 
to English. It was possible for them to assimilate with astonishing ease 
if they so chose. When the retention of obviously German behavior 
became a source of discomfort or deprivation, as during World War I, 
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the proportion of those who consciously abandoned ethnicity was 
dramatically enlarged. 
In their long history in the United States, the Germans acted in 
concert only in response to external threats or events that impinged upon 
their culture. Prohibition, legislative threats to parochial schools, and 
anti-German propaganda are examples of issues that could temporarily 
stimulate German Americans to unity. When the threat disappeared, 
possibilities for strong leadership also vanished. If the defense of ethnic 
culture was the only basis for leadership, it was inevitable that when 
German-American voices were heard in the land, they sounded negative, 
harsh, and unattractive to old-stock Americans. 
The alternative lay in the kind of leadership exemplified by Carl 
Schurz. As a politician, Schurz had not pursued specifically German-
American interests. Even though he was willing enough to exploit German-
American votes, he was essentially an American statesman who happened 
to have been born and educated in Germany. While his cultural heritage 
certainly influenced his goals and methods, his political appeal was rarely 
circumscribed by ethnicity. It was the quality of leadership in national 
affairs that gave him status and position. When he spoke on the issues, 
the nation as well as German Americans listened, even though they often 
did not agree with him. Thus Schurz's role as spokesman for his ethnic 
group was almost incidental-a by-product of his national leadership. 
In the years following World War I, however, there was no one of 
German birth or descent of comparable stature on the national scene. 
Nagel probably came the closest. But he, like most men of modest fame in 
the political, business, or academic worlds, had no desire to be identified 
as the leader of the Germans. As for those persons who were closely tied 
to ethnic organizations, most were unknown to the public at large or 
were broken in spirit by the events of the World War-men such as Dr. 
Charles Hexamer, the former president of the defunct National German-
American Alliance. There remained the vainglorious Viereck. Although 
his notoriety as a propagandist eliminated him from any substantial 
leadership role, Viereck saw himself in a different light. 
The German immigrant churches in particular would have nothing 
to do with Viereck and his ilk. They had been the chief victims of 
superpatriotism, and superpatriotism had been stimulated by the verbal 
excesses of the German ethnic chauvinists. For the churches, ethnicity 
had been primarily a means to achieve religious ends; when it tended to 
hinder rather than to ease the attainment of their goals, they readily 
abandoned programs of language and culture maintenance. Most church 
leaders distrusted political activity as a way to accomplish their objectives, 
and they remained deeply suspicious of the ethnic political organizations, 
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perceiving them as the heirs of the liberal, anticlerical traditions brought 
to America by the refugees of the revolutions of 1848.5 
In most denominations there was a remarkably swift transition to 
English-language services in the first postwar decade, a mandatory step if 
the loyalty of the younger generation was to be retained. German-
language church periodicals were gradually replaced by English equivalents. 
Most parochial schools converted to instruction in the English language. 
In the Evangelical Synod and in several Lutheran synods, notably the 
Iowa and Ohio synods, these alleged "nurseries of Kaiserism" virtually 
disappeared. Meanwhile, dozens of German Methodist congregations 
withdrew from German conferences and merged with parent organizations. 
Transition to English usage was especially dramatic in German Catholic 
parishes, and membership in the German Catholic Central-Verein, the 
national layman's organization, dropped to one-half of its prewar figure 
during the 1920s. Even the isolationist, pacifistic Mennonites, although 
slower to give up the use of German, developed extraordinary benevo-
lence programs and voluntary relief work to demonstrate in positive 
ways their worth as American citizens.6 
John Baltzer, president of the Evangelical Synod during the early 
1920s, was typical of many German-American church leaders of the 
time. He repeatedly declared that his church, although German in origin, 
was thoroughly American in spirit and constitution. Yet he opposed the 
movement led by the great American theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, then 
a young parish pastor in Detroit, to merge the Evangelical Synod with 
other denominations. As a moderate, Baltzer admitted the inevitability 
and even the desirability of the transition to English, but he pleaded for a 
slowing of the process for the sake of clergymen and parishioners who 
could not accommodate themselves to an abrupt change. At the same 
time, some denominations, notably the Lutheran Church - Missouri Synod, 
inaugurated broad programs to equip the faithful for life in an English-
speaking church. Sermons, instructional materials, religious literature, 
hymns, and prayers were published in English in the hope that orthodoxy 
could be sustained as linguistic barriers fell.7 
In some respects the traditionally anticlerical Amerikanische Turner-
bund acted much like the churches. Its leaders also believed survival 
depended upon transition to a nonethnic basis. By the 1920s, its political 
radicalism was only a memory, its name had been legally changed to the 
American Gymnastic Union, its periodical, the Amerikanische Turnzeitung, 
included many columns of English-language articles, and its adult male 
membership dwindled to about thirty thousand persons. Its national 
chairman, Theodore Stempfel, strongly objected to German ethnic poli-
tics and disapproved of mass protest meetings. The assimilationist drift 
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of the Turnerbund was not unopposed, of course, and its leaders were 
bitterly attacked by the faithful, both within and without the organization.8 
On the local level, thousands of ethnic clubs, societies, and associa-
tions of all kinds continued to exist, despite the corrosive effects of the 
anti-German hysteria. Some of their members advocated the conversion 
of their Vereine to "American" institutions, but most hoped to enjoy 
unobtrusively the pleasures of ethnic sociability, to celebrate their culture 
with drink and song, and to reap the economic rewards of ethnic contacts 
within the privacy of their organizational quarters.9 A few societies 
experienced a resurgence of life after the war, as they were strengthened 
by persons whose ethnic consciousness had been awakened by wartime 
persecutions.1o In many of the large cities, dozens of these societies were 
united into an umbrella organization, such as the influential United 
German Societies of New York and Vicinity.11 Ordinarily not given to 
political activity, the umbrella organizations often coordinated charitable 
endeavors, such as relief programs for war sufferers in Germany, and 
promoted annual German Day cultural festivals, which by 1920 had 
begun to revive. Some members of the Vereine feared that organized 
political involvement was a senseless rocking of a leaky boat. But others 
attacked such attitudes as promoting self-indulgence, complacency, and a 
deceptive spirit of security. They urged participation in the activities of 
the two national organizations for German ethnic political action that 
had emerged in the immediate postwar period.12 
The first of these was the Deutsch-Amerikanische Biirgerbund, 
or the German-American Citizen's League, which had its origin in 
Chicago under the leadership of Ferdinand Walther. It was deliberately 
patterned on the discredited National German-American Alliance, with 
state and local branches organized wherever sufficient interest could 
be generated. The Biirgerbund was dedicated to the revival of German 
language and culture and was motivated by a spirit of revenge. George 
Sylvester Viereck found such militancy to his liking and, for a time, 
served as its eastern regional director. Its leadership consisted largely 
of former National Alliance officers, but unlike that organization, it 
was openly and avowedly political. In August 1920, when it sponsored 
a national conference to support the presidential candidacy of Repub-
lican Warren G. Harding, it resolved "to sweep from office all mis-
creants, irrespective of party, who abused the authority conferred upon 
them by the people for the prosecution of the war, to make war upon 
their fellow citizens, who hounded and persecuted Americans of German 
descent, ... who, contemptuous of any hyphen except the one which 
binds them to Great Britain, unmindful of the supreme sacrifice of 
Americans of German blood in the late war, attempt even now to deprive 
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our children of the noble heritage of speech and song and prayer that has 
come down to us from our sires beyond the sea."13 
The Biirgerbund was formally organized as a national body at a 
poorly attended meeting in Chicago in January 1921, when it adopted a 
series of resolutions defining its policies and commenting on current national 
and international issues.14 Never very successful on the national leveL 
the Biirgerbund was influential chiefly in Chicago and the Midwest, but even 
there it lacked the support of the German-language press. No German 
ethnic leaders of importance emerged from the organization. Its strategy 
was excessively chauvinistic; it spelled trouble in an intolerant age,15 
The second national organization was the Steuben Society of America. 
Founded originally as a secret society in 1919, it was no less committed 
to political action than was the Biirgerbund. It also sought to protest 
against the treatment that Americans of German descent had suffered 
during the war, and it accepted the theory that if the Germans could unite 
they could hold the balance of political power in the United States. But 
this organization recognized that German Americans also had to estab-
lish their credentials for civic virtue and patriotism. Instead of screaming 
for its rights to be recognized, the Steuben Society hoped to demonstrate 
that it deserved respect. Hence, it constantly urged energetic participation 
by its members in the political life of America and, as its name suggests, 
publicized the contributions of Germans to the greatness of America 
from colonial times to the present. Its defense of Germany in interna-
tional affairs was less strident than what was typical of the Biirgerbund, 
and to the disgust of the chauvinist radicals, it chose English as its official 
language. The Steubenites believed that this strategy would bring suffi-
cient status and power to prevent the German Americans from being 
persecuted or ignored politically in the future,16 
Although the Steuben Society became the best-known national 
German-American organization in the two decades between the wars, it 
also produced no significant leaders. Carl E. Schmidt of Detroit, an aging 
businessman of moderate wealth and culture who had played a minor 
role in Michigan politics, consented to serve as national chairman, but he 
never gave more than symbolic leadership to the society, which was 
centered in New York City. Thus leadership fell by default to Theodore 
H. Hoffmann, who was hobbled by acting chairman status until Schmidt's 
death in 1934,17 As an instrument of German-American unity, the Steuben 
Society was also a failure. Throughout the interwar period it suffered 
from indecisive leadership, internal dissension, and severe criticism from 
German Americans outside the organization. Despite the respectability it 
enjoyed, its membership never exceeded 20,000,18 
Even so, the Steuben Society's strategy was consonant with the 
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advice of the historian Ferdinand Schevill, who had urged, in response to 
Viereck's 1919 editorial on the lack of German ethnic leadership, that 
any action the Germans took should be preceded by a self-examination 
"to discover the qualities ... which have invited hostility and contempt." 
Such dispassionate reflection was difficult for the chauvinists; it was 
impossible for Viereck, who seemed to have learned nothing from the 
war. Eagerly seeking distinction as the leader of the German Americans, 
Viereck plunged into the political waters as the presidential election of 
1920 approached. He exhorted his fellows to unified political activity in 
order to force decision makers in the national government to recognize 
German-American political power and to reward it when used to their 
advantage. He energetically supported the candidacy of Republican 
Warren G. Harding with every means at his disposal. First he tried to 
establish a German-American political action group, which he called the 
Committee of 96. When it failed to catch on, he shifted to the Biirgerbund, 
which, like almost all the German-language newspapers, endorsed Harding 
not because they regarded him highly, but rather as a means to defeat 
Democrat James Cox, whom they despised as the political heir of Woodrow 
Wilson. Everywhere Viereck preached boldness to the intimidated Ger-
man Americans, and everywhere the press, to his delight, identified him 
as their leading spokesman. Indeed, as the campaign drew to a close, Cox 
singled out Viereck as his whipping-boy, as he denounced the return of 
hyphenism to American politics. But Viereck was not dismayed; such 
treatment was to be expected if he was to project himself successfully as 
the dauntless leader of all German Americans who were properly con-
scious of their ethnicity.19 
Viereck's claim to ethnic leadership had little substance. The New 
York Times and other newspapers gave him much publicity because he was 
articulate and arrogant; apparently they assumed that he was also influen-
tial. But most German Americans, including the publishers of the German-
language press, ignored or disputed his claims to leadership; many found 
his extremism appalling.20 It is true that in the election of 1920 the 
majority voted overwhelmingly for Harding, as did the electorate generally, 
but they would have done so even if Viereck had remained silent.21 
Viereck pressed on. Remembering Schurz's alleged delivery of the 
German-American vote to Abraham Lincoln in 1860 and his subsequent 
reward of the ministry to Spain, Viereck dispatched a congratulatory tele-
gram to Harding with a reminder that six million Americans of German 
descent had voted Republican as he had predicted.22 In January the Biirger-
bund resolved to send a five-man delegation, including Viereck, to visit 
Harding before he took office and urge him to consider the great contri-
butions of Germans to America when he made his cabinet appointments. 23 
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Harding politely received the Biirgerbund delegation on February 
16, 1921, while vacationing in Saint Augustine, Florida. The president-
elect understood fully that he owed no debts to Viereck or, indeed, to the 
German-American voting population as a group. He assured the delega-
tion that no candidate for high appointive office would be discriminated 
against because of German birth or descent. The effect of Viereck's 
well-publicized visit was to make it politically impossible for Harding to 
appoint a German American to any significant position, regardless of the 
candidate's qualifications. Ethnic politics, especially German, was simply 
repugnant to large numbers of native-stock voters. The Buffalo Express, 
for example, denounced the Viereck visitation as "ridiculously impudent," 
and in Kansas the Salina Journal called it "insolent stupidity." The 
American Legion protested against what it perceived as a German-
American demand to receive an appointment to the cabinet. In Texas the 
state legislature adopted a resolution endorsing the stand taken by the 
Legion. 24 
Viereck and the chauvinists were disappointed with Harding's refusal 
to appoint a German American to high office. Even though it was 
apparent that their tactic was bound to be counterproductive, given the 
xenophobic tendencies of the times, they continued to pressure the president, 
especially in autumn 1921, when the position of ambassador to Austria 
fell vacant. Instead of agreeing on a single candidate, each of several 
activist elements within the German community, mainly in New York, 
lobbied for their own men. In the end Harding appointed a non-German. 25 
The whole affair resulted in laying bare a deep division within the 
ranks of Germans who were committed to united ethnic action. The 
Viereck clique believed in the open organization of raw political power; 
some even seemed to think that a frankly German political party would 
be ideal. They were opposed by persons, usually German-language news-
paper editors and publishers, who were influential as leaders in local 
umbrella organizations. Fearful of renewed nativistic recriminations against 
the Germans, this group of leaders espoused a more covert strategy. They 
preferred to limit the public display of German ethnicity to cultural and 
social affairs such as German Day celebrations, bazaars, and benefit 
concerts. Meanwhile, they hoped to negotiate privately with leaders of 
the major political parties, trading German ethnic support for promises 
to pursue policies they favored. They wanted to bargain under circum-
stances where rationality and discretion could prevail, without the extrem-
ism of either Viereck and his followers or of latter-day superpatriots such 
as the leaders of the American Legion. No less committed to German 
ethnic goals than the extremists were, these moderates believed they 
could gain more for the Germans at less risk. Chief among them were the 
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Ridder brothers, Bernard and Victor, the owners and publishers of the 
New Yorker Staats-Zeitung, one of the largest and most influential of 
the German-language newspapers in the United States.26 
Once it was apparent that no German American would get the 
Vienna post, Viereck began a sustained attack on the Ridders, Paul 
Mueller of the Chicagoer Abendpost, F. W. Elven of the Cincinnati Freie 
Presse, and the German-language press generally. Incensed by their 
refusal to publicize, much less support, the activities of the Biirgerbund 
and other chauvinist groups, Viereck denounced them in January 1922 as 
"renegade Judases" of "supine docility" and "bovine passivity" who meet 
"in secret conclave" with log-rolling politicians. In April he published his 
version of how the Ridder brothers, by their meddling, had prevented 
Bernard Heyn, a German-American attorney of New York, who had been 
a member of the delegation that had visited Harding, from getting the 
Austrian ambassadorship. The Ridders, charged Viereck, had inherited, 
not earned, their positions of leadership and were motivated solely by 
desire for financial gain. He complained that any potential leader who 
failed to concur in their dictation could expect to be punished by being 
denied publicity in the German-language press. Viereck pointed out that 
the Ridders' alleged manipulation had led to their banishment from the 
halls of the socially prestigious Liederkranz, whose president, William O. C. 
Kiene, had also become tangled in the Austrian imbroglio. Viereck dragged 
out what he considered to be dirty laundry from the war period to 
incriminate the Ridders. Finally, he reported that "throughout the country, 
Americans of German descent, desirous of bringing about harmony, are 
in open revolt against such individuals claiming leadership."27 
Viereck's outbursts inevitably alienated intelligent men of good will 
among the German Americans. Frustrated by his failure to attract a 
substantial number of followers, Viereck next broadened his verbal attack 
to include his chief journalist rivals, the editors of Issues of To-Day, 
George Abel Schreiner and Frederick Franklin Schrader. Their periodical, 
closely tied to the Steuben Society of America, was strongly pro-German, 
like the American Monthly, but was better edited and more moderate in 
tone. In Viereck's indictment, Schreiner committed the crime of defending 
the French on one occasion, and Schrader had expressed some doubt 
about the truth of all the stories then circulating about forced prostitu-
tion of German women for black French soldiers then occupying the 
Rhineland. 28 But Viereck continued to suffer a steady erosion of support. 
Ultimately he was unable to command publicity in either the American 
or German-language press. 
During the next two years the German ethnic group seemed to 
acquire a new sense of community. The storm-cellar mentality of the 
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immediate postwar period faded as German-American leaders became 
more openly assertive of their rights and hopes. They made frequent 
references in their speeches and editorials to the wartime persecution 
their people had endured, and fresh voices were heard in favor of politi-
cal organization. The Amerikanische Turnerbund, for example, received 
new, aggressive leadership in the person of George Seibel. He urged 
German Americans to ignore their differences, to unite in order to fight 
prohibition and other forms of cultural imperialism, and to denounce 
such international injustices to Germany as the French invasion of the 
Ruhr. Similarly, the United German Societies of New York acquired a 
Lutheran clergyman, Dr. William Popcke, as its president; he also espoused 
political organization to prevent the disintegration of Germany.29 The 
German-language press also waxed more aggressive. The New Yorker 
Staats-Zeitung, for example, agreed that the time had come for all 
German Americans to develop a powerful, united political organization 
for their own self-protection and self-interest.3o The Steuben Society of 
America emerged as the dominant political organization as the more 
radical Burgerbund faded from the national scene. The New York Times, 
as well as the Staats-Zeitung, frequently publicized Steuben Society 
leaders and activity. Meanwhile, sympathy in the United States for 
Germany grew as the Weimar Republic struggled with inflation and the 
occupation of the Rhineland and the Ruhr. At the same time, revisionist 
historians and journalists, building on the widespread disillusionment with 
the Peace of Versailles, explained the origins of the Great War in terms much 
less favorable to Britain and France than given in the "official" version. 
Thus, as the election of 1924 approached, it appeared that German ethnic 
political action could succeed, even though the nation continued to be 
troubled by excesses of racism, xenophobia, and superpatriotism. 
Most German Americans were disappointed with the major party 
candidates for president in 1924. Calvin Coolidge meant only a continua-
tion of a Republicanism that had done little for them. Democrat John W. 
Davis was a hopeless compromise candidate who, to the Germans, 
symbolized Wall Street and the kind of financial manipulations that had 
dragged the United States into the war. Thus when Robert M. LaFollette, 
their battle-scarred hero from the days of the World War, ran as a 
third-party candidate, the majority of the German ethnic leaders rushed 
enthusiastically to his support. They loved him not so much for what he 
favored as for what he opposed. All they asked of any candidate was that 
he be against British and French dominance in international affairs, 
against the Versailles settlement and any arrangement, such as the Dawes 
Plan, that tended to perpetuate it, against the international bankers of 
Wall Street, and against the restrictive immigration legislation of 1924. If 
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a candidate had a record of having opposed prohibition, women's suffrage, 
and American entry into the World War, so much the better. German 
ethnic politics thus rested on a foundation of negativism; positive goals 
were rarely defined. Because party loyalty did not exist, German ethnic 
leaders could shift easily from a conservative Harding in 1920 to a 
progressive LaFollette in 1924. 
The Steuben Society of America (SSA) was especially active in the 
election of 1924. Its Political Committee sponsored a conference of 
German-American leaders in Chicago early in June to hammer out a 
platform for the edification of the major parties in their national 
conventions. 31 In August the SSA met to endorse LaFollette, and in 
September it staged a great rally in Yankee Stadium in New York. 
LaFollette himself addressed the assembly of 40,000 and told them with 
his usual eloquence what they wanted to hear-that Germans were 
hardworking, valuable citizens who had, by their intelligence, thrift, and 
endurance, contributed immeasurably to America's greatness. Crowds 
heard similar speeches at meetings staged in many other cities, including 
Philadelphia, Buffalo, Chicago, San Francisco, and Portland. By these 
means the German leaders hoped to demonstrate that their people were 
good patriotic Americans who happened to speak the German language 
and to value German culture; they were determined to revise the image of 
the German American as being more interested in Germany than in the 
United States.32 
Still, memories of World War I remained vivid. No longer, announced 
the New Yorker Staats-Zeitung, will German Americans allow them-
selves to be muzzled, slandered, or harassed. The enemies of Deutschtum 
can be routed if German Americans will work together to present a 
united front. 33 "The German element," wrote Frederick Franklin Schrader, 
"knows when it is insulted, ignored, and impugned. It has a whole 
register of grievances, and since the policy is to dampen the smoldering 
fires of discontent rather than to put out the fire, the explosion will take 
place in due time, and it will not be to the liking of the powers that be."34 
Viereck reminded his readers that "no official rebuke was ever administered 
to the wretches who were guilty of ... outrages [against Americans of 
German descent] except in a mild Presidential protest, utterly inefficient 
in checking the tendency to declare American citizens of German blood 
beyond the protection of the law."35 Meanwhile, the national press gave 
extensive coverage to the activities of the Steuben Society and reported in 
considerable detail the political preferences of German leaders in the 
various states.36 
But even with the LaFollette candidacy, the Germans could not 
achieve unity; it was impossible to define the group interest to everyone's 
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satisfaction. It is true that the majority of the German-language news-
papers condemned both the Democrats and the Republicans as they 
endorsed LaFollette, but the old divisions between the extremists and the 
more cautious editors and publishers had not disappeared. 37 Fearing a 
repetition of Viereck's strategy of 1920, F. W. Elven, the publisher of the 
Cincinnati Freie Presse, authored a lengthy editorial in which he reviewed 
the "flagrant tactlessness" of the Biirgerbund with its policy of ethnic separa-
tism and of making demands in return for concessions. The appropriate 
leaders of the German ethnic group, insisted Elven, were the publishers of 
the German-language press; it was their duty to prevent "persons who lack 
every qualification of leadership to force themselves into prominent po-
sitions and by their blunders compromise the cause of the German element." 
Elven argued that circumstances made ethnic political activity unwise. 
"We have our hands full at present to make amends for the sins of men of 
German blood who do not take their oath of allegiance too seriously and 
refuse to recognize the fact that we are not living in a German colony."38 
While Elven did not mention Viereck by name, it is clear whom he had in 
mind when he upbraided incompetent and impertinent political amateurs 
who "immurred themselves with their itching vanity and monumental self-
esteem." Others shared Elven's view. Schrader, for example, urged that 
the Steubenfest in Yankee Stadium be divested of all suggestions of 
"hyphenism" that were so susceptible to exploitation by "Anglomaniacs, 
Ku Kluxers, and the New York Morgan Gazettes." Nothing, he said, must be 
done "to suggest that our citizens of German origin expect either privileges 
or rewards in return for the solidarity they will manifest" on election day.39 
The German American World agreed with Elven that the Viereck visit to 
Harding was stupid and that German ethnic political segregation was the 
greatest of follies. Yet it adhered to the notion that if the German element 
was "to reassert its claim to that position of influence to which it is his-
torically and economically entitled," it must remain neutral in the political 
contest until partisan lines are distinctly defined and then assign its weight 
to the candidate or party that is compatible with the German interest. 4o 
Viereck was outraged by Elven's attack and published a lengthy 
defense of his own behavior. Later he countered with charges that German-
language newspapers that supported Coolidge, such as Elven's Freie 
Presse, did so because they had been bribed with lucrative advertising 
contracts arranged by the Republican campaign committee. Viereck 
associated such corruption with the tragic suicide of Hans Hackel of the 
St. Louis Westliche Post; but he reserved special scorn for Val J. Peter, 
publisher of the Omaha Tribune, who, according to testimony given 
before a congressional investigating committee, had flipped to Coolidge 
late in the campaign in return for $12,500. 41 
German-American Leadership Strategies 65 
Any prominent German who disagreed with the dominant pro-
LaFollette position was severely criticized in the German-American press. 
When Charles Nagel, whose loyalty to the Republican party was above 
reproach, announced that he intended to vote for Coolidge on the basis 
of nonethnic issues, the Steuben Society prepared a long rebuttal. The 
society charged that Nagel, although proud of his German heritage, chose 
Coolidge because he was the St. Louis representative of the Republican 
powers of Wall Street.42 
The failure of LaFollette to win election in 1924 underscores the 
inability of the German-American leaders to marshal the ethnic vote. 
They obviously had not wielded the balance of political power, even 
though a substantial portion of LaFollette's five million votes was cast by 
persons of German birth or descent. Many thousands had also voted for 
the major party candidates, especially Coolidge. It was apparent that either 
major party could ignore the Germans if such a course were otherwise in 
their interest. Nevertheless, the German ethnic leaders continued to delude 
themselves. Carl Schmidt wrote that his Steuben Society had finally shed 
the party yolk. "If we continue to throw our vote whichever way our 
conscience may dictate, we will compel the respect of all parties, and will 
henceforth receive consideration by whatever party may be in power." 
Viereck insisted that support for LaFollette had cut across all German 
ethnic classes and group divisions; he even toyed with the idea of a third 
party "recruited largely from the German element."43 Viereck, Schmidt, 
and other leaders knew that German Americans generally were still bitter 
about their wartime treatment; they erroneously assumed that the masses 
would translate their resentment into unified political action. This capa-
city to misinterpret experience and to believe only that which conformed 
to preconceptions gives substance to Mencken's observation that the 
Germans in America were led by mediocrities. Yet the actual voting 
behavior of German American citizens belies his charge that they almost 
instinctively followed fools. 
There was no way that the strategy urged by the Steuben Society of 
America could produce strong political leadership among the Germans. 
In this view, party loyalty was an evil; support was to go to the party that 
would cater to the ethnic group interest. Such a policy precluded the 
possibility of a German ethnic leader achieving prominence in one of the 
major parties.44 Election to important political office was therefore 
impossible. The only remaining avenue to a leadership position was to 
work through ethnic organizations such as the Steuben Society. But this 
alternative offered no long-term promise, for the Germans constituted a 
disintegrating constituency-a melting iceberg, in the words of one observer. 
Moreover, the Steuben Society as a matter of policy played down the 
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leadership of its officers. Despite his many years of service at the head of 
the Steuben Society, Theodore Hoffmann was not even well known 
among German Americans. 
The bankruptcy of the idea that the Germans held the balance of 
political power in the United States, provided they could unite, was made 
manifest by the presidential election of 1928, when they were hopelessly 
split by the candidacies of Herbert Hoover and Al Smith. One group 
insisted that Smith's Democratic party was still the party of Woodrow 
Wilson, William McAdoo, and A. Mitchell Palmer and that the hated 
prohibition amendment had been foisted upon the American people by 
Southern Democrats. Hoover, they said, was of German descent and 
proud of it; besides, he had saved thousands of Germans from starvation 
in his relief work after the war. But others saw Hoover as a pro-British 
conservative and a prohibitionist. They much preferred the Irish-Catholic 
Smith, with his open record of opposition to prohibition, his distrust of 
England, and his support for liberal, progressive measures. Capitalizing on 
this sentiment, the Democratic National Committee flaunted the names of 
persons who endorsed Smith, including the well-known former Republican 
congressman Richard Bartholdt of Missouri, Theodore Hoffmann of the 
Steuben Society, Charles Korz of the Catholic Central-Verein, Val Peter 
of the Omaha Tribune, baseball players Babe Ruth and Lou Gehrig, and 
even the disdainful H. L. Mencken. 45 But there were still other Americans 
of German descent, chiefly pietistic Protestants, who favored Hoover 
precisely because he was "dry." After the election, the usually apolitical 
Christliche Apologete, a Methodist periodical, hailed the new chief with 
a full-page portrait. Meanwhile Lutherans rejected Smith simply because 
he was Catholic. 46 
The German-American press was similarly divided. A few news-
papers, including Elven's Cincinnati Freie Presse, endorsed Hoover. A 
few more, such as Paul Mueller's Chicagoer Abendpost, supported Smith. 
But the great majority, the New Yorker Staats-Zeitung among them, were 
reluctant to offend any significant number of their subscribers and remained 
independent or even ignored the election entirely.47 
The Steuben Society of America was incapable of providing leader-
ship under these conditions. At first its organ, the Progressive, edited by 
Frederick Franklin Schrader, dismissed Hoover as pro-British and praised 
Smith as the champion of all that was dear to German Americans. In 
August, however, Schrader made a sudden switch, offered apologies to 
Hoover, and recommended his election. Certain local branches of the 
SSA also publicly announced for Hoover, but the national organization, 
wracked by internal dissension, finally endorsed Smith in mid-October. 
It severed its ties to the Progressive and declared the Steuben News, the 
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publication of the New York council, to be its official voice m the 
future. 48 
After the fiasco of 1928, German Americans spoke less of what 
could be accomplished through political unity. References to World War I 
became less frequent. Viereck abandoned all pretense of ethnic leadership 
as he surrendered the editorship of the American Monthly to others. The 
Steuben Society of America continued to exist, of course, but its 
effectiveness was scorned in many quarters. Unable to agree on presiden-
tial candidates, it unintentionally abdicated a national leadership role as 
it concentrated on state and local politics. Meanwhile, the Steuben News 
larded its pages with glowing accounts of the heroic deeds of the ethnic 
fathers. Sanitized tales of Steuben, Schurz, De Kalb, Lieber, Sigel, and 
many others were repeated ad nauseam, as ever more obscure Americans 
of German origins were discovered and publicized in this effort to lay 
claim to authentic Americanness. 
But the number of German Americans who were attracted by such 
unrelieved filiopietism diminished steadily. By the end of the 1920s the 
Americanizers were firmly in control of most German immigrant churches. 
The number of German-language publications, including church periodi-
cals and trade journals, dwindled to 172, only a fourth of the prewar 
figure, and the multifarious Vereine continued to atrophy and die. In 
1930 Oscar Illing, editor of Die Neue Zeit of Chicago and an old-time 
German-American journalist in the Viereck mold, delivered an extended 
lamentation on the impending fate of German America. Illing saw betrayal 
everywhere. No ethnic institutions, least of all the German-language 
press, escaped his jeremiads: all were led by fearful, self-serving cowards 
who avoided controversy and gave lip service only to the maintenance of 
language and culture. In his view, singing societies, for example, had 
degenerated into English-speaking businessmen's clubs where German 
songs could sometimes be heard, but were sung by hired singers. Illing 
could offer no remedy for the dissolution of ethnicity; he repeated the 
threadbare lines about political unity, but admitted it was impossible of 
attainment. He refused to understand that for the ethnic masses, immi-
grant language and culture could not be perpetuated beyond the point of 
their social or psychological utility. Illing wanted German Americans to 
organize in order "to cultivate the imponderable properties of German 
culture," and he resented it fiercely when ordinary people could not share 
his elitist values. The only bright spot in Illing's ethnic world was the new 
Carl Schurz Memorial Foundation, which he understood to be a great 
German-American cultural institute of imposing character and financial 
power sure to compel respect. 49 
Although the Schurz Foundation never became quite what Illing 
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imagined, it was symbolic of a new emphasis in German ethnic life at the 
beginning of the 1930s. The futility of the political strategy having 
finally become obvious, leadership fell increasingly to the moderates, led 
by the editors and publishers who stressed the importance of cultural 
education programs. 50 Still, new efforts were made to create national 
organizations capable of serving the interests of Germans in America. 
One of these, the German-American Federation of the U.S.A., embodied 
all the cultural goals of the Steuben Society but specifically rejected 
politics as a means to achieve them. Merely a revival of the old prewar 
National German-American Alliance, it had difficulty attracting supporters, 
partly because of the interest shown in it by several American proto-Nazi 
organizations. 51 More important was the National Congress of Ameri-
cans of German Descent, an informal conference that met in New York in 
October 1932 under the auspices of the German-American Conference of 
Greater New York and Vicinity. The guidance of the Ridder brothers was 
much in evidence at this meeting. Cynically interpreted, the congress was 
an attempt by the German-language press to sustain and revive the ethnic 
community in a time of economic distress, just as the officers of partici-
pating ethnic organizations hoped thereby to preserve their positions of 
authority and respect. 
The United States was approaching the depth of the Great Depres-
sion at the time of the first National Congress of Americans of German 
Descent. It was surprisingly well attended. Most delegates represented 
national, regional, and city organizations and alliances, but ethnic craft 
unions, socialist workers groups, and church bodies had no interest in 
such an affair. At the core of the congress were cultural chauvinists 
whose prosperity and education permitted them the luxury of cherishing 
ethnic heritage for its own sake. Many speakers urged the assembly to 
lead the German element to its rightful place in American society. Their 
repeated use of such words as "recognition" and "respect" demonstrate 
that they were still troubled by the status deprivation engendered by 
World War 1. The congress seemed to flounder about in search of some 
device or some institution that promised to preserve ethnic culture. It 
supported proposals to create an institute for research in ethnic language 
and culture, and to establish German houses at universities, German-
language instruction programs, information bureaus, and cultural exchanges 
with Germany. The least realistic was a proposal to create a German-
American university. 52 
Meanwhile, the Schurz Foundation had been established in Phila-
delphia. Supported by substantial contributions from several wealthy 
German-American businessmen and industrialists, it made no pretense to 
ethnic leadership per se. Instead, the foundation promoted cultural exchange 
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programs and sought to acquaint Americans with German cultural achieve-
ments through its beautifully edited magazine, American-German Review, 
which started in 1934.53 
Philadelphia was also the scene of the second National Congress of 
Americans of German Descent, held in October 1933 in commemoration 
of the 250th anniversary of the first German settlement in America in 
1683 at Germantown. Devoid of new ideas and unable to overcome the 
constrictions of economic depression, the congress movement died 
thereafter. Quite sensibly, neither the first nor the second congress had 
shown any concern for Germany, possibly out of fear of being identified' 
with Nazism. But both congresses also tended to ignore the problems of 
the approximately four hundred thousand immigrants from Germany 
who entered the United States during the 1920s.54 
When the older generation of immigrants (or "Grays," as they were 
traditionally called) commented at all on the postwar arrivals from 
Germany ("Greens"), it was usually in uncomplimentary terms. They 
were distressed chiefly because the latter showed little interest in the 
preservation of Deutschtum and often formed organizations of their own 
rather than supporting older, established institutions, most of which 
desperately needed the backing of the newcomers. In one instance, the 
Greens were even criticized for joining the liberal Evangelical Synod, 
which was presumably less committed to German-language maintenance, 
rather than the conservative, orthodox Missouri and Wisconsin Lutheran 
synods. Observers in Germany also disparaged the postwar emigrants as 
having an unprecedented proportion of complainers and renegades who, 
after one year in America, preferred to speak bad English rather than 
good German. 55 
The Greens themselves saw their circumstances differently. One of 
their most eloquent spokesmen was Dr. Fritz Schlesinger of New York, 
who addressed the first National Congress of Americans of German 
Descent in 1932. He reminded the assembled Grays that the postwar 
immigrants had come seeking a new life, believing that America offered 
them more opportunities and better security than did Germany. Unlike 
the earlier immigrants, most of whom were farmers and workers who 
had arrived before 1895, the Greens were representative of all levels of 
German society, including a disproportionate number of intellectuals. 
The majority, said Schlesinger, were interested in a rapid acculturation 
and hence tended to regard the use of the German language as a neces-
sary evil during the transition period. They had not pursued Deutschtum 
in America and generally considered it a hindrance to a successful 
adjustment. Schlesinger explained that soon after their arrival these 
immigrants discovered that most ethnic associations were interested in 
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perpetuating an outmoded form of German culture. Moreover, the Vereine 
seemed both unprepared and unwilling to serve the needs of the newcomers. 
Forced to be self-reliant, the Greens therefore used the societies for the 
only thing they were good for-convenient social contacts. The idea that 
the immigrant had a duty of some kind to preserve Deutschtum in 
America never occurred to them. Schlesinger further pointed out that 
most of the agencies for cultural preservation, such as the Carl Schurz 
Memorial Foundation, the Goethe Society of America, the many singing 
societies, and the great umbrella organizations like the United German 
Societies and the German-American Conference, were almost exclusively 
run by second- and third-generation German Americans.56 
The problem of German-American unity, according to Schlesinger, 
concerned social class much more than people were willing to believe. 
Americans of German descent completely overlooked the fact that Germany 
was a land sharply divided into social strata and that in their private 
social relationships Germans rarely crossed the traditional lines. Upon 
his arrival in America, the newcomer found persons of all classes and 
occupations mixed together in the Vereine; furthermore, the leaders 
seemed chiefly to be "self-made" men, economically successful but culturally 
deficient. Thus the immigrant intellectuals-academics and professional 
people, many with language problems that forced them to accept work 
beneath their educational level-felt economically inferior but culturally 
superior to most of the German Americans. Made uncomfortable by this 
anomaly, they often preferred to seek admission to American circles 
rather than to ethnic organizations. Yet these persons were precisely the 
ones who were expected to be the new champions of German Geistesgilte. 
Even the simpler people among the Greens, Schlesinger observed, sensed 
a provincialism or the lack of progressive or modem spirit among the 
German-American leaders. Finally, Schlesinger pleaded for a deeper 
involvement in American political affairs, not in terms of the German 
ethnic group interest, but in the service of the entire American society. 
Ties to German political parties must be severed, he said, and preoccupa-
tion with daily political events in Germany must end, if German Ameri-
can unity was to be achieved. 
Schlesinger, a Jew, was obviously thinking of the Nazi party and the 
advent of Adolf Hitler, who came to power in Germany three months 
later. Other postwar immigrants were also thinking of Hitler, but in 
rather more favorable terms. American Nazi organizations were formed 
as early as 1924. Their memberships consisted almost exclusively of 
urban workers or proletarianized members of the German middle class 
who found few of their American dreams fulfilled. In their frustration, 
they consciously rejected assimilation, disparaged American life, and 
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embraced fascism. At no time did the Nazi organizations attract a collec-
tive membership of more than a few thousand persons.57 But because of 
their ideology of authoritarianism, racism, and extreme nationalism, they 
crowded the staid, bourgeois German-American societies from the stage 
of public attention, beginning with Hitler's rise to power in 1933. From 
then until the American entry into World War II, the activities of the 
Friends of the New Germany and its successor, the so-called German-
American Bund, were daily fare in the New York Times and other major 
metropolitan newspapers. By the end of the decade, Fritz Kuhn, the 
leader of the Bund, was the best-known German in America.58 
American Nazi organizations, like the older ethnic societies, were 
also concerned with German-American unity and leadership. But instead 
of basing their appeal on culture, the Nazis used race. In their view, all 
Germans everywhere were united by blood and were thereby bound in 
loyalty to the Fatherland. Anti-Semitic and anti-Communist propaganda 
was spread to attract popular support; brutal methods and threats of 
violence were employed in a series of efforts, most of them unsuccessful, 
to take over or to discredit the old umbrella organizations and the 
Steuben Society. 
The leaders of the German-American Bund repeatedly demon-
strated ignorance of American society and of the place of German 
immigrants in it. They understood nothing of American ideals and values 
or of the extent to which the masses of German Americans shared them. 
The efforts of Kuhn and his coterie to assume the leadership of German 
America on dictatorship principles must be written off as an abject 
failure. Even the German foreign ministry was frequently embarrassed by 
Bundist blunders and took all steps short of outright repudiation to 
control the organization. 
Yet the American Nazis succeeded in keeping the established leaders 
of the ethnic group off balance. This was partly due, of course, to the 
apparent success of the Hitler government in both domestic and foreign 
affairs during the 1930s. Few prominent old-line German-American leaders 
were willing to speak out forcefully and consistently against Nazi outrages, 
so proud were they of the positive accomplishments of the new regime. 
They took delight in the way Hitler violated the detested Treaty of 
Versailles. The leaders of the Americanized German churches likewise 
refrained from condemning Hitlerism.59 Indeed, some of the churchmen 
seem to have been encouraged to indulge in their own versions of anti-
Semitism.60 Unlike secular societies, the churches did not count Jews 
among their members. Thus only German-Jewish and Socialist organiza-
tions fought vigorously and relentlessly against American Nazism from 
1933 to World War 11.61 
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As a matter of policy, the leaders of the old organizations generally 
avoided commenting on Nazi excesses. In the cases of the churchmen, 
silence was partly the consequence of their Weltanschauung; disposed to 
divide human affairs into two separate worlds of the sacred and the 
profane, they rarely discussed contemporary issues of any kind. But the 
leaders of the secular organizations were fearful of losing their positions 
of prestige. Their societies had already been enervated by depression and 
assimilation, and they were reluctant to risk alienating even small parts 
of their constituencies. Some leaders were practically driven to take 
strong anti-Nazi stands by the Bundists, whose bully tactics left them no 
choice. Their moral perceptions dulled by ethnocentrism, the leaders of 
the German-American Conference of New York and the Steuben Society 
of America refrained from taking a forthright anti-Nazi stand until 1938, 
when the insolence and contempt of the Nazi challenge to their leadership 
was so general it could no longer be ignored.62 
Two other events in 1938 stimulated a somewhat more general and 
open criticism among German Americans of Hitler and National Socialism. 
One was the imprisonment in a concentration camp of Pastor Martin 
Niemoller, a special hero of German Protestants who had been a com-
mander of a German submarine in World War I. The other was the 
Kristallnacht pogrom of November 1938, touched off by the assassina-
tion in Paris of a German diplomat by a young Polish Jew. These acts 
finally goaded both the Kirchendeutsche and the Vereinsdeutsche into 
condemning Nazism.63 But even thereafter, muted pride in Hitler's deeds 
was more common in the German-language press than was consistent 
condemnation.64 Some small-town newspapers, such as the Fredericksburg 
[Texas] Wochenblatt, concentrated on local news and ignored the world 
crisis generally; a great many papers, among them the Sheboygan 
[Wisconsin] Amerika, tried to present a neutral or objective reporting of 
the news; a few, such as the Iowa Reform [Davenport] and the Dakota 
Freie Presse [Bismarck], were clearly pro-German, anti-Semitic, isolationist, 
and intensely anti-Roosevelt. 
Just before World War II began in 1939, Carl Wittke, the eminent 
historian of German America, who was then a dean at Oberlin College, 
encapsulated the moral problem faced by the leadership in his own ethnic 
group. It was apparent, Wittke wrote, that newspaper accounts of Nazi 
atrocities against the Jews were not exaggerated and that there were 
millions of persons in Germany who were appalled by the policies of the 
Hitler regime. But instead of giving moral support to honorable men who 
were fighting against fearful odds for decency, humanity, and brotherhood, 
the leaders of the German element preferred to extol the glories of the 
"Porty-eighters" and their flaming liberalism while excusing Nazi excesses 
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as a passing phase or characterizing "the noble fuehrer" as an unfortunate 
"victim of an ignorant or brutal minority of his party."65 
Whereas H. L. Mencken had been disdainful of German ethnic 
group leadership, Wittke was simply disgusted. He was offended by their 
moral obtuseness and narrow chauvinism. It is clear, moreover, that their 
record over the two decades of the interwar period is distinguished by 
neither insight nor foresight. Most spokesmen for the group, self-appointed 
or otherwise, were deficient in understanding their constituencies and 
how they, as leaders, might relate to the great masses of Americans of 
German origins or descent. Remarkably various in economic status, 
religious belief, and even in language and culture, most German Americans, 
unlike the core of leaders, were not moved primarily by ethnic consi-
derations. Hundreds of thousands of persons who were technically counted 
as German Americans had no significant measure of identification with 
the ethnic group. Indeed, some were antagonistic to programs for the 
preservation of ethnic identity. Others perceived ethnicity as inhibiting 
the attainment of other goals deemed more important. Church Germans, 
for example, abandoned ethnicity at an accelerated pace during the 
1920s and 1930s. 
But even those leaders who shared the desire for ethnic unity could 
not agree on how it should be attained. Some persisted in strategies that 
were inevitably counterproductive, given the character of the times, and 
thus stimulated further fragmentation of the ethnic group. Filled with 
bitterness and resentment over their treatment in World War I and 
perturbed by an enduring sense of having lost status, they first hoped to 
regain respect through united ethnic political action. Some advocated the 
use of raw political power; others preferred persuasion. After the political 
strategy had failed repeatedly during the 1920s, they shifted to an empha-
sis on culture. But their programs were based upon elitist values at 
variance with those of the masses. The leaders refused to believe that 
immigrant language and culture could not be effectively perpetuated 
beyond the period of social or psychological utility. Vitiated by the Great 
Depression, cultural programs faded as the American Nazis, ever bold 
and arrogant, captured public attention with their strategy of blood. This 
racist quest for German-American unity, appealing chiefly to recent, 
postwar immigrants, was so antipathetic to American ideals and habits of 
thought and attitude that it eventually drove most traditional German-
American leaders into opposition. This meant that, except on the local or 
personal levels, the attainment of ethnic group goals by means of orga-
nized activity was abandoned with the advent of World War II. 
One may scarcely speak of German ethnic leadership in the United 
States since World War II. The Steuben Society of America, the Catholic 
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Central-Verein, the Carl Schurz Memorial Foundation, the American 
Turners, and more than a dozen other national organizations continued 
to exist, sustained by large numbers of German-speaking refugees from 
central and eastern Europe who arrived during the 1940s and 1950s.66 
Old patterns persist. The attitudes of the old Biirgerbund are presently 
reincarnated in the Deutsche-Americanische National Kongress and in 
the Federation of American Citizens of German Descent. Their rhetoric 
and strategies often seem unchanged from what they were in the 1920s.67 
But no one listens; these organizations, united chiefly by a hatred of 
Communism, are unknown to the general public and ignored by most 
German Americans who may have heard of them. Meanwhile, German 
ethnicity thrives in many hundreds of local Vereine throughout the land, 
but especially in major centers of German population, such as New York, 
Cleveland, and Chicago, plus Florida and California. They gather together 
persons whose attachment to the German language and culture is more 
emotional than intellectual, more social than political, who are interested 
chiefly in maintaining an associational environment in which they may 
converse, dine, play, sing, and dance with others who share their values 
and attitudes.68 Ironically, it is this dimension of German life in America 
that the chauvinists of half a century ago predicted could not survive 
without their leadership. 
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yerman Immigrants and 
.9Lmencan PoCities: Problems of 
Leadership, Parties, and Issues 5 
For a hundred years, from the age of Jackson to the era of Franklin 
Roosevelt, German Americans complained about the political apathy 
they perceived to be characteristic of their ethnic group. As they saw it, 
German immigrants tended to be phlegmatic or lethargic when it came to 
political matters, at least in contrast to the vigor and industry they 
displayed in their economic pursuits. The Germans also appeared to be 
politically backward and ineffective, at least in comparison to the Irish. 
In this view, apathy explained why the number of German Americans 
nominated and elected to political office was rarely commensurate with 
the proportion of German Americans in the electorate. The frequently 
voiced complaint went still further: American politicians paid insufficient 
attention to the needs and desires of their German constituents, and they 
rarely seemed to appreciate the magnificent contributions Germans had 
made to American greatness. 
There was, of course, a substantial factual basis for these charges, 
depending upon one's definition of political behavior and the role of 
politics in a multiethnic, democratic society. Most of the critics took a 
narrow view of politics; for them, it was primarily a matter of voting and 
holding office. But a meaningful assessment of political behavior encom-
passes much more, such as becoming a citizen, paying taxes, assuming 
jury duty, and serving in the armed forces. It takes in any discussion of 
political issues and the relationships of an ethnic group to governmental 
and political processes, in newspapers, editorials, public addresses, or 
sermons, and it also includes the influence such activity may have on the 
formation of public policy. Thus, for a German-American clergyman to 
take a stand on the compelling issues of the day - slavery, prohibition, 
compulsory public school education, neutrality in world wars-or to 
refuse on theological grounds to take a stand on such issues, is also to 
behave politically. One cannot easily separate political behavior from 
other activities. It is woven into the fabric of lik with all its complexities 
and contradictions; it reflects relationships with work, play, beliefs, values, 
and aspirations. 
Although such a comprehensive view of political behavior is not 
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new, few recent studies of German-American political history have placed 
ethnic leaders in such an enlarged social and cultural context. Officeholding, 
for example, has not been studied systematically or with appropriate 
comparisons. There is good evidence that many German-born persons held 
minor political office already in the pre-Civil War era, but we do not know 
how their activity compares to that of either the native-born or other 
immigrant groups. We know also that only five persons of German birth 
have ever been elected to the United States Senate. But that fact has little 
meaning unless it is compared statistically to the record of other groups. 
Another important aspect of ethnic officeholding concerns pre-
emigration experience. The Irish, for example, had acquired crucial politi-
cal skills in their long struggle against English dominance in Ireland. 
Accustomed to questioning the legitimacy of formal government, they 
felt comfortable in America with the extralegal arrangements developed 
by nineteenth-century urban political machines. In addition, the Irish had 
no language barrier to impede their political acculturation. By contrast, 
German immigrants, speaking a foreign tongue and accustomed to authori-
tarian regimes buttressed by the church, brought little political experi-
ence to America. Moreover, Germans were much more likely than the 
Irish to settle on farms, where isolation from political activity was more 
or less inevitable in the nineteenth century. In the cities, however, Ger-
mans generally enjoyed better economic prospects because of their crafts, 
education, and wealth than did the Irish, whose poverty and lack of skills 
forced them to pursue any means of survival, including the political. 
Thus the Irish immigrant as policeman and ward politician became a 
fixture in our national mythology, but we can hardly imagine a German 
equivalent. 
Political involvement was discouraged by some of the German 
immigrant churches. The Mennonites in particular were commited to the 
doctrine of the two kingdoms-the sacred and the secular-and taught 
that, while the Christian was in the world, he was not of it. Politics was a 
worldly snare, according to this view, and was to be avoided except in 
those cases when the defense of the faith demanded it. Certain German 
Lutheran theologians, especially of the Missouri Synod, held similar 
views. Insisting upon a total separation of church and state, they explicitly 
encouraged a spirit of separatism as a means of preserving their "pure 
doctrine" and shielding the young from the allurements of a sinful world. 
Politics in America, these theologians believed, was hopelessly corrupt; 
as a group, politicians were greedy, ignorant hacks given to bribery and 
demagoguery. Such attitudes naturally precluded any encouragement to 
political officeholding by the laity. 
Another important question regarding officeholding by immigrants 
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concerns the relationship between the official and his ethnic group. Did a 
German-born holder of high political office see himself as a representa-
tive of his own ethnic group, or did he rise above such considerations in 
order to serve broader constituencies? It seems clear that an ethnic 
politician could successfully adopt the former role only under special 
conditions, such as when his group comprised the majority (or its func-
tional equivalent) in his electoral unit or when ethnic group interest 
happened to coincide with the majority view. In the nineteenth century, 
Irish-American politicians in such cities as New York, Boston, and Chicago 
often enjoyed these circumstances, but the electoral constituencies of 
German-American politicians were usually less highly concentrated. More 
important, German-American voters were frequently spread across the 
socioeconomic spectrum and hence rarely held uniform views on the 
political issues of the day. In other words, the German ethnic community, 
unlike the Irish, was ordinarily so diverse, with its rich and poor, its 
educated and uneducated, its skilled and unskilled workers, its urban as 
well as rural residents, its Catholics and Protestants, that unity in support 
of anything or anyone was rarely possible to achieve. Hence, the numer-
ous lamentations about the lack of German unity by the most idealistic of 
German-American leaders, who, it is worth noting, were usually journalists, 
not practicing politicians. 
Such leaders understood, of course, that the Germans in America 
were a remarkably diverse and divided group. They hoped, however, that 
unity could be achieved through an appeal to German idealism, whatever 
its relationship may have been to the issues of the day. But such a notion 
was fundamentally elitist in character and ignored the fact that ordinary 
voters were more likely to be moved by practical "bread-and-butter" 
considerations. This is not to suggest that the common folk lacked 
idealism, but rather that the things they valued were ordered differently. 
Thus we have the familiar rhetoric of the Forty-eighters-that grand 
generation of political refugees-who were outraged by slavery in a 
republic and whose idealism usually led them to strong support for 
Abraham Lincoln and the newly founded Republican party. Yet the 
common people among the Germans in America noticed that in many 
states Republican leaders were often persons who just a few years earlier 
had been prominently associated with the nativist, anti-Catholic Know 
Nothing party. Moreover, ordinary German Americans, who often had 
close ties to religious institutions, also observed that the prominent 
German-American leaders were usually anticlerical freethinkers or atheists, 
some of whom regularly castigated the churches and their clergy. It 
should not surprise us, therefore, that a large proportion of German-
American voters marched to different drummers and voted Democratic. 
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The vocal German idealists were also highly critical of the Ameri-
can political system and its apparent pragmatic qualities. Despite their 
intelligence and erudition, they failed to understand that pragmatism was 
a necessary ingredient in the American political recipe and they were too 
impatient or disdainful to discover this truth through experience. Nor did 
they understand that the Constitution of the United States, through its 
provisions for an electoral college, indirectly and unintentionally dictated 
a two-party system. Thus, from the 1850s to the 1920s, from Karl 
Heinzen to George Sylvester Viereck, we have examples of German-
American leaders who were advocates of a German-American political 
party-a third party united on the basis of German idealism that would 
hold the balance of power. By positioning itself between the two major 
parties, such an organization presumably could force one or the other 
major party to do its bidding. Ironically, the bald pragmatism inherent in 
this approach was espoused in the name of idealism. 
The advocates of this strategy, believing in the superiority of Ger-
man idealism and in the power of their logic, naively hoped to transcend 
German-American heterogeneity to forge an ethnic unity and thus an 
effective voting bloc. But they failed to see that their efforts could 
generate only resentment and disdain among non-German political leaders. 
An ethnic politician who tried to force one or the other party to support 
the interests or ideals of his group could never expect to attain a position 
of power or influence in a major party. Such a strategy would inevitably 
narrow the base of his support. The most that could be expected was that 
a major party would temporarily bend to support the minority interest, 
but the long-range effect would be to remove ethnic leaders from genuine 
political power within the major party structures. 
In the American system, especially in the nineteenth century, advance-
ment in political officeholding was a concomitant of loyalty to party and 
not to the ideals of a minority ethnic group. If a politician worked 
faithfully and consistently for his party, he could expect to move gradually 
to higher levels of leadership, authority, and power. This system, however, 
placed a considerable strain on the typical German-American politician. 
If advancement is linked to party loyalty, it is incumbent upon the 
politician to support his party even in those instances when it pursues a 
course contrary to ethnic group interest or to ethnically defined ideals. 
Faced with this dilemma, those German-American politicians who chose 
loyalty to party over idealism were forced to abandon strong identifica-
tion with their ethnic group; those who chose loyalty to idealism over 
party could not win reelection. 
An example of the latter is the revered Carl Schurz. Schurz was 
truly a man of extraordinary talents-a brilliant journalist and orator, 
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minister to Spain, Civil War general, senator from Missouri, secretary of 
the interior, and, at least by his own account, a confidant of most 
presidents from Lincoln to Theodore Roosevelt. Americans generally 
paid attention to Carl Schurz only when he transcended ethnic politics to 
speak and act on issues that were important to the entire nation. His 
idealism led him to oppose slavery, to support Lincoln, to advocate 
Radical Republicanism in the Reconstruction era, and later to lead the 
Liberal Republican movement. In those instances his views were shared 
by countless Americans of reformist tendencies; the fact that they were 
rooted in his German culture was incidental to his success. But when 
Schurz tried to function as an ethnic politician, he was less successful. He 
was elected to only one office-by the Missouri legislature, not by the 
voters of Missouri directly-and he had no chance of reelection. It is true 
that Lincoln and other political leaders perceived him as being exception-
ally influential with German voters and that they sometimes fashioned 
their strategies accordingly; yet there is no convincing evidence that 
Schurz was actually able "to deliver the German vote," especially among 
the thousands of Catholics, Lutherans, and other church people who 
distrusted him. Ultimately, Schurz's real eminence was as an American 
statesman, not as a German American. His effectiveness emerged from 
his eloquent exposition of national issues, not those that preoccupied the 
attention of the German-American ethnic group. 
Sen. Robert Wagner of New York typifies those German-born 
politicians who chose loyalty to party over ethnic idealism. Invariably 
loyal to the Democratic party, Wagner pragmatically pursued policies 
that were framed by the interests of his multiethnic constituency. Through-
out his career as a Democratic politician, from urban wards in New York 
to the U.S. Senate, Wagner always played down his German birth. 
Although he was interested in the affairs of the Roland Society (a Ger-
man Democratic political organization in New York City), he never gave 
it publicity. In the end, his record of legislative accomplishment as the 
champion of the interests of the common, laboring people in New York 
and the nation easily exceeded the achievements attained by Schurz. One 
specialized in words, the other in deeds. 
Wagner'~ long political career, which spanned four decades, was 
thus largely independent of the Germans as a special interest group and 
therefore of the vagaries of ethnic politics. Unlike the Irish or the blacks, 
who were united by economic deprivation, social ostracism, and religious 
discrimination, the generally more prosperous Germans had no reason to 
act in concert except to defend their culture. Issues capable of stimulating 
the Germans to unite politically, such as prohibition and attacks on 
parochial schools, were usually temporary. When the threat faded, so did 
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opportunities for political leadership based on German group interest. 
Moreover, the defense of German ethnic culture was essentially a nega-
tive enterprise. It was usually a question of what the Germans were 
against rather than what they were for. If a German-American political 
leader had no reason for existence other than the defense of ethnic 
culture, he inevitably sounded strident, uncompromising, and unattractive 
to nonimmigrant voters. 
Still, ethnocultural clashes were endemic in the nineteenth century, 
and the political conflict they generated flared from time to time and 
from place to place, sometimes with remarkable intensity. An early 
controversy concerned questions of citizenship and the right to vote 
and hold office. Nativist fears of immigrant voters were greatly aug-
mented in the 1830s and 1840s as huge numbers of Irish and Germans 
arrived in the United States. Because most of the former and probably 
half of the latter were Roman Catholics, they imported a value sys-
tem that sometimes contrasted sharply with the pietistic Protestantism 
characteristic of American society at that time. Eager to limit the 
influence of such immigrants in the political process, many old-stock 
Americans used the Whig party to attack the status of the foreign-born 
as equal citizens. 
Nativism took on a variety of forms and goaded many thousands 
of ordinary German immigrants to act politically on the local level, 
where they usually affiliated with the Democratic party. The Democrats, 
inspired by Jeffersonian concepts of the negative state and spurred by the 
Jacksonian rhetoric of egalitarianism, were pleased to have immigrant 
voters add to their strength. In the 1850s, as immigration soared to new 
heights and as the old Whig party foundered on the rocks of slavery, 
nativism and anti-Catholicism became the driving force behind the short-
lived Know Nothing party. In some states, this organization was quickly 
superseded or displaced by the new Republican party. Determined to halt 
the extension of slavery into the territories, if not to abolish it, the party 
of Abraham Lincoln rested on an ideology attractive to the articulate, 
educated political refugees of the 1848 Revolution. Many common folk 
among the German immigrants also rallied behind this new banner, most 
dramatically in Missouri, where Republicanism was free of the taint of 
Know Nothingism. But elsewhere, especially in districts distant from 
slave states where German workers feared the competition of free blacks, 
many German voters remained true to the Democracy as a bulwark 
against nativism. Nevertheless, the essentially erroneous idea that Ger-
man voters had provided the margin of victory for Lincoln in 1860 
became fixed in the minds of many political leaders. 
In the decades following the Civil War, the majority of German-
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American voters in most states drifted back to the Democratic party. 
This was generally true of Catholic Germans and, less consistently, of 
Lutherans. Other German Protestants, especially those of pietistic ten-
dencies, continued to find Republicanism congenial. 
This division of the German vote along religious lines rested partly 
in differing views about the role of government in questions of morality. 
Old-stock Americans, overwhelmingly Protestant, tended to believe that 
religion was a matter of the heart, not the head-that it was more 
emotional than intellectual- a matter of "right behavior" more than 
"right belief." Emphasis was accordingly placed on the conversion experi-
ence and a pious life as marks of God's having chosen a person for eternal 
salvation. According to this view, the Christian life was a constant 
struggle against Satan and sin, and as the sincere Christian did battle with 
the forces of evil, he was expected to use all legitimate weapons to 
vanquish the foe, including the power and authority of the government. 
Thus slavery should be rendered unconstitutional; the slavery of alcohol 
should be legislated out of existence; pious, God-fearing women should 
be enlisted in the battle through women's suffrage; Sabbath-day proprie-
ties should be preserved by means of a multitude of so-called blue laws; 
and by various regulatory measures, the schools of the immigrants should 
be hindered so that public schools could socialize the children to proper 
Protestant values. Many German Evangelicals, Baptists, and Methodists 
were in basic agreement with this view and therefore in varying degrees 
supported the Republican party, which generally supported these measures. 
But programs of coercive reform were offensive to large numbers of 
German Catholics and Lutherans, especially of the more theologically 
orthodox or conservative synods. For them, religion was more creedal, 
more formal, more authoritarian. In their view, the central role of govern-
ment was to guarantee the fullest measure of personal liberty consonant 
with law and order. For the government to legislate morality by means of 
prohibition or Sabbatarian legislation was to invade the authority of the 
church. They argued, for example, that a bottle of whiskey, by itself, was 
neither good nor evil. Sin lay in its abuse: it was not wrong to drink, but 
it was a sin to get drunk. Similarly, many Germans were appalled at the 
effect that Sabbath laws could have on their traditions of "continental 
Sundays" -amiable conversation, convivial drinking, and innocent danc-
ing in beer gardens or, for that matter, at church picnics. From their 
standpoint, women's suffrage was merely a political trick to double the 
prohibitionist vote. Worse, it threatened the role of women as wives and 
mothers and thereby the centrality of the family. As for restrictive school 
legislation, both Catholic and Lutheran Germans could unite against it, 
as they did in Wisconsin and Illinois circa 1890, to shatter the dominance 
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of the Republican party when it supported the regulation of parochial 
schools. After all, they thought, the public schools were little more than 
tax-supported institutions for pietistic Protestants. 
As a result, ethnocultural issues were capable of producing remark-
able majorities among German voters for the Democratic party in state 
and local elections late in the nineteenth century. It is important, however, 
not to overstate the case. Pietistic Germans, of course, tended to remain 
Republican. Furthermore, Christian religious polarities had little rele-
vance for the anticlerical intelligentsia and none at all for the German 
Jews, while urban workers attracted by socialist doctrines rejected such 
notions as detractions from the struggle against economic oppression in 
an industrializing America. 
In general, the pattern of German voting behavior underwent a 
transformation in the 1890s. The symbolic politics of the 1870s and '80s 
continued to be important in those states, counties, or cities where 
ethnocultural issues were raised, but in other respects German-American 
voters responded more strongly as constituents of other collectivities-
that is, as farmers, factory workers, merchants, mechanics, teamsters, 
teachers, saloon keepers, or as rich men or poor, as young persons or old, 
as veterans of the nation's wars, or as opponents of imperialistic foreign 
policies. This became especially clear during the Populist era of the 
1890s, when urgent economic issues, including currency reform, railroad 
regulation, and tariff questions, reduced the salience of ethnocultural 
conflicts. In some states distinctive German voting almost disappeared. 
Nevertheless, historic attachments of certain German subgroups contin-
ued for many more decades, even though they were less firm than 
formerly. Catholic Germans, for example, tended to remain loyal to the 
Democratic party, but it became easier for them to be dislodged from that 
adherence, at least temporarily. Independent voting among Germans, as 
among Americans generally, increased significantly in the early decades 
of the twentieth century. 
At the same time, foreign policy issues increased in importance for 
many German Americans. In earlier decades, before the creation of the 
German Empire in 1871, few German immigrants regarded the govern-
ments of their home states in Europe with affection. Most German states 
had been authoritarian, repressive, intolerant ()f religious diversity, and 
unresponsive to the needs of the common people. But many German-
American hearts swelled with pride as Bismarck whipped the French in 
1871 and placed his Prussian king on an imperial German throne. 
Although thousands of Germans had emigrated to escape military service, 
their pulses quickened at the news of German victories on European 
battlefields. A new sense of German-American ethnicity developed as the 
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number of immigrants from rapidly industrializing Germany declined, 
and ethnocentric publicists deliberately cultivated a new pride in things 
German to halt the erosion of the German-American community caused 
by assimilation. This movement was institutionalized on a national level 
in the creation of the National German-American Alliance, which during 
the early years of the twentieth century claimed an inflated membership 
in the millions. 
Such activity came to an abrupt end during World War I. Through-
out the neutrality period of 1914-17, the German ethnic leaders and 
associations such as the National German-American Alliance worked 
tirelessly for American neutrality, hoping thereby to prevent the United 
States from joining the Allied powers against Germany. Countless speeches 
and editorials were written in support of neutrality, against Britain and 
France, and in defense of Germany; many hundreds of churches, Vereine, 
and other organizations conducted fund-raising campaigns, rallies, and 
bazaars for the German Red Cross. The effect was to create an illusory 
image of strength and unity among German Americans. Most prominent 
German-American leaders perceived Pres. Woodrow Wilson as a parti-
san of the Allied cause and therefore opposed his reelection in 1916. 
Among the masses of German-American voters, however, there was no 
such unanimity, even though they displayed a slight shift toward the 
Republican candidate. 
In April 1917, only a few months after the election of 1916, the 
United States Congress, at President Wilson's request, declared war on 
Germany. Suddenly, behavior that had been perfectly legal (though 
indiscreet) in the neutrality period became unpatriotic, if not treasonable. 
Thousands of superpatriotic Americans now believed it to be their duty 
to wage a war on German culture on the domestic front. German-
language newspapers were subjected to crippling censorship, German-
language instruction in the schools was nearly eliminated, and all 
manifestations of German culture-from the performance of Beethoven's 
symphonies to the presentation of Schiller's plays-were discouraged, if 
not expressly forbidden. Innumerable acts of oppression were committed 
against innocent German-American citizens, whose loyalty to their adopted 
country was now under suspicion. In varying degrees, national, state, 
and especially local governments supported the anti-German hysteria. 
For many German Americans, Wilson became the symbolic source of 
their persecution, and many thousands sullenly awaited the day when 
they could punish Wilson's party in the privacy of a voting booth. 
Already in the off-year election of 1918, the Germans, especially in 
the midwestern states, registered a sharp drop in Democratic voting. Two 
years later, when Democratic governor James Cox of Ohio ran for 
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president as a Wilson surrogate, the Germans had their revenge. Even 
though there were nagging domestic problems of inflation, labor unrest, 
and agricultural discontent, German voters tended to ignore them as they 
turned to the Republican candidate, Warren Harding, in dramatic numbers. 
It was not that they were for Harding; it was that they were against 
Wilsonism as represented by Cox. Once again, negativism characterized 
German-American voting. 
Scores of German-American precincts recorded enormous margins 
for the Republican candidate, sometimes at a ratio of 100 to 1, especially 
in German Protestant communities. Even in German Catholic precincts 
in rural Wisconsin, Minnesota, and North Dakota, Democratic voting 
dropped to a third of what it had been four years earlier. In Milwaukee, 
where German voters found both the Democrats and Republicans wanting, 
they turned in huge numbers to Eugene Debs, the Socialist candidate, 
who at that moment remained in a federal prison, a victim of the wartime 
Espionage Act. Similarly, in Minnesota, thousands of Germans supported 
the Farmer-Labor party. 
The politics of revenge continued through the 1920s. By 1924 
German-American spokesmen became more assertive as they endorsed 
the futile third-party presidential candidacy of Robert M. LaFollette, the 
senator from Wisconsin, who had come to symbolize resistance to Ameri-
can participation in World War I. That LaFollette's Progressive ideology 
was in sharp contrast to the Republican conservatism the Germans had 
supported four years earlier mattered little. They loved him for what he 
had opposed, not for what he favored. Party loyalty meant nothing to 
them; what mattered most was that a candidate oppose British and 
French dominance in world affairs and any arrangements that perpetu-
ated the prescriptions of the Treaty of Versailles. 
The majority of the German-language newspapers backed LaFollette, 
and German Americans supplied a substantial part of his vote. Still, 
careful analysis reveals that old divisions among the Germans remained, 
both in leadership and voting behavior. This was laid bare in 1928, when 
the Democratic party candidacy of New York governor Al Smith, the 
very symbol of urban ethnic politics, was simply too much for Protestant 
German voters. The pietists rejected Smith because he was "wet"; the 
Lutherans, because he was Catholic. But Herbert Hoover was also 
controversial. Some German Americans insisted that because Hoover 
was allegedly of German descent and because he had saved many thou-
sands of Germans from starvation in Europe after World War I he 
deserved their support. Others dismissed him as a prohibitionist conserva-
tive who would surely follow a pro-British foreign policy. 
So hopeless had the effort to unify the German-American vote 
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become that thereafter most German ethnic publicists abandoned the 
concept and concentrated instead on cultural goals. This was not true, 
however, of the notorious German-American Nazis. Their strategy of 
blood and strong-arm tactics was repugnant to all but a tiny minority 
and revealed that they understood nothing about either American poli-
tics or the essential character of the German ethnic group in the United 
States. Still, many leaders of the German-American churches, the German-
language press, and the old established societies were reluctant to repudi-
ate Nazism, either in Germany or America, so earnestly did they desire a 
strong place for Germany in international affairs and so deeply did their 
affection for things German run. 
Since the mid-1930s, German-American political behavior has taken 
on a substantially different character. In earlier decades there had been 
open and vocal attempts to organize the German Americans into a bloc 
of voters unified by ethnic group concerns. The German-language press 
had taken strong positions and had argued them forcefully and some-
times stridently; organizations had been created to marshal the German-
American vote on a national scale. But as the assimilation process took 
its toll of ethnic consciousness, Hitlerian brutality and Nazi excess 
transformed German ethnicity in America into a source of social and 
psychological discomfort, if not distress. The overt expression of German-
American opinion consequently declined and, in more recent years, 
virtually disappeared as a reliable index of the political attitudes of those 
Americans for whom German ethnicity continues as a significant part of 
their lives. In other words, German-American leadership has disappeared 
even though distinctive German-American voting has continued in some 
quarters. 
This change became apparent in the 1930s and '40s when German-
American opposition to Franklin Roosevelt and his foreign policies 
accounted for much of what was described as midwestern isolationism. 
German-American voters simply wanted no involvement in another war 
with Germany. The domestic concomitants of fighting against one's 
ancestral homeland remained etched in their memories. Thus, in the 
presidential election of 1936, midwestern German Catholics gave strong 
support to William Lemke of the Union party, supported as he was by the 
vehemently anti-Roosevelt rhetoric of the "radio priest," Father Charles 
E. Coughlin of Michigan. Four years later, many thousands of other 
German-American voters deserted Roosevelt for Republican Wendell 
Willkie, whose obviously German name and whose criticism of the drift 
toward war they found comforting. 
Such German-American voting without the benefit of articulate 
leadership has continued through the decades since World War II. At the 
90 Germans in the New World 
same time, the Germans have disappeared as an ethnic group in cities 
such as New York; the German-language press had continued its long 
decline into obscurity; and no politician would ever think of addressing 
his German ethnic constituency directly or explicitly. It is even likely that 
many voters of German descent are themselves unaware of the extent to 
which German ethnic feeling still influences their political behavior. Yet 
careful analysis suggests that, for example, Harry Truman's surprising 
victory in 1948 may be partially explained by the return of many 
midwestern German Catholic farmers to the Democratic fold following 
their defection from Roosevelt in 1940 and '44. 
Sensitivity to foreign policy issues has usually explained the extent 
to which German-American voting can be distinguished from that of 
other definable collectivities, especially in the Midwest. In the 1950s, 
Dwight Eisenhower benefited from Republican gains in German Catholic 
precincts, where resentment over the Korean War was strong. Likewise, 
other German-American voters bought the argument of Republican sena-
tor Joseph McCarthy and others that the Democratic party was "soft on 
Communism," firmly believing that the cold war demonstrated that the 
Soviet Union, not Germany, had always been America's most formidable 
enemy. As political analyst Kevin Phillips has observed, such a view 
conveniently transformed the German-American discomfort of 1935-45 
into patriotic perception. 
The election of 1960, which pitted the cold warrior Richard Nixon 
against the Irish Catholic John Kennedy, carried overtones of 1928. 
German Catholics returned strongly to the Democratic party while Republi-
can voting was reinforced in German Protestant precincts. In 1968, 
however, when Nixon's Democratic opponent was a Protestant, many 
German Catholics once again voted Republican. In fact, Nixon's greatest 
gains over his 1960 performance came in German Catholic districts in 
midwestern states. 
Such analysis only skims the surface and tests only the most obvi-
ous issues and the most prominent candidates. It is largely based on 
fragmentary rather than systematic analysis of data. Although historians 
have studied German-American political behavior in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries in great detail and with much sophistication, 
they have ignored the last three decades. Similarly, political scientists 
have been preoccupied in their analyses, not with white ethnic political 
behavior, but with more pressing questions concerning blacks, Spanish-
speaking ethnic groups, and women; with basic economic and social 
variables; and with foreign policy issues. 
Nevertheless, the cumulative record of historical scholarship during 
the last twenty years has revealed much about the successive concerns of 
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German Americans as a group. In the nineteenth century German immi-
grants were moved first by questions of their status in the American 
democracy and then by issues of ethnocultural clash. Still later, as immi-
gration declined and assimilation accelerated in the twentieth century, 
foreign policy issues became transcendent. Historical analysis also explains 
why strong leadership never could have emerged from the diversity of 
German America and how, in recent decades, German ethnic leadership 
has disappeared entirely, even though distinctive voting can still be 
discerned among certain elements within the ethnic community. A sum-
mary view of German-American political behavior thus demonstrates 
how strongly political developments have been conditioned by cultural 
influences and how intricately they are woven into the fabric of our 
national history. 
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Patterns of german 
Sett[ement in tlie V.nited States 
and 1)razi' 1830-1930 
To understand the successful development of the United States, there is 
nothing like the study of the development of the colonies of Rio 
Grande do Sui. 
- Vi anna Moogl 
6 
Comparisons between the United States of America and the United 
States of Brazil, as the southern giant was known following the promulga-
tion of the constitution of 1891, are common, if not commonplace. If the 
former has been characterized properly as the Colossus of the North, the 
latter may well be called the Colossus of the South. Both countries are huge, 
populous, and rich in resources; both occupy vast portions of their respec-
tive continents. Although the United States lies within the temperate zone 
and Brazil mostly in the tropical, both imported enormous numbers of 
Africans to feed the voracious appetites of their respective plantation sys-
tems. Both, seduced and bedeviled by slavery, rid themselves of that 
iniquitous institution in the latter half of the nineteenth century, one earlier 
and violently, the other later and peacefully. Both countries, moreover, 
received streams of European immigrants in the same century, large in 
proportion to their respective populations, in Brazil partly as a substitute 
for slave labor, in the United States despite slavery and its legacies. 2 
Immigrants from the German-speaking states .of Europe were 
enormously important for both countries. In the United States German 
immigration was exceeded only by the Irish and, in the century from 
1830 to 1930, amounted to nearly six million persons, less an undetermined 
number of returnees or remigrants. In Brazil, where the size of both the 
receiving population and the immigration was generally much smaller, 
the Germans were the fourth largest group, ranking behind the Portuguese, 
Italians, and Spanish. Easily the most important of the northern Euro-
pean groups to go to Brazil, the Germans were the only large group with 
a majority of Protestants to go to that Catholic and Latin country. 
Official data indicate that approximately two hundred thousand persons 
arrived from German-speaking countries during the century in question, 
a mere 3.5 percent of the volume of German emigration to the United 
States (table 1).3 
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The context of immigration was radically different in Brazil com-
pared to that which pertained in the United States, despite certain superfi-
cial similarities. A fundamental difference arises from the fact that many 
thousands of German-speaking immigrants settled in the American 
colonies during the colonial period. Often called Palatines, they were 
especially numerous in Pennsylvania. They began to arrive in the 
1680s, increasing gradually until the 1750s. Many assimilated rapidly 
into colonial society so that when the enormous German immigration 
of the nineteenth century commenced, the newcomers were able to 
build upon the social and cultural foundations laid by their prede-
cessors a century earlier. 4 Nothing comparable occurred in Brazil during 
its colonial period. 
Neither country experienced significant immigration from any source 
during the half century from 1775 to 1825, an era of war, revolution, and 
domestic turmoil for most of Europe. Unlike the newly independent 
United States, Brazil during this period became the refuge of royalty as 
the Portuguese king and his government fled before Napoleon's armies. 
Both the Portuguese and their Brazilian successors were aware of the deep 
divisions between the landed elite and the impoverished workers and 
slaves. Early in the nineteenth century they developed policies to encour-
age the immigration of non-Portuguese persons for the purpose of creat-
ing a middle class in Brazilian society, especially in the subtropical south, 
where there were no slave-dependent plantations. Such an infusion, some 
leaders argued, would counter the deeply rooted abhorrence of the Brazilian 
upper class for manual labor and their disdain for commercial enterprise. 
Had the Brazilian government failed to sponsor its program of recruit-
ment and subsidy early in the nineteenth century, it is likely that later and 
larger patterns of chain migration and formal colonization would not 
have occurred and that the German component in the population of 
Brazil would never have attained significant levels. In contrast to the 
Brazilian, American society, from its beginnings in the seventeenth century, 
consisted largely of independent farmers, artisans, and petty merchants-
the very kinds of persons the Portuguese government had hoped to 
attract to Brazil. Hence the government of the United States felt no need 
to develop strategies to recruit European settlers or to subsidize coloniza-
tion ventures, as did the Brazilians.5 
Thus even before the establishment of independence in 1822, the 
Brazilian government deliberately and actively sought immigrants from 
Europe and offered a variety of inducements to lure them to the New 
World, including at different times free passage, animals, seeds, and 
implements, plus loans and grants to colonization companies. Germans 
were especially recruited in the 1820s to populate Brazil's southernmost 
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Table 1. German Immigration to the United States and Brazil 
Total German German % 
immigration immigration total immigration 
Decade to U.S. to U.S. to U.S. 
1820-29 128,502 5,753 14.5 
1830-39 538,381 124,726 23.2 
1840-49 1,427,337 385,434 27.0 
1850-59 2,814,554 976,072 34.7 
1860-69 2,081,261 723,734 34.8 
1870-79 2,742,137 751,769 27.4 
1880-89 5,248,568 1,445,181 27.5 
1890-99 3,694,294 579,072 15.7 
1900-09 8,202,388 328,722 4.0 
1910-19 6,347,380 174,227 2.7 
1920-29 4,295,510 386,634 9.0 
Total 37,520,312 5,881,324 15.7 
Total German German % 
immigration immigration total immigration 
Decade to Brazil to Brazil to Brazil 
1820-29 7,765 2,236a 30.0 
1830-39 2,669 207 7.8 
1840-49 7,303 4,450 60.9 
1850-59 117,592 15,815 13.4 
1860-69 110,093 16,514 15.0 
1870-79 193,931 14,627 7.5 
1880-89 527,869 19,201 3.6 
1890-99 1,205,803 15,992 1.3 
1900-09 649,898 13,848 2.1 
1910-19 821,458 25,902 3.2 
1920-29 846,522 75,839 9.0 
Total 4,490,903 204,721 4.6 
aRecent research indicates that this figure, based on official sources, seriously underesti-
mates the size of the German emigration to Brazil (see note 6). 
Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial 
Times to 1970 (Washington, D.C., 1975), 105; Jose Fernando Carneiro, Imigrafao e 
colonizafao no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro, 1950), facing p. 60. Other sources offer variant data 
for Brazil; compare B.R. Mitchell, International Historical Statistics: The Americas and 
Australia (Detroit, 1983), 141-43, and Thomas W. Merrick and Douglas H. Graham, 
Population and Economic Development in Brazil: 1800 to the Present (Baltimore, 1979), 
91. 
96 Germans in the New World 
province of Rio Grande do SuI and to strengthen the defense of that area. 
German farmers were seen as especially desirable. In 1824 a colony was 
founded at Sao Leopoldo, located twenty miles north of Porto Alegre in 
the eastern part of the serra, a hilly, forested region between the flood 
plain of the Rio Jaqui on the south and the grass-covered plateau to the 
north. In some respects the colony at Sao Leopoldo was a Brazilian 
equivalent to the Germantown settlement established near Philadelphia 
in 1683; in other respects it resembled Ebenezer, the Salzburger colony in 
Georgia, founded in 1734 to help anchor the southern frontier of the 
English colonies. 
Statistically, the German immigration of the 1820s was similar in 
both countries-usually less than a thousand persons per year-although 
it is likely that the Brazilian total for the decade surpassed that for the 
United States.6 Then, whereas the numbers of persons headed for the 
United States spiraled upward dramatically to the climactic year of 1854 
(when 215,000 persons arrived from the German states), the emigration 
to Brazil ended altogether. In the 1840s, annual immigration from all 
sources rarely exceeded a few hundred persons, of whom almost all were 
from either Portugal or Germany. A decade later the Brazilian totals 
gradually increased to ten or fifteen thousand per year, of whom approxi-
mately a fifth were German. Still, the huge numbers of Germans that 
descended upon the United States in the 1880s had no counterpart in 
Brazil, where they seldom exceeded five thousand per year until 1891, 
following the final abolition of slavery in 1888 and the overthrow of the 
empire in 1889. Thereafter German immigration again dropped off and 
exceeded five thousand only in the years immediately preceding World 
War I. Not until the 1920s, when the total for the decade surpassed 
75,000, did Brazil experience its heaviest influx from Germany. In the 
immediate postwar years from 1919 to 1921, the German immigration to 
Brazil actually exceeded that to the United States. This increase, which 
was substantial in relation to the prewar Teuto-Brazilian population, had 
the natural effect of slowing the process of assimilation at a time when, 
in the United States, it had accelerated because of the legacies of World 
War I. During the century following the 1820s, the Brazilian pattern 
paralleled the American only in the first decades of the twentieth century, 
although usually at a lower rate? 
Germans emigrated to both countries from approximately the same 
regions and for approximately the same reasons. In the early decades 
they came from the western and southern German states; later northern 
and eastern parts of Germany were more important. Most came because 
of interrelationships in inheritance customs, demographic behaviors, eco-
nomic well-being, and cultural concerns.8 
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In generaL the social and cultural characteristics of the German 
emigrants to both the United States and Brazil were also much the same.9 
They were persons mostly of the lower and lower middle classes seeking 
a better life in the New World. Political and religious concerns, while not 
absent, were not often primary considerations. Data on Germans in the 
United States are much more comprehensive than for Brazil, although the 
Germans of Rio Grande do SuI have been studied in exquisite detail by 
Jean Roche, a French scholar,l° Impressionistic evidence suggests that 
both migrations consisted of similar proportions of unskilled workers, 
farmers, artisans, craftsmen, storekeepers or petty merchants, and pro-
fessionals, although late in the nineteenth century the major Brazilian 
cities attracted many highly trained technicians and businessmen, many 
of whom saw their Brazilian residence as temporary. 
There is no reason to believe that, at the time of emigration, literacy 
rates were different between the two contingents. Religious divisioilSWere 
also similar, but few German Jews appear to have gone to Brazil. Catho-
lics formed a strong minority in both groups, although they were prob-
ably a little stronger among the Brazilians because of the virtual absence 
of Protestantism in that country. According to one estimate made in the 
early 1920s, 54 percent of the Germans in Rio Grande do SuI were of 
Protestant origins, the remainder Catholic. No doubt similar proportions 
were characteristic of other major concentrations of Germans in Brazil. l1 
After their arrival in the New World, however, the German Protestant 
denominations evolved differently in the two countries. In the United 
States the several Lutheran synods were highly successful in shepherding 
German immigrants into their folds. Other churches, such as the Reformed, 
EvangelicaL Methodist, and Mennonite, were less important. In Brazil the 
predominant Protestant church was the EvangelicaL with the Lutherc1n 
ranking second. Moreover, the Brazilian Evangelical synods maintained 
close administrative and financial ties with the Prussian state church, a 
relationship that had no parallel in the United States,12 
Germans generally were much less attracted to Brazil as a new home 
than to the United States. Some of the reasons are obvious: Brazil offered an 
unfamiliar climate with strange, tropical diseases; uncertainty of land titles; 
undeveloped transportation systems; and a virtually nonexistent school sys-
temP Although German emigrants had no experience with political demo-
cracy as practiced in the United States, most were favorably disposed toward 
it. Certainly they were not drawn to the elitist, imperial regime of Dom 
Pedro II, nor was the apparent instability of the later republican government 
perceived as much of an improvement. The United States was considered 
to be progressive and dynamic, a world leader in industrial and techno-
logical development; Brazil was often seen as backward and undeveloped. 
98 Germans in the New World 
In addition, Brazil suffered from much negative publicity in the 
German press, which regularly described Brazil as unattractive for 
Germans.1 4 Problems emerging from religious differences were especially 
difficult. For example, Brazil, one of the most Catholic countries in 
the world, held Protestant marriages to lack legality and treated them 
as concubinage, thereby clouding inheritance rights of Protestant im-
migrant children. Moreover, Protestant houses of worship we're not 
allowed to display the standard insignia of churches, such as crosses 
and spires. But there were other problems as well. Unfortunate publicity 
attended problems connected with immigrant recruitment efforts of 
the Brazilians and from controversy over the use of German share-
croppers in the coffee-producing areas of Sao Paulo. These circum-
stances prompted the Prussian government in 1859 to issue a directive 
that curtailed the recruitment of immigrants in its domain. Although 
Brazil responded by moderating some of its offending laws in the early 
1860s, Prussia did not rescind its Heydt'sche Reskript, as it was called, 
until 1895.15 
The Brazilian census of 1920 provides a statistical summary of a 
century of German emigration. It reveals that Germany ranked a distant 
fourth behind Portugal, Italy, and Spain as a source and that German 
immigrants and their descendants were highly concentrated in the south-
ernmost states of Rio Grande do SuI, Santa Catarina, and Parana, where 
the majority lived in agricultural areas.16 Other significant colonies were 
to be found in the major cities, especially Porto Alegre, Sao Paulo, and 
Rio de Janeiro. By 1930, approximately two hundred thousand persons 
had entered the country from Germany and, in addition, many thou-
sands more of German-speaking immigrants had arrived from other 
countries, notably Russia. From this undetermined total must be subtracted 
remigrants, but they were matched many times over by the Brazilian-
born children of the immigrants. According to one generous estimate 
made by a German-Brazilian, the number of persons of German birth 
and descent in 1920 in Rio Grande do SuI alone had grown through 
immigration and natural increase to between 360,000 and 400,000 per-
sons in a total population of 2,142,000.17 
But the German flow to Brazil was a mere trickle compared to the 
flood of newcomers who sought jobs and homes in the United States, 
where, during the century from 1830 to 1930, at least one of every six 
immigrants was German-speaking. In most years late in the nineteenth 
century, immigrants from Germany outnumbered those from any other 
country. By 1900 they and their children constituted a tenth of the total 
population of the entire nation.1 8 Like the Teuto-Brazilians, German 
Americans tended to concentrate in specific regions. About 85 percent 
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resided in the middle Atlantic states and in the Midwest. Moreover, about 
two-thirds lived in cities, a vastly greater proportion than in Brazil. Huge 
concentrations developed, especially in New York City and Chicago, that 
dwarfed the largest German-Brazilian urban enclaves, which were located 
in Porto Alegre and Sao Paulo. The proportions of German Americans 
who were unskilled workers and servants (roughly 40 percent at the end 
of the nineteenth century) apparently was much greater than the compa-
rable Brazilian share, just as the percentage of farmers (about 35 percent) 
was much smaller.19 
In both the United States and Brazil, however, there was great 
diversity in the German immigrant population that was largely unnoticed 
by the receiving population, which tended to think of the Germans in 
their midst as a unified group with common characteristics. Thus impor-
tant distinctions within the German immigrant society with respect to 
place of origin, variations in regional speech or dialect, religious divisions, 
and social and political differences were lost on both Anglo-Americans 
and Luso-Brazilians, who tended to lump them all together on the basis 
of their presumably common language. 
But careful study reveals striking differences in the provincial ori-
gins of Germans in the United States. For example, Wiirttembergers were 
heavily concentrated in Philadelphia but were comparatively rare in 
Milwaukee. Mecklenburgers flocked to Milwaukee but not to Philadelphia. 
Hanoverians were common in Cincinnati and St. Louis, but relatively 
uncommon in Wisconsin and Michigan. 20 Even within German enclaves, 
both urban and rural, distinct provincial concentrations developed. For 
example, in New York's Kleindeutschland of 1860, Bavarians dominated 
the Eleventh and Seventeenth wards, Prussians the Tenth, and Hessians 
the Thirteenth.21 Settlement patterns in rural districts were much the 
same. In Warren County, Missouri, 17 percent of all the many Germans 
resident there in 1860 were from the tiny German principality of Lippe-
Detmold; at the same time, Lippe-Detmolders were virtually absent in 
St. Charles County, another heavily German county located immediately 
to the east. 22 
Such concentrations also developed in Brazil. In Rio Grande do SuI 
many of the early settlers of the 1820s were from Holstein, Hanover, and 
Mecklenburg; later many arrived from the Rhineland, especially the 
Hunsriick district south of the Mosel River. 23 Similarly, Pomeranians 
were especially numerous in the state of Espirito Santo, where even today 
Teuto-Brazilians are known as pomeranos, regardless of origin. 24 Many 
other provincial clusters developed, especially in Rio Grande do SuI and 
Santa Catarina, where one valley might be inhabited almost entirely by 
Germans from one state or region and the next by Germans from another. 
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Thus Westphalians were numerous in Estrela, Pomeranians in Santa 
Cruz, and Swabians in Panambi,25 
But there were profound differences between the two countries in 
the nineteenth century patterns of settlement in rural areas. In the United 
States, countless thousands of Germans, intent upon preserving an agri-
cultural way of life in the New World, streamed through the ports of 
entry such as New Orleans and New York, seeking land in the states and 
territories of the North and West. Sometimes the immigrants, lacking the 
means to settle on farmland directly, would practice a trade or labor as an 
unskilled worker for a year or more before they could settle on the land. 
The farms the immigrants acquired, whether by purchase from the 
government, a previous owner, or a railroad that had received a govern-
ment grant, by preemption, or by homesteading, usually were shaped by 
the rectilinear surveys established by the Land Law of 1785 and subse-
quent amendatory legislation. The land passed into the hands of individ-
ual farmers in small parcels, usually consisting of 160 acres. There were 
notable instances of colonization companies or associations that acquired 
large tracts for division among their members, thereby permitting one 
ethnic group to settle an area exclusively, but the predominant pattern 
required the farmer, whether native or immigrant, to compete individu-
ally for land ownership. Thus a small number of successful German 
immigrants on the land would attract others-often relatives or acquaint-
ances from their home town in Europe-and slowly a rural cluster would 
develop, usually intermixed with native-born Americans or other immi-
grants, but sometimes almost exclusively German and Catholic or Lutheran 
or some other denomination.26 
In Brazil a rather different pattern emerged. Government policy and 
land laws unintentionally encouraged the development of exclusive eth-
nic enclaves, a circumstance the Teuto-Brazilians readily perceived as an 
advantage.27 They were attracted especially to the hilly, forested, and still 
uninhabited land in the subtropical southern provinces that lay between 
the coastal plains (often very narrow) and the cattle country of the 
interior uplands. They liked the abundance of wood, the reasonably 
fertile soil, and the more than adequate rainfall. Moreover, the landscape 
was somewhat reminiscent of certain parts of Germany.28 
Typically the German agricultural settlement was organized around 
what they called a Schneiss or Pikade. The founders of a colony would 
decree a long, straight cut through the forest that could later become a 
road. Individual settlers would then receive long, narrow plots of land of 
one or two hundred acres that stretched out at right angles to the road. 
Farmhouses were built at the side of the road, thereby creating a strung-
out rural village similar to the Waldhufendorf or Strassendorf of central 
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Germany. Several such Pikaden would constitute a colony. At the center 
of the colony would be the Stadtplatz, which would consist of a cluster 
of buildings, including the church, school, civil offices, stores, workshops, 
and a mill. Sometimes the farms would adjoin a river instead of a Pikade, 
and elongated properties would stretch in from the river bank. But the 
essential spatial organization remained the same.29 Of course, not all 
Teuto-Brazilian pioneer farmers lived in such agricultural settlements; 
others struggled to survive in even more primitive and isolated conditions. 
The line-village pattern, rarely found in the United States because land 
laws and custom worked against it, allowed the rural Teuto-Brazilians to 
live as they pleased in virtual isolation from other social and cultural 
groups. In such a setting they did not have to conform to preexisting 
standards. Linguistic acculturation was unnecessary. Their situation 
required only minimal adaptation to the social environment.30 
The physical environment was another matter. Some of the rural 
colonies, such as Blumenau and Joinville, were organized by entrepre-
neurs who had the forests partially cleared and roads built before placing 
German colonos on the land, thereby enhancing the chances for individ-
ual success. But as the land was taken up and as settlers spread out into 
new areas, they often encountered formidable environmental obstacles. If 
a settler came into a frontier area and devoted all his energy to clearing 
the forest so that he could farm as he had in Europe, he was almost sure 
to fail. By the time he could accomplish the task of clearing the land of 
trees, crucial planting seasons would have passed. Instead, the German 
pioneers typically adapted the primitive slash-and-burn techniques that 
they had learned from the caboclos, who were poor and despised natives 
of mixed Indian and Portuguese blood. Lacking capital and credit, as well 
as effective means of transportation, many Teuto-Brazilian farmers also 
turned to indigenous crops of manioc and maize, which they planted 
among the partially carbonized tree trunks. When the fertility of a given 
clearing was exhausted after several years, the pioneer would move to 
another spot and start the process over again. Such primitive, subsistence 
agriculture often became a more or less permanent part of the German-
Brazilian way of life in some areas and sometimes continued long after 
improvements in transportation and access to credit and world markets 
rendered such methods obsolete.31 
As a result of these environmental influences, the rural Teuto-
Brazilians do not fare well in comparison to their German-American 
counterparts, even though they were commonly perceived as highly 
successful by their countrymen. Many remained in poverty and extreme 
isolation for generations, well into the twentieth century.32 Because their 
settlements tended to be exclusive of other ethnic groups, they were able 
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to achieve the critical mass necessary, despite a relatively low population 
density, to create the various institutions and associations that naturally 
perpetuate ethnocultural forms. Churches were the easiest to create, but 
the Teuto-Brazilians also established all the familiar ethnic organizations 
and societies, as well as a German-language press. Because Brazilian 
public schools were not well developed in the nineteenth century, the 
Germans created their own, which were often taught by the parish 
pastor.33 All these agencies combined to maintain the use of the German 
language, to preserve German cultural forms, and thereby to slow the 
assimilation process. For example, data from the Brazilian census of 1940 
show that in Rio Grande do SuI, 97.6 percent of the German-Brazilian 
families habitually spoke German in their homes. Even in Sao Paulo, 
where Germans were well dispersed within the metropolis, the propor-
tion still exceeded 50 percent.34 In all these respects, the Teuto-Brazilians 
were not much different from German-Americans; the variation lay in 
degree, not in kind. Few German communities in the United States had 
resisted assimilation as effectively as the typical German community in 
rural southern Brazil. 
Such rural societies were a world apart from the ethnic communi-
ties that developed in the large towns where Germans constituted a 
majority, such as Sao Leopoldo, Blumenau, Joinville, Brusque, and Sao 
Bento. In such places they were able to evolve self-contained socioeco-
nomic structures that included all the strata - rich entrepreneurs and 
professional persons at the top, supported by small merchants, clerks, 
skilled industrial workers, and at the lower levels, unskilled laborers and 
the farming population of the surrounding countryside. In such a society 
there was little economic interdependence with other groups and few 
incentives to develop social intercourse with Luso-Brazilian society.35 
These communities were not unlike the German-American enclave in 
nineteenth-century Milwaukee described by Kathleen Conzen.36 Still, 
there were few small cities in the United States that were so dominated by 
the German element as were those Brazilian places. 
In some of the large coastal cities, most notably Porto Alegre, Sao 
Paulo, and Rio de Janeiro, where the Germans constituted a small frac-
tion of the total population, they were still numerous enough to develop 
the complex of supporting voluntary organizations that gave coherence 
to their immigrant society. Inevitably, however, as they went about their 
daily tasks as industrialists, professional people, merchants, craftsmen, 
and laborers, they had many more interpersonal contacts with members 
of the dominant Luso-Brazilian society than did their isolated rural 
cousins. Naturally they learned Portuguese much more rapidly. Assimila-
tion in such a setting was relatively easy for persons so inclined. 
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Urban occupational structures within the German communities of 
both countries were similar. In the United States, data from the census of 
1890 show that German immigrants were strongly represented in the 
food industries, such as baking and meat packing. Brewers were eight 
times as common among the German-born than among the white popula-
tion at large; bartenders were twice as frequent. German Americans 
engaged in retailing of all kinds; they were also attracted to domestic and 
personal services, such as barbering and hairdressing. Inevitably it was 
difficult for them to find employment in occupations that required a good 
knowledge of the English language, but they were proportionately numer-
ous among musicians, chemists, artists, and architects. 37 Comparable 
data for Brazil are not readily available, but Jean Roche has shown that in 
Rio Grande do SuI Teuto-Brazilian manufacturers dominated the manu-
facture of leather and glass, and were leading producers in brewing, 
metallurgy, furniture, tobacco processing, and soap-industries also fre-
quently associated with Germans in the United States.38 Other members 
of the Teuto-Brazilian elite made fortunes from trade with Germany. The 
social environment of Brazil, conditioned in part by the reluctance of 
Luso-Brazilians from engaging in materialistic business pursuits, strongly 
encouraged the rapid economic advancement of Teuto-Brazilian business-
men. In the United States, German-American businessmen had no compa-
rable advantage, except perhaps in New York, which was the major port 
of entry for goods from Germany. 
The urban Teuto-Brazilians were significantly different from their 
American counterparts in that a substantial proportion were Reichsdeutsche 
-subjects of the German kaiser-who looked upon their residence in 
Brazil as temporary and who had no interest in acquiring Brazilian 
citizenship. Many were educated, middle-class persons employed by 
German firms with offices in Brazil; they looked forward to the day when 
they could return to their mother country. Often disdainful of Luso-
Brazilian culture, they involved themselves in Brazilian affairs only inso-
far as such matters impinged upon their immediate business interests. 
Many such persons knew little and cared less about the rural colonies. Yet 
the impressions that members of the Luso-Brazilian elite gathered about the 
Germans in their country were often derived from their contacts with the 
city people, unrepresentative though they may have been. Of course, 
persons with such attitudes could also be found in German-American 
communities, but there they were on the whole less influential and less 
often thrust into leadership positions. In the United States, the German 
immigrant population was rather more diverse in character and distribution, 
and hence less subject to dominance by Reichsdeutsche. 
Such comparisons between German immigrants in the United States 
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and in Brazil reveal many similarities in origin, occupation, education, 
socioeconomic status, religious affiliations, demographic patterns, and 
cultural concerns. Similar social structures were erected in both countries. 
Many parallels in their respective histories of adaptation and assimilation 
might also be drawn. But the differences between them may be the more 
instructive. The two streams of German immigrants flowed to dramati-
cally different environments, both physical and social, as well as economic, 
political, and cultural. 
In contrast to the German Americans, many Teuto-Brazilians came 
to the New World in response to government recruitment efforts and 
subsidies. In their settlement patterns, they were more highly concen-
trated regionally, displayed sharper distinctions in the characteristics of 
their urban and rural communities, and tended toward greater rural 
isolation. The physical environment of Brazil forced more dramatic 
adaptations in rural settlement patterns and agricultural practices, while 
imposing more persistent rural poverty. The social environment required 
the Germans independently to maintain their levels of literacy (which 
were much higher than those of the receiving Brazilian society) through 
the establishment of private educational systems that were generally 
superior to government schools. These circumstances often combined to 
produce among Teuto-Brazilians attitudes of cultural superiority and 
disdain for Luso-Brazilian culture, at least among their leaders. The 
process of assimilation was thus slowed, compared to the rate generally 
experienced in the United States. This tendency in turn was augmented 
by the fact that the language, culture, and often the religion of the 
Germans, as northern Europeans, were significantly different from what 
prevailed among the majority of Brazilians. 
In other words, the cultural differences between the German immi-
grants and their hosts were noticeably greater in Brazil than in the United 
States. The potential for conflict was therefore accordingly increased, as 
the destructive anti-German riots of 1917 in Porto Alegre, Sao Paulo, Rio 
de Janeiro, and other cities demonstrate. In response to the presumed 
threat posed by an "enemy" ethnic group that seemed to resist assimilation, 
the Brazilian government enacted repressive legislation during World 
War I and later, especially in the Vargas era.39 These laws were intended 
to accelerate the assimilation and integration of the German immigrants 
and their descendants into Brazilian life. Nothing approaching their 
severity was ever enacted in the United States. 
The German ethnic group thus played a rather different role in the 
history of Brazil than in the United States. Comparisons between the two 
countries, as Vianna Moog claimed, help to explain why. 
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Images of (jerman Immigrants 
in the qjnited States and tBraziL 
1890-1918: Some Comparisons 7 
In the 1890s, following a decade of unprecedented immigration 
from Europe, the United States experienced a period in which national 
identity was greatly stressed. The term Americanization carne into fre-
quent usage as many citizens, privately and through various organizations, 
stressed conformity to the dominant culture in language, manners, and 
religious belief. 
During these same years a similar development, in some respects 
stronger than in the United States, could be detected in Brazil. In 1889 the 
empire of Brazil ended when Pedro II went into exile and Brazilian leaders 
introduced a republican form of government. During the preceding dec-
ade Brazil, like the United States, had experienced heavy immigration 
from Europe.1 The abolition of slavery in 1888 had created a labor 
shortage, chiefly in the central and southern states, that the government 
had sought to relieve through the recruitment of Italian, Spanish, 
Portuguese, and German immigrants. During the 1890s the Brazilian 
Republic, unsure of itself in its first years, experienced a wave of nativism 
much like that in the United States. The new Brazilian leaders, motivated 
strongly by doctrines of Comtean positivism, insisted on a new national 
unity. They felt strongly that immigrants should resist the natural ten-
dency to remain separate. To speak a different language, to wear different 
clothing, to eat different foods, to attend different schools, and to wor-
ship a different god all seemed undesirable because such behavior threatened 
to alter national identity and to undermine the confidence of the republi-
cans to govern their huge, diverse, and undeveloped country.2 
German immigrants and their children were conspicuous in both 
countries. Approximately five million Germans had arrived in the United 
States during the nineteenth century. In each of the peak years of 1854 
and 1882 more than two hundred thousand persons arrived. Although 
85 percent of the Germans settled in the northeastern quarter of the 
country, they could be found in all states of the Union. Two-thirds lived 
in urban places (a proportion much higher than that for the American 
population generally at that time), but they were also strongly attracted 
to agriculture, especially dairy farming in the Midwest. By the end of the 
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century there were about eight million first- and second-generation Ger-
mans in the United States, roughly 10 percent of the total population. 
Unusually diverse in origin, occupation, residence patterns, and religious 
belief, they were easily the largest non-English-speaking group in America.3 
The Brazilian pattern was similar but on a much smaller scale. The 
German immigration to Brazil had begun in the 1820s, largely as a 
consequence of vigorous recruitment efforts sponsored by the Brazilian 
government. The annual totals seldom exceeded two thousand, yet after 
seventy-five years the Germans had multiplied and prospered until they 
numbered nearly four hundred thousand persons, mostly Brazilian-born 
and German-speaking. Although important colonies developed in the 
large cities and seaports of Brazil, the majority of Teuto-Brazilians (as 
they were called) settled in rural regions, where they founded exclusive 
settlements chiefly in the two southernmost states of Rio Grande do SuI 
and Santa Catarina, in which they accounted for one-fifth of the popula-
tion by 1910. There, even more than in the United States, they created a 
society within a society-a large, isolated, diverse, structured community 
with its own values, attitudes, language, and folkways. They adapted 
their agricultural practices to subtropical realities, raised large families, 
and built churches, schools, and towns. Like the German-Americans, the 
Teuto-Brazilians were of diverse provincial origins and were divided 
between the Catholic and Protestant faiths. Like their American counter-
parts, the Teuto-Brazilians developed a substantial German-language 
press and an amazing array of voluntary associations. 4 
Stereotypes naturally developed in both countries. Each receiving 
society tended to regard the Germans in their midst as a unified group 
with common characteristics. Provincial differences, linguistic variations, 
religious divisions, and social and political distinctions were usually lost 
on the native-born, who tended to lump all German immigrants together 
on the basis of their presumably common language. Because Germany 
did not exist as a unified state\mtilI871, a German was simply someone 
who spoke the German language. 
There was no uniform or consistent content to the images of the 
German immigrant. Wealthy and educated Americans, for example, gen-
erally registered more favorable impressions than did the lower classes. 
Rarely rubbing shoulders with ordinary newcomers, these Americans 
more often encountered persons who had adapted quickly to American 
ways and who, like themselves, were educated and successful. Moreover, 
their impressions were conditioned by notions about Germany itself, 
such as the preeminence of German learning. In the nineteenth century, 
approximately ten thousand Americans had studied in various German 
universities. They discovered a quality of scholarship, a depth of thought, 
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and an appreciation for learning and academic freedom that led them to 
place Germany on a cultural pedestal. Although such impressions of 
Germany and its institutions must be separated from ideas about German 
immigrants, they contributed to a generally high regard for them among 
the upper strata of society.s 
Ordinary Americans of the nineteenth century, however, had little 
contact with the products of German universities and still less with their 
books and essays. Instead, impressions of things German were gained 
from ordinary contacts with German-born barbers, bartenders, cobblers, 
cooks, and seamstresses, or with immigrants who lived next door or on a 
nearby farm, worked in the same factory, or deposited savings in the 
same bank. 
Perhaps the most prominent elements in the American stereotype of 
German immigrants were industriousness, thrift, and honesty-admirable 
virtues in the American value system. The German male seemed strongly 
attached to his family; he was orderly, disciplined, and stable. A bit too 
authoritarian by American standards, he was nonetheless admired for his 
ability to achieve material success through hard work. Similarly attrac-
tive was his reputation for mechanical ingenuity. The Germans were 
usually perceived as an intelligent people, although somewhat plodding 
in their mental processes. And if they tended to be unimaginatively 
thorough, they sometimes also seemed stubborn and graceless in manner. 
But the German wife and mother was commonly regarded as a model of 
cleanliness and efficiency; her daughter was valued as a reliable house 
servant or maid. Although some native Americans thought that the 
Germans treated their women badly, on the whole they considered these 
newcomers desirable additions to the American population. 
But there were negative elements in the image as well. Some felt that 
Germans were unwarrantably proud of their origins and culture. Others 
had ambivalent feelings about German festivities. It seemed as though 
the Germans had a celebration for every occasion, complete with parades 
and contests both athletic and cultural. Even their church affairs often 
took a festive air. Especially offensive was what puritanical Americans 
perceived as abandoned dancing and boorish swilling of beer, especially 
on the Sabbath, the day that God had set aside for worship, rest, and 
spiritual contemplation. Still others were put off by the apparent radical-
ism of German immigrants. The American labor movement seemed to 
have among its leaders an unusually large number of Germans who 
preached alien doctrines of communism, anarchism, and varying degrees 
of socialism. Impressions drawn from such unfortunate and widely publi-
cized affairs as the Chicago Haymarket Riot of 1886 strengthened the 
image of at least some Germans as dangerous revolutionaries.6 
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Clashes between native and immigrant cultures produced some of 
the most potent political issues of the late nineteenth century. Although 
many German immigrants were interested in political reform, economic 
development, and the tariff and currency questions, they responded more 
strongly to issues related to ethnocultural conflict. In addition to political 
and economic liberties, they wanted social and cultural freedom. By the 
1890s prohibition had become the dominant political manifestation of 
cultural conflict. Women's suffrage, Sabbatarianism, and efforts to regu-
late (if not close down) parochial school education were closely related 
issues that were capable of producing remarkable, although temporary, 
levels of uniformity in the voting behavior of German immigrants. 7 
Ethnocultural politics had an impact on nativist attitudes. Awareness 
of ethnic group identities was greatly intensified among immigrants and 
nativists alike. Thinking in stereotypes and symbols was encouraged; 
tolerance and understanding diminished. The live-and-Iet-live attitudes 
common in earlier decades were weakened by organized political action. 
Changes in attitudes toward immigrants were also fostered by some of 
the most respected social scientists of the day, whose study of the immi-
gration question led them to conclude that socially undesirable character-
istics were hereditary and were more typical of some ethnic groups than 
of others. Both negative and positive qualities were thus thought to be 
fixed or rigid.s 
StilL as such ideas gained currency at the end of the nineteenth 
century, the German Americans fared well. Although there were dissents 
from the general view, most Americans considered the Germans to be a 
desirable people. Moreover, as racial thinking became increasingly com-
mon early in the twentieth century, some German-American intellectuals 
were stimulated, in countless speeches and articles, to laud and magnify 
the achievements of their group, ranging from such early contributions as 
those of Baron von Steuben in the Revolutionary War to the more recent 
accomplishments of such engineers as John Roebling and his American-
born son, who designed and built the Brooklyn Bridge. This indulgence 
in cultural chauvinism was partly an effort to lay claim to a share in 
American greatness, but it was also intended to balance Anglo-Saxonist 
notions of racial superiority and preeminence in world affairs. 9 
By the beginning of World War L the leaders of the rapidly 
assimilating German element in the United States, understandably proud 
of their cultural heritage, were encouraged in their ethnocentrism by the 
stereotypes native-born Americans generally held of them. Some were 
even prompted to promote their heritage as a culture counter to the 
dominant Anglo-American. But this was a dangerous course in a period 
of resurgent nativism. Deviations from American norms were but lightly 
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tolerated by persons unwilling or unable to distinguish cultural chau-
vinism from the political or nationalistic variety. 
In Brazil, German immigrants were generally perceived favorably 
in the nineteenth century, especially by the ruling classes, who regarded 
them as desirable additions to Brazilian society. The Germans, they 
thought, would not only bring valued skills to Brazil but would also 
"whiten" the population, which in 1890 was only 44 percent white. The 
Brazilian elite, like the American, was strongly influenced by racist 
theories based on presumably scientific criteria that gave the highest 
rating to so-called Nordic peoples, which, of course, included the 
Germans.10 As in the United States, they were admired for their industry, 
orderliness, and stability. 
Even though the Germans were welcomed and valued for the 
contributions they were making to Brazilian development, the Brazilian 
image, even more than the American, rested on inadequate and distorted 
information, rhetorical exaggeration, and mythll because the multiracial 
Brazilian society was considerably more divided than the American 
between rich and poor, the literate and the illiterate. German immigrant 
society in Brazil was both more concentrated spatially and more isolated 
socially than in the United States, especially in the rural settlements. 
Moreover, the German enclaves in the Brazilian cities were often domi-
nated by wealthy, educated Reichsdeutsche (subjects of the German 
kaiser). Such persons-bankers, industrialists, merchants, journalists, 
technicians, and various representatives of large German firms-frequently 
considered life in Brazil to be temporary. Moreover, they were often 
contemptuous of Luso-Brazilian culture,12 an attitude that did not go 
unnoticed by the Brazilians with whom they were in frequent contact. 
Some Teuto-Brazilian leaders also shared this attitude of condescen-
sion for Brazilian culture. Feeding on ethnocentric German nationalist 
propaganda of the turn of the century, they considered Brazilian culture 
to be decidedly inferior to their own. In one example of such literature, a 
German writer on Brazil recommended stout resistance to assimilation on 
the ground that Brazilian culture was worthless. "What the Lusitanians 
have created in America," he wrote, "is a country that has produced 
nothing memorable in any field, including economics and culture; in the 
economic sphere ... this state ... is crippled, ... a poorly organized com-
munity of seventeen million people. And these seventeen million, who 
rule over a rich and productive area the size of Europe, are unable to 
colonize anything, nor are they able to establish a properly functioning 
means of transportation and communication, regulate their financial 
affairs, guarantee justice, build a fleet, nor maintain an army other than 
one that is really nothing more than a privileged band of robbers."l3 This 
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statement is so extreme, of course, that it cannot be considered typical. 
Still, many Teuto-Brazilians regarded Brazilian culture as weak and 
ineffectual; the Luso-Brazilians themselves seemed to combine indolence 
and ignorance with ridiculous conceit. The Portuguese language was 
useful to know for practical reasons, they thought, but it seemed to offer 
few literary treasures compared to the German.14 Like the most extrava-
gant of German-American cultural chauvinists, some Teuto-Brazilians 
insisted that the Germans would perform their best service as loyal 
citizens by infusing the culture of their adopted country with their 
presumably superior German qualities. If German language and culture 
were allowed to fade from use, they argued, Brazil would be deprived of 
the invaluable German sense of duty and commitment to the work ethic. 
Many felt that the chances for successful maintenance of German lan-
guage and culture were greater in Brazil than in the United States, where, 
they believed, Anglo-American Protestant culture was so strong that 
German immigrants were virtually unable to withstand its assimilative 
power.lS 
The status of the Germans in Brazilian society was not a topic of 
national debate. At most it was a regional issue discussed in the states 
where the Germans were concentrated and where upper-class perceptions 
were drawn primarily from the behavior of unrepresentative persons 
who perpetuated immigrant culture because it served their economic 
interests and psychological needs. Hence most educated Brazilians had 
little comprehension of the diversity of the German immigrant group, 
such as the differences that divided Catholics from Protestants or the 
disparate values and behaviors that distinguished the rural farmers from 
the urban workers and the economic and social elite. Moreover, they 
failed to understand how the physical environment, in conjunction with 
unique events in Brazilian history, promoted German isolationism. They 
were often mystified by the German spirit of separatism. They could not 
understand why the Germans would want to perpetuate their own lan-
guage and culture indefinitely, especially since Brazilian culture was so 
attractive. In their view, Brazilian culture was open, tolerant, hospitable, 
adaptable, nonideological, humane, and free of rigid stratification. 
Brazilians, they believed, were motivated by a spirit of conciliation that 
sought compromise and rejected extremist measures. Above all, they 
considered themselves to be a nonviolent people.16 
It is not possible to determine the extent to which the illiterate and 
unskilled classes in Brazilian society shared the concerns of the elite. 
Because of the isolated character of most German rural settlements, the 
social interaction of the Germans with other Brazilians was infrequent 
and often superficial. Furthermore, the Germans, like any other social 
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group, differed widely in education, skills, health, and working habits, 
and large numbers experienced a deterioration in social and economic 
circumstances as they struggled to survive in the Brazilian environment. 
But the prevailing image was that the Germans were better housed and 
fed; that their system of private and parochial schools was often superior 
to what passed for public education in Brazil at that time; and that their 
homes and persons were cleaner and healthier. The Germans also seemed 
willing to work very hard, at least in contrast to the impoverished 
caboclos (persons of mixed Indian and Portuguese descent), among 
whom labor was intermittent and subject to frequent and long interruptions. 
One may assume that some Brazilians of the less privileged classes 
regarded the Germans with resentment and jealousy, but even so, there is 
no record of persistent cultural conflict based on ethnic differencesP 
Of course, most Brazilians, rich or poor, white, black, mulatto, or 
caboclo, rarely thought about the Germans at all, much less in any 
systematic way. Similarly, the ordinary Teuto-Brazilian people went 
about their daily business, adapting to their surroundings and rarely 
giving the problems of assimilation any consideration. Like any other 
immigrant group, the Germans included many persons who were favor-
ably disposed toward the language and culture of the host society and 
wanted to become part of it as quickly and painlessly as possible. 
Through daily contacts at work, at the store, at church, in school, or even 
in the home, they learned Portuguese readily. Whether they learned 
quickly or slowly depended upon individual circumstances and whether 
they had good or poor opportunities for interaction with speakers of 
Portuguese. Obviously, the isolated, exclusive rural colonies offered few 
such chances. 
The existence of colonies where there were no Portuguese-language 
schools and where hundreds of second- and third-generation children 
had only rudimentary knowledge of Portuguese began to concern mem-
bers of the Brazilian elite as the nineteenth century drew to a close. When 
they tried to identify typical German attitudes they naturally paid atten-
tion to the most conspicuous persons-the articulate German-Brazilian 
idealists who made speeches and wrote editorials, essays, and letters 
demanding their right to maintain their cultural separatism. Some per-
sons in government were eager to break up the rural German enclaves, 
especially in Rio Grande do SuI, and to guarantee that new settlements 
would consist of a mixture of ethnic groups. Several efforts were made on 
both the state and national levels to restrict the growth of the colonies, 
but none were effective. In Santa Catarina the attack on immigrant insti-
tutions centered on private schools. For example, a law enacted in 1913, 
mild by present-day standards, ordered inspection by state officials and 
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required that statistics of attendance be reported. It further specified that 
any schools that accepted subventions from either state or local govern-
ments were required to use Portuguese as the language of instruction.l 8 
Luso-Brazilian fears that the Germans in the southern states were 
becoming so numerous that they could never be assimilated were heightened 
by much discussion of the so-called "German peril" - a commonly held 
belief that Germany had set itself upon a course of worldwide imperialism, 
based in part on the presence of German immigrants in various under-
developed countries, including Brazil. At the same time, German aggres-
siveness was observed in the South Pacific, China, the Philippines, and 
the Caribbean. When in 1904 the Germans threatened the integrity of 
Venezuela in a debt-collection controversy, alarmists saw the first steps in 
a plan designed to create a German protectorate over southern Brazil and 
possibly a state that would be German in language and culture.19 
Meanwhile in Germany the noisy, supernationalistic Pan-German 
League fueled new fears of German imperialism. In its widely distributed 
publications, this organization emphasized the cultural kinship of Ger-
mans all over the world and agitated vociferously for a colonial empire, 
for an enlarged navy, for war as an instrument of national policy, and for 
the preservation of German language and culture in German settlements 
overseas. A symptom rather than a cause of the rampant nationalism of 
the time, the Pan-German League was identified by English and French 
propagandists as the coordinating agency of German imperialism. Although 
the league's importance was grossly exaggerated, a flood of articles 
exposing the alleged Pan-Germanist conspiracy soon appeared in news-
papers and periodicals in Europe and America. In Brazil, the noted 
Brazilian literary critic Sylvio Romero produced a lengthy tract entitled 
o allemanismo no suI do Brasil (1906). Although he welcomed the influx 
of German immigrants, Romero warned his countrymen of the German 
peril, outlined steps that could be taken to combat the threat, and urged 
that measures be taken to assimilate the German colonists into Brazilian 
society.20 Other Brazilian writers expressed similar fears. 
When world war engulfed Europe in 1914, the governments of both 
the United States and Brazil declared their neutrality. For most ordinary 
people in both countries, but especially in Brazil, the war in Europe was a 
distant affair of no particular consequence. It seemed to affect their daily 
lives in no direct or discernible fashion. Still, the war tended to evoke 
sympathies for one side or the other. Immigrants and their descendants 
naturally felt an emotional bond with their ancestral homeland and were 
convinced of the justice of its cause. Leaders of the German ethnic groups 
in both countries tended to be extravagant in their partisanship for 
Germany. Opinion among the educated or "established" groups in both 
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the United States and Brazil, however, tended to favor the Allied powers. 
In Brazil, even more than in the United States, the press was disposed 
against Germany. 
In 1917 the neutrality period came to an end when both the United 
States and Brazil declared war on Germany, ostensibly because vessels in 
their respective merchant marines had been torpedoed by German 
submarines. Although there were strong similarities in the behavior of 
Brazilians and Americans toward the Germans in their midst, the differ-
ences are striking. 
In the United States, the war introduced a period of persecution for 
German Americans. Many citizens of German origin were suspected of 
disloyalty. Individuals were harassed in various ways as the American 
people were swept up in a wave of anti-German feeling. In effect, there 
was a war against German language and culture. The climate of suspicion 
produced such measures as bans on German-composed music and the 
renaming of persons, foods, streets, parks, and towns. German-language 
instruction in the schools was restricted or eliminated, and German-
language newspapers were closely regulated. There were scores of patri-
otic demonstrations in which German Americans were forced to kiss the 
American flag, buy war bonds, or sing the national anthem. Ceremonies 
were held at which German-language books were burned. There were 
frequent instances of vandalism, beatings, arrests for allegedly unpatriotic 
utterances, and even a lynching of a German alien in Illinois.21 
But the American behavior pales in contrast to the Brazilian. Fol-
lowing the Brazilian break in diplomatic relations with Germany in April 
1917, German Brazilians were victims of numerous destructive riots. 
Property damage was enormous as hundreds of residences, German-
language newspaper offices, churches, schools, clubhouses, businesses, 
factories, and warehouses were damaged or destroyed by mobs. Six 
months later, following Brazil's declaration of war in October, a second 
series of riots resulted in more destruction. Martial law was declared in 
Rio de Janeiro and all southern states, where the great majority of the 
Teuto-Brazilians lived. All publications in the German language were 
forbidden. All instruction in the German language was banned in all 
schools at all levels. All German-language church services were outlawed. 
The president was empowered to seize the property of enemy aliens and 
to sell all goods consigned to them. Enforcement of these repressive 
measures was inconsistent and sometimes haphazard, but Brazilian behav-
ior was remarkably violent and repressive compared with the American. 22 
It is easy to explain the Brazilian response to the German problem 
in terms of the classic stereotype of the Latin temperament as irresponsible, 
unrestrained, volatile, emotional, and spontaneous. But such a simple 
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interpretation would explain very little. It is more useful to compare 
Teuto-Brazilian circumstances with the American. Although Germans 
represented a much smaller proportion of Brazilian society than of the 
American, their settlement patterns were more highly concentrated, 
exclusive, and isolated in Brazil. Usually better educated and often wealth-
ier than the average Brazilian, the Germans were more slowly assimilated 
than in America. As northern Europeans, the Teuto-Brazilians, in con-
trast to the more numerous Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese immigrants 
in Brazil, had a language and a culture that were significantly different 
from those of the host society. Differentness in turn promoted a heightened 
sense of minority group identity in addition to a full complement of 
ethnic institutions-churches, schools, social organizations, a German-
language press-that tended to be more closely tied to Germany than 
were their equivalents in the United States. All these elements combined 
to promote a general sense of cultural superiority that had no equal in the 
United States. Moreover, leadership was more often vested in Reichs-
deutsche, whose bonds with Germany were close. Finally, compared to 
their American cousins, the Germans in Brazil wielded greater economic 
power, but their political influence was weaker. 
The comparison should be carried a step further. Brazilian society, 
compared to the American, was more highly stratified: its rich were 
richer and its poor poorer. Its economy was less developed and its 
political institutions less democratic; it had no long-standing constitutional 
tradition. Illiteracy was pervasive. In such a social setting, the relatively 
prosperous Germans naturally tended to evoke antagonism, the Brazilian 
reputation for tolerance and goodwill notwithstanding. 
As the spirit of nationalism swelled early in the twentieth century, 
the Brazilians, like the Americans, naturally acted on the basis of stereo-
types that obscured individual differences and beclouded interpersonal 
relationships. Lacking both knowledge and understanding of the separatistic 
German subsociety, its manners and institutions, they demanded an 
unprecedented measure of conformity to established Brazilian ways. 
When war came in 191?, they treated their Germans with a severity 
surpassing anything generally experienced by Germans in the United 
States. Had the German Americans been as divergent from the American 
norms as the Teuto-Brazilians were from Brazilian, it is likely that 
they too would have suffered from destructive riots, as did nineteenth-
century Chinese in mining camps of the American West, or American 
blacks in Chicago, East St. Louis, Tulsa, and elsewhere in the immediate 
postwar period. Had their number been small enough, they might have 
been herded into concentration camps, as were Japanese Americans in 
World War II. 
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In April 1917, shortly after Brazil broke off diplomatic relations 
with Germany, Brazilians of German origin or descent were victims of 
numerous, destructive riots. Although death and personal injury were 
minimal, property damage was enormous as hundreds of residences, 
business houses, factories, and warehouses were damaged or destroyed 
by mobs gone out of control. Porto Alegre was the scene of the worst 
riots, but disturbances occurred almost simultaneously in Sao Paulo, 
Pelotas, and other cities of the South, where large numbers of German 
Brazilians lived. Six months later, following Brazil's declaration of war 
against the German Empire, another series of riots resulted in more 
destruction in the German districts of Rio de Janeiro, Petropolis, Curitiba, 
and elsewhere. 2 
Like most riots, these outbursts of violence may be attributed to 
immediate causes. In this case, intergroup tension was intensified by 
genuine dismay and anger over Germany's having torpedoed Brazilian 
merchant vessels, by virulent anti-German propaganda, and by the rhe-
torical excesses of pro-Ally politicians. But that is like saying that World 
War I itself was caused in 1914 by the Serbian nationalist who assassi-
nated the Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo. The anti-German riots 
in Brazil are better understood within a larger context of ethnic history: 
The behavior of the dominant Luso-Brazilians (persons of Portuguese 
language and culture) and the minority Teuto-Brazilians (as the Germans 
were often called) may be best interpreted if examined historically in 
terms of ethnic group relations, perceptions, and images.3 
Germans were among the earliest and most numerous of non-
Portuguese Europeans to settle in Brazil. Beginning in the 1820s, a small 
stream of Germans entered the country, largely as a consequence of 
vigorous recruitment efforts sponsored by the Brazilian government. The 
number of German immigrants seldom exceeded two thousand in a single 
year. Yet after nearly a century they had multiplied and prospered until 
they numbered approximately 400,000 persons, mostly Brazilian-born 
and German-speaking. 4 
Although colonies of German immigrants developed in several of 
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the large cities and seaports in Brazil, the majority sought new homes in 
rural regions that had been ignored or bypassed by earlier Portuguese or 
Azorean settlers, Locating chiefly in the southern states of Rio Grande do 
SuI and Santa Catarina and to a lesser extent in Parana, they built a new 
society, different from what they had known in Germany and different as 
well from that of the receiving Luso-Brazilian society, The Teuto-Brazilians 
adapted their agricultural practices to subtropical realities, raised large 
families, and built churches, schools, and towns, They were the dominant 
group in some provincial cities, notably Sao Leopoldo, Blumenau, and 
Joinville, and became an influential minority in such major cities as Porto 
Alegre, Sao Paulo, and Rio de Janeiro,S 
Because of the accidents of time and place, the Germans in Brazil 
had been allowed to develop their own society without much interference, 
By the 1880s, the last years of the Brazilian Empire, they had become a 
society within a' society - a large, diverse, and structured community 
with its own values, attitudes, language, and folkways, In general, they 
were well received, respected, and valued for the contributions they were 
making to Brazilian economy and culture,6 
With the advent of the republic in 1889, however, attitudes toward 
the Teuto-Brazilians began to change, The difference was partly a matter 
of confidence: The republic had to demonstrate its authority and its 
ability to govern, a task made more difficult by the diffusion of political 
power among the states and the development of political parties on a 
state basis, The abolition of slavery had its own repercussions as many 
thousands of new immigrants were recruited in Italy, Spain, and Portugal 
to supplement the labor supply, At the same time, the modernization of 
the economic structure of Brazil was under way, especially in the South, 
With the expansion of industry in relation to the production of agricul-
tural commodities came economic and social dislocations that were new 
to Brazilian experience, As the world has witnessed so often in the 
twentieth century, modernization produced new social problems and 
tensions, especially in the cities, Some Brazilians, doubting the capacity 
of their society to absorb the flood of immigrants, demanded that the 
newcomers learn to conform to Brazilian ways,7 
A measure of nativism also invaded Brazilian thought and attitude, 
Nativism was consonant with the doctrines of the Comtean positivism to 
which many of the new republican leaders subscribed, The commitment 
of the Brazilian positivists was not merely to progress, but also to order, 
which they understood to include a harmony among the classes, races, 
ethnic groups, and sexes, They could applaud the diverse origins of 
Brazilian society and culture and yet insist that a new unity-a distinctively 
Brazilian unity-had to be achieved, by force of dictatorship, if necessary,S 
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During the decade before the outbreak of World War I, many 
Brazilians in all levels of society, but especially among the ruling classes, 
began to perceive the Germans as a problem-an element that threatened 
the equilibrium of Brazilian society.9 The Germans seemed rich and 
powerful, socially exclusive, and unwilling to be assimilated. To the more 
suspicious, they were eager accomplices in a vast Pan-Germanic plot to 
extend the power of the German Empire and with it German language 
and culture to all parts of the world, especially the southern states of 
Brazil.1° 
The Brazilian image of the Germans, like most stereotypes, rested 
on insufficient and distorted information, rhetorical exaggeration, and 
myths. ll There was little comprehension of the diversity within the 
group, such as the differences that divided Catholics from Protestants or 
the disparate values and behaviors that separated rural farmers from 
urban workers and businessmen, or Teuto-Brazilians from Reichsdeutsche. 
Perceptions were drawn primarily from the behavior of the ethnic elite-
the articulate, educated clergy, journalists, and businessmen who perpetu-
ated immigrant culture because it served their economic interests and 
satisfied their psychological needs. 
To the most ethnocentric among the German elite it seemed obvi-
ous that Luso-Brazilian culture was inferior to their own. They found 
little in it that they deemed worthy of adaptation or imitation. Brazilian 
culture was thought to be weak, and Luso-Brazilians themselves seemed 
to combine indolence with ridiculous conceit. As for their Portuguese 
language, it seemed useful to know but unimportant in terms of world 
culture. Compared to German, they thought, it offered few literary 
treasures. 12 
At the same time, however, these same Teuto-Brazilians sought 
acceptance and recognition. They were eager to be considered an essen-
tial element in their adopted country's history and they wanted Brazilians 
to understand and appreciate how extensive their contributions had been 
to Brazil's development. Thus the literature of Teuto-Brazilian filiopietism 
describes how individual Germans had participated in the exploration of 
the land, the independence movement, and the preservation of Brazilian 
territorial integrity through the wars with Argentina and Paraguay. More-
over, they insisted that German leaders had helped to initiate the renewal 
of national intellectual life through their defense of liberty of conscience. 
Filiopietists also stressed the role of the Germans in placing new value and 
dignity on work and in condemning slavery as morally and socially 
obnoxious; they had contributed significantly to the elevation of moral, 
cultural, and material standards in Brazil; and they could take credit, 
at least in part, for the emergence of the middle class in Brazil.13 
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For a substantial proportion of the German subsociety in Brazil, 
this kind of ethnocentric talk was pointless. Like any other immigrant 
group, the German included persons who were favorably disposed toward 
the language and culture of the host society and wanted to become a part 
of it as quickly and painlessly as possible.14 Unlike the cultural idealists 
who insisted that it was their right to maintain their immigrant speech 
and folkways and who denied the right of the government to demand 
that they learn the language of the country, such rapid assimilators were 
eager to abandon the marks of immigrant status because they had become 
a source of social and economic deprivation. 
Between these two-the cultural chauvinists at one extreme and the 
rapid assimilators at the other-was the majority, who saw no problem 
at all. They went about their daily business gradually adapting to their 
surroundings and rarely giving the problem of assimilation any thought. 
If their assimilation was unusually slow, it was because they had further 
to go, culturally speaking, than, for example, the Italians, to whom they 
were frequently and negatively compared. Because of this cultural distance, 
they tended to cluster in separate communities. Since they were so 
numerous, they could create the institutions that maintained their distinc-
tive cultural forms. Yet through daily contacts at work, in school, at 
church, or at the store, they learned Portuguese more or less automatically. 
Whether they learned quickly or slowly depended upon individual cir-
cumstance and whether provided good or poor opportunities for interac-
tion with speakers of Portuguese. For most of them, however, the ability 
to speak Portuguese became the symbol of higher social status; it was the 
avenue to social and economic progress, especially for the young.IS 
When governmental personnel began to object to the exclusiveness 
of the rural German colonies and the slowness of the Germans to assim-
ilate, as they did in the two decades preceding World War 1, they 
thought first of the extreme cases-the highly isolated districts where 
there were no Portuguese-language schools and where hundreds of second-
and third-generation children could be found whose knowledge of Portu-
guese was rudimentary at best. Similarly, when they tried to identify 
typical German attitudes, they naturally paid attention to the most 
conspicuous persons-the noisy idealists who made speeches and wrote 
editorials, essays, and letters demanding the right to maintain their 
cultural separatism. 
Thus the Luso-Brazilian majority acquired a distorted image of the 
Teuto-Brazilians. Some elements of the composite picture were correct, 
others were out of proportion, and a few were simply wrong. For decades 
in the nineteenth century, the Luso-Brazilian majority had ignored the 
question of German assimilation, probably because it had not seemed 
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important enough to demand action. Then, when the failure of the 
Germans to assimilate began to be perceived as a problem, some Brazilian 
leaders tended to overreact and to press for extreme or far-reaching 
measures that were intended to enforce greater conformity. 
When national rivalries exploded into world war in 1914, Luso-
Brazilian sympathies were strongly with France and her allies and their 
tolerance for the loyalty Teuto-Brazilians naturally felt for Germany was 
correspondingly reduced. Influential political and cultural leaders then 
attacked Brazil's German ethnic group as a menace to national security 
and recklessly charged them with a full range of subversive activity. The 
subsequent anti-German riots of 1917 were thus the natural children 
born of intergroup tensions in conjunction with the accidents of world 
history. 
The long neutrality period from 1914 to 1917 was generally a 
period of incubation for these tensions. Circumstances in Brazil were 
much like those in the United States. Germans in both countries felt a 
strong bond of loyalty to the land of their fathers; the host societies 
leaned toward the Allies. In Brazil, the Portuguese-language press quickly 
became a vehicle for intensely anti-German atrocity propaganda; the 
Germans in Brazil vigorously countered with propagandistic efforts of 
their own. The effect of this verbal conflict was to rejuvenate the German 
ethnic community and invest it with a new sense of self-esteem, if not 
strength. The German-language press thrived and voluntary organization 
experienced new surges of vitality as they shared in the new chauvinism.16 
German ethnic behavior was not, of course, uniform. This was 
especially true of the churches. The leading Protestant denomination was 
the Evangelical church, which was organized in several synods. Espe-
cially strong in Rio Grande do SuL it claimed as members about half of 
all Teuto-Brazilians. In the nineteenth century the Evangelicals (plus 
certain Lutheran groups) developed strong institutional ties with the 
Prussian state church, from which they received most of their clergy in 
addition to significant financial support. Not surprisingly, it became a 
central doctrine among Evangelicals that German language and culture 
were inseparable from religious belief. In the neutrality period, therefore, 
Evangelical parishes and other institutions became powerful agents for 
the promotion of pro-Germanism. They raised funds for the German Red 
Cross, bought German war bonds, sponsored bazaars and rallies to aid 
German victims of war; special prayer services were held to implore the 
deity for the success of German arms,17 
In contrast to the Evangelicals, the Lutherans, especially those 
affiliated with the North American Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, 
were much less chauvinistic. Their subsidies came not from Germany but 
128 Germans in the New World 
from the United States. Even though this church still used German as its 
basic language, it believed that a transition to Portuguese was essential to 
survival. Hence it never offered a word of defense for Germany or for the 
preservation of Deutschtum. These Lutherans saw the European conflict 
as a judgment of God upon a sinful people-punishment for wickedness, 
unbelief, failure to pray, contempt for God's word, and the idolatry of 
human wisdom as revealed especially in modern science and theological 
liberalism. IS 
The German Catholics in Brazil provided a third pattern of behavior. 
That Catholicism was the religion of the vast majority of Brazilians made 
their situation fundamentally different from the Protestants. The German 
Catholics were nearly as numerous as the Evangelicals but were much 
less chauvinistic. Because the Catholic church was universal and multi-
ethnic, it tended to unite its German adherents with other Brazilians-
persons of Italian, Portuguese, and Spanish origins-rather than to sepa-
rate or isolate them from the rest of society. Even when a Catholic parish 
consisted largely of Teuto-Brazilians, it usually was not a ready agency 
for raising either money or enthusiasm for Germany's cause. Moreover, 
the preeminent German in the Brazilian Catholic hierarchy, Archbishop 
Joao Becker of Porto Alegre, was determined to align his administration 
with the dominant attitudes and behaviors of Luso-Brazilian society. 
Nevertheless, there were individual German Catholics who were outspo-
ken in their partisanship for Germany.I9 
In contrast to the churches, secular ethnic societies, especially the 
umbrella organizations, were more likely to lend themselves consistently 
to active or vocal pro-Germanism. Brazil had no national organization 
like the National German-American Alliance in the United States, but 
early in 1916 a German agent, ostensibly working as a fund-raiser for the 
German Red Cross, founded the short-lived Germanischer Bund fur 
Sud-Amerika. Widely publicized, this organization inevitably generated 
suspicion and alarm among partisans of the Allies; but even within the 
German subsociety it also earned much opposition because it represented 
a challenge to the established ethnic leadership, especially the Evangelical 
clergy.20 
The Germanischer Bund unintentionally stimulated the growth of 
patriotic organizations among Luso-Brazilians, the most important of 
which was the Liga pelos alliados (League for the Allies). Led by the 
brilliant Brazilian orator and statesman Ruy Barbosa, this organization 
bore a striking resemblance to the National Security League in the United 
States. Both organizations defended the Allies, advocated preparedness, 
protested alleged German atrocities, raised funds for the British and 
French Red Cross, and sought to hasten the assimilation of immigrants 
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through educational means-literacy programs, instruction in the lan-
guage of the host society, and in the promotion of patriotism. A special 
target of the Liga pelos alliados was Brazil's distinguished foreign minister, 
Lauro Muller, a thoroughly assimilated second-generation Teuto-Brazilian 
who was finally forced out of office in May 1917.21 
Following Germany's decision to resume unrestricted submarine 
warfare on February I, 1917, anti-German propaganda was intensified in 
Brazil. It was repeatedly charged that Germany was plotting to use the 
Teuto-Brazilian colonies in the southern states as the base for its imperialist 
designs. Similarly, the German-language newspapers persisted in their 
intense pro-Germanism, despite many ominous signs that Luso-Brazilian 
tolerance for such behavior was weakening.22 
The breaking point came on AprilS, 1917, when a German subma-
rine torpedoed a small Brazilian freighter, the Parana, off the coast of 
France. Official confirmation of the sinking came on the same day the 
United States declared war on Germany.23 Brazilian newspapers stormily 
protested the loss and demanded that the government take decisive 
action; the Liga pelos alIi ados urged an immediate declaration of war and 
several prominent dailies swelled the chorus. 24 Patriotic rallies and dem-
onstrations attracted huge crowds in Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Porto 
Alegre, and elsewhere. In several cities these demonstrations were 
transformed into ugly anti-German affairs. Allegedly impelled by patrio-
tism, crowds of people surged to prominent German business establish-
ments, clubhouses of German societies, and German-language newspapers. 
Despite genuine efforts of municipal governments to maintain order, 
several demonstrations degenerated into riots causing enormous losses 
due to arson and 100ting.25 
On Saturday, April 14, and continuing through to Tuesday, April 
17, Porto Alegre experienced the worst of these riots, as much of its 
German district was burned. Mobs consisting largely of waterfront riffraff, 
enlivened by alcoholic drink, pillaged the district. At the end of three 
days of riot, nearly three hundred buildings lay in various stages of ruin. 
Factories, warehouses, restaurants, schools, newspaper offices, plus many 
private residences were damaged or destroyed. 26 
Riots plagued other cities in Rio Grande do SuI, most notably 
Pelotas, located near the southern tip of Brazil. Although the heavily 
German state of Santa Catarina was mostly spared, other cities from 
Curitiba in Parana to Pernambuco far to the north experienced disturbances. 
Governments on all levels attempted to cope with the problem of civil 
disorder as efficiently as possible, yet in the weeks that followed, superpa-
triots continued their intolerant and inflammatory rhetoric. The press 
also continued to print, as it had before the riots, the wildest of rumors, 
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including one that an army of 80,000 armed Germans were gathering in 
Santa Catarina, where the governor was Felippe Schmidt, another Brazilian-
born German, a cousin of Lauro Muller, the foreign minister,27 
The range of reaction among the Germans of Brazil following the 
April riots was as varied as the people themselves. A few fled to the 
exclusive German colonies in the interior, but most were willing to 
accommodate their behavior to the newly narrowed standards of patri-
otic conduct. Some decided that the best course would be to make overt 
gestures of assimilation. This could be done most obviously by changing 
German names to something acceptable in Portuguese. Others dropped 
their memberships in the numerous Vereine or withdrew their children 
from the German schools. The German-language newspapers suspended 
publication for a couple of weeks, but by the end of April most had 
resumed publication, with government approval. A sharp division of 
opinion emerged regarding the proper course to follow. Some die-hard 
chauvinists were more determined than ever to maintain their ethnicity 
and to assert the justice of the German cause, but others advised a more 
moderate course.28 Even though the majority of the ordinary German-
speaking Brazilians had been indifferent to the war in Europe, many 
persons had now been touched by it in a frightfully direct way. Given the 
unrestrained character of the riots and the hatred they seemed to project, 
mimy Teuto-Brazilians wondered what would happen to them if Brazil 
actually declared war. 
That did not occur until another six months had passed. On Octo-
ber 25, 1917, following the news that another Brazilian vessel, the 
Macao, had been torpedoed, the Brazilian president asked Congress to 
declare war, which it promptly did the following day. Nearly as promptly, 
Brazil subjected itself to another round of riots. This time Rio Grande do 
SuI remained relatively free of trouble, although this was not true of the 
city of Pelotas. Santa Catarina suffered serious disorders in Itajai and 
Florianopolis. But the worst excesses occurred in the cities farther north, 
beginning on October 28 in Curitiba, spreading to Petropolis, and climaxing 
in Rio de Janeiro on November 3. As in April, property damage was 
extensive but there was no loss of life.29 
Government repression of its German ethnic citizens began immedi-
'ately after the declaration of war. The minister of the interior ordered an 
end to all publications in the German language, including newspapers, 
periodicals, and books, even prayer books and textbooks for teaching 
German speakers to learn Portuguese. Another decree ordered the dosing 
of all German schools in which Portuguese was not the language of 
instruction. The Brazilian postal service announced that it would no 
longer handle materials printed in the German language. There were also 
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injunctions against the use of the German language in public meetings, 
including worship services in the immigrant churches.3D 
Congress also enacted special wartime legislation, the most signifi-
cant of which was the Lei de guerra, enacted on November 16, 1917. 
This law chiefly treated economic problems and was aimed directly at the 
great German-owned banks and coffee-exporting firms. By it the presi-
dent of the republic was empowered to seize the property of enemy aliens 
and to sell all goods consigned to them. Superpatriots in the Congress 
also demanded and received a provision granting the president the author-
ity to declare any part of the country to be under a state of siege. The next 
day the president announced that Rio de Janeiro and the southern states 
were in such a state of siege. Martial law was imposed, German aliens 
were interned, and detachments of the Brazilian army were billeted in the 
German colonies. Inevitably, German aliens were required to register -
with police; passes with fingerprints and photographs were issued; and 
mail was censored.31 
The total prohibition against any publication in the German lan-
guage was far more severe than any wartime restrictions imposed by the 
United States upon its German-speaking minority. In Brazil economic 
survival for the publishers was possible only if they switched entirely to 
Portuguese, which many of them did. Such Portuguese-language substi-
tutes almost always were considered to be temporary expedients but 
inevitably most newspapers experienced sharp reductions in the number 
of their subscribers. 
Like the newspapers, the German-language schools were shut down 
immediately-267 in Santa Catarina alone. They were not allowed to 
open until they could demonstrate that they were staffed with teachers 
competent in Portuguese and that instructional materials in Portuguese 
were going to be used. 32 In the United States there was nothing compa-
rable to Brazil's nationwide closure of private and parochial German-
language schools, although German-language instruction was generally 
curtailed in the public schools. Even though enforcement was lax in some 
districts, many schools never reopened. Because public schools had never 
been established in many areas of German settlement, the regulation 
meant that thousands of Teuto-Brazilian children were simply deprived, 
of education during the war. 
It was also a difficult time for many of the German churches, 
especially in the larger towns and cities, where superpatriotic pressures 
were felt most strongly. Inevitably, the Evangelicals suffered the most 
because of their insistence on the linkage between religion and German 
language and culture. A few congregations simply' suspended all public 
functions for several months. Others tried to make the requisite transition 
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to Portuguese. Some that were located in remote rural districts ignored 
the wartime restrictions entirely and continued undisturbed. Enforce-
ment was thus inconsistent or haphazard. Higher government officials 
often tended to be tolerant and understanding, but local authorities were 
sometimes harsh and unyielding. Still other officials enforced the anti-
German decrees only when superpatriots in a local community demanded 
it. Individual preachers and parishes endured harassment, but the most 
important general consequence of the war for the Evangelicals was that it 
cut off the source of financial support and the supply of well-trained 
clergymen. They were thus forced to become more independent, more 
self-reliant.33 
In contrast to the Evangelicals, the Catholics and the Missouri 
Synod Lutherans fared reasonably well. Again, individual clergymen and 
congregations suffered, sometimes deservedly. The Lutherans, because of 
their connections with the United States, actually prospered during the 
war and, by all accounts, suffered no depredations during the riots, even 
though their congregations included virtually no one who was not German. 
In the numerically dominant Catholic church, the ranking Brazilian 
prelate (the archbishop of Rio de Janeiro) issued a pastoral letter urging 
understanding and tolerance of the Teuto-Brazilians, but the German-
born archbishop of Porto Alegre, Joao Becker, imposed his own prohibi-
tion against the use of the German language in his diocese, closed all 
Catholic schools administered by German priests, and replaced parish 
priests of German birth. When individual German parishes were attacked 
in the superpatriotic press, Becker failed to defend them, fearing the 
wrath of superpatriots within Brazil's ruling class, and earning thereby 
the contempt of many Teuto-Brazilian Catholics.34 
It was relatively easy for the numerous Vereine to accommodate to 
the new restrictions, compared to the churches, schools, and newspapers. 
Large numbers changed their names to something in Portuguese; some 
revised and rewrote their governing documents and opened their doors to 
persons other than Germans. Even so, most such organizations lost many 
members during the war and some simply voted themselves out of 
existence.35 
Brazil's actual participation in the war was limited. Its navy patrolled 
a part of the Atlantic but no soldiers were sent to the battlefields of 
Europe. Agricultural production was greatly stimulated, but the impact 
of war was almost imperceptible for most persons. Under such conditions, 
the intense anti-German feelings that prevailed during the fall months of 
1917 were bound to dissipate. Some of the severest federal restrictions 
were relaxed and a few were removed by spring 1918, although the ban 
on publication in the German language remained in force through most 
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of 1919. On the state level there was much variation. In Santa Catarina, 
for example, restrictions against German-language schools remained in 
force until 1921. 36 
After the war, the Germans of Brazil quickly returned to their old 
patterns of cultural chauvinism and self-imposed separation. German-
language schools reopened, newspapers resumed publication, German 
sermons were heard again in the churches, and the Vereine resumed their 
activities as before the war. Teuto-Brazilian businessmen and industrial-
ists prospered. Nevertheless, the forces of assimilation inevitably eroded 
ethnic consciousness in many persons. It is impossible to determine how 
many Teuto-Brazilians were absorbed into the Brazilian mainstream because 
of war-born influences. But in the isolated, rural colonies, bastions of 
German ethnicity remained intact, if not untouched. The cultural dis-
tance between Teuto-Brazilians and the rest of society, enhanced by the 
strong sense of German cultural superiority, remained much greater in 
Brazil than in the United States, where the decline of German ethnicity 
was almost precipitousP 
Even though a general spirit of tolerance prevailed in Brazil in the 
postwar decade, a residue of bitterness remained. Just as some Luso-
Brazilian patriots continued to insist that national unity demanded pro-
grams of forced assimilation, there were Teuto-Brazilians who felt more 
disillusioned and more alienated from political life than ever before. 38 
Some newspapers, such as the Germania of Sao Paulo, resumed preach-
ing the gospel of ethnic chauvinism immediately upon resumption of 
publication in 1919. Still, this journal also insisted that Germans owed 
their Brazilian fatherland love and loyalty and that they had the responsi-
bility to work for its progress and welfare. 39 Nevertheless, the sense of 
resentment remained keen in many Teuto-Brazilian hearts. Their sense of 
ethnic distinctiveness had been intensified by the war; it was further 
strengthened by political unrest in the southern states of Brazil during the 
1920s, when self-protection against revolutionary bands became neces-
sary in some cOlflmunities. Taken together, these experiences caused 
many German Brazilians to be receptive to the siren song of Volkspolitik. 
When the Nazi variations on that theme were played in the 1930s, some 
Teuto-Brazilians found the music irresistible. 40 Given this history, it 
should come as no surprise that the programs of forced assimilation 
undertaken by the Brazilian government under the Vargas regime and 
thereafter were more intense and prolonged than anything attempted 
during World War 1. 
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During the past century an enormous number of books and articles 
have been written on European ethnic groups in American history. 
Mainly produced by amateur historians, this extensive literature consists 
of articles in state and local history journals and collections, books 
published by obscure and sometimes private presses, church or denomina-
tional histories, diaries, and reminiscences. Primarily factual in character 
and descriptive of separate ethnic group experience, most of these materi-
als fail to illuminate either internal social structures or the intricate 
relationships of minorities to each other and to the dominant or host 
society. Moreover, they tend to be filiopietistic; their purpose often is to 
praise the great deeds of the ethnic fathers who led their people through 
. the wilderness to establish new homes in a strange land. They recount in 
loving detail how this group or that settled here or there, established their 
distinctive institutions, and perpetuated their special cultural forms. They 
record the bravery, fortitude, imagination, and skill with which ethnic 
groups braved environmental hardship to become solid and respectable 
citizens. Analyses of failure, incompetence, mismanagement, intragroup 
conflict, and stubborn refusal to adapt are less common in this literature. 
Filiopietistic accounts that concentrate on the accomplishments of 
ethnic group leaders or prominent members of the sub society have a 
special tendency to mythologize the past. The history of ethnic groups in 
America is first of all the story of large numbers of ordinary persons, not 
dramatic tales of colorful or unusually talented leaders. To focus on an 
ethnic elite without treating the character of the masses or examining the 
relationships between leaders and followers is automatically to distort the 
history of immigrant people. Some leaders, because of their own personal 
background and psychological needs, identify much more strongly with 
the ethnic group than do the rank-and-file members. Other persons, 
prominent because of individual accomplishments in the business, political, 
or intellectual worlds, tend to have exceptional social experiences and 
hence may have few meaningful ties with the ethnic group associated 
with them in the public mind. They may, in fact, shed ethnic attitudes 
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and behaviors with remarkable speed. In either case, it is a mistake to 
apply generalizations drawn from leadership or elite experience to the 
minority group as a whole, as often has happened in immigration history. 
If the writings of amateurs and filiopietists tended to lack adequate 
conceptual foundations, the work of academic or professional historians 
early in our century was often influenced strongly by a point of view that 
tended to minimize the importance of ethnic history. I refer to the frontier 
thesis of Frederick Jackson Turner (1861-1932) and his considerable 
influence on the concepts and methods employed by American historians 
during his lifetime and after. 
Turner's impact on immigration historiography, as I try to make 
clear in the pages that follow, also had its positive aspects, particularly 
with respect to methodology. In the early development of this subfield, 
Turner's emphasis on the environment as a force leading irresistably to 
the assimilation of millions of immigrants infused the writings of academic 
historians. Then, in the 1950s, when the work of Oscar Handlin stamped 
the field with insights drawn from sociology and other social sciences, the 
historiographical emphasis shifted from environmentalism to social con-
flict or, in other words, from rapid assimilation to the persistence of 
immigrant cultural forms. By the 1970s the Turnerian thread virtually 
disappeared as attention shifted first to ethnocultural variables in politi-
cal behavior and then to a variety of social analyses that stress the 
pluralist character of American society. Finally, in the 1980s, in the work 
of historians who trace the patterns of international migration, there has 
been a renewed recognition of environmental factors. This essay con-
cludes with some discussion of a neo-Turnerian conceptual framework 
that interprets ethnic history as emerging from the interaction over time 
of immigrant culture with specific physical and social environments. 
II 
The central assumption of Turner's overarching schema-his cele-
brated frontier thesis-is that the exigencies of life in primitive circum-
stances forced people, regardless of their origins or culture, to adapt their 
ways to the physical realities of the place they had chosen for their new 
home. The frontier environment is thus assumed to have been a crucible 
in which the cultural characteristics of newcomers were melted away. 
Out of the heat of this refining process, wrote Turner, emerged a new 
type, an American, who was different and probably superior in his or her 
strengths, qualities, values, and virtues, compared to his or her forebears 
and contemporaries in Europe. Where environmental forces are assumed 
to be especially powerful, as in the American West with its barren deserts, 
rugged mountains, and treeless, semiarid plains, ethnocultural distinc-
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tions could be easily eradicated. Thus Turnerism, it appears, predisposed 
the historian to emphasize the ease and rapidity with which ethnic groups 
were assimilated into American society and to ignore ethnocultural con-
flict and the persistence of immigrant attitudes, values, and behaviors. 
Turner was a master whose sweeping imagination and romantic 
style inspired scores of followers to write histories patterned on his 
famous thesis with its dominant strain of environmental determinism. 
Many historians of the American frontier writing in the Turnerian mode 
tended to treat their subject as the story of an undifferentiated, English-
speaking majority on a steady, civilizing march from the time of explora-
tion and settlement toward the present, with its allegedly high levels of 
accomplishment. This is not to say that racial groups were absent from 
these accounts, which often describe how progress was generally obstructed 
by Indians, sometimes noble but usually savage, and in lesser ways by 
Mexicans and Chinese. But questions of the past were seldom framed in 
terms of the differing cultures in collision and even more rarely in ways 
that fostered the analysis of ethnocultural variations within white society. 
But Turner also stressed the importance of method. Because he 
produced so few books and essays of a monographic character in his own 
lifetime, his methodology does not emerge clearly from his published 
works. In his seminars, however, Turner led his students to data stored in 
census reports, commercial records, church registers, and the multifari-
ous tabulations compiled by county, city, and township governments; he 
taught them to sort, classify, and interpret quantitative evidence. Moreover, 
he emphasized the spatial differentiation that may be discovered in econo-
mic, sociat and cultural evidence. Turner's workshop contained numerous 
maps that plotted election data, ecological information, differences in 
soils, ethnic settlement patterns, literacy rates, church memberships-
anything that might reveal geographical variation.1 This was the Turner 
who stressed the significance of sections. In contrast to the frontier thesis, 
which worked against the study of the ethnic variable, Turner's sectionalist 
doctrines were based on a methodology that was ideally suited for the 
study of ethnic minority groups in America. 2 
Nevertheless, it is a fact that Turner himself never pursued ethno-
cultural variables in a more than superficial way. He understood that 
ethnicity was capable of modifying a region's character to such an extent 
that it could be distinguished from the rest of the nation. Moreover, he 
often charted ethnic and religious groups on his maps, and he even wrote 
a series of popular articles on several immigrant groups for the Chicago 
Record-Herald in 1901.3 Yet he never penetrated the subject deeply 
enough to analyze the significance of the variables he had discovered. 
This could emerge most readily through the study of group conflict, but 
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for Turner conflict occurred chiefly between regions rather than within 
them. Because of his preoccupation with variation on a sectional scale, he 
tended to slight class and group conflicts that were not fundamentally 
related to spatial distribution.4 
But it took no great leap of the imagination to substitute ethnic 
minority groups for regions in Turner's sectionalist theories. Ethnic groups, 
like the people of each region in the United States, considered their 
culture to be superior and they expected the rest of the country to tolerate 
their ways, if not to emulate them. It as Turner had taught, the American 
political system provided a forum for the definition of regional interest 
and an arena for the resolution of sectional conflict through accommoda-
tion and compromise, it could also be understood as serving the same 
function for ethnic minority groups, although on a more local level. The 
question therefore arises whether any of Turner's students analyzed 
immigration or ethnic history in a way that transcended the confinements 
of the frontier thesis by employing the research methods Turner had 
fostered in his pursuit of sectionalism. 5 
Turnerian methodology is ably illustrated in the several works by 
Joseph Schafer, a Turner Ph.D. who became superintendent of the State 
Historical Society of Wisconsin in 1920. Although not an immigration 
historian, Schafer was much interested in the acculturation of Wisconsin's 
numerous ethnic groups, especially the Germans. During his two decades 
as superintendent, Schafer produced a series of microcosmic studies 
under the general title of The Wisconsin Domesday Book. It was an 
ambitious enterprise. Ultimately he produced five volumes, of which 
three are attempts to understand the history of carefully defined areas in 
Wisconsin-four lakeshore counties, the lead region, and a river basin-in 
terms of the interaction of the people, including the many immigrants, 
with their specific environments. Schafer treated topography, soils, land 
use, migration and settlement, agriculture, politics, and population changes. 
Ethnic groups were always integral parts of his analysis, but as a devoted 
Turnerian committed to the frontier thesis, Schafer tended to emphasize 
the Americanization of the immigrants-how rapidly they were assimilated 
in the frontier environment, not how tenaciously they retained ethnic 
cultural characteristics.6 
Schafer also tended to overstate the striving of immigrants toward 
the ideal of the socially acceptable American citizen, but he admitted that 
it was not necessary for them to discard all ethnic traits in order to 
become "good Americans."7 No filiopietist, Schafer had a keen under-
standing of the assimilation process, its ethnic group variations, and the 
role in it of language, religion, and exogamy, even though he tended to 
overestimate the rate at which these variables operated. He employed 
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census data, land office records, and surveyor reports to calculate for 
each immigrant group such variables as spatial diffusion, attitudes toward 
land, occupational distributions, family size, marriage rates, and income 
patterns compared with native-born persons. In short, Schafer's analysis 
was remarkably comprehensive for its time. He provided a model for 
research that has been all but ignored by later generation of historians 
interested in ethnic history. 
One of the last of Turner's students at Harvard, Merle Curti, 
followed Schafer a generation later with a far more comprehensive and 
systematic case study. The Making of an American Community was 
designed to test objectively Turner's frontier thesis, most specifically the 
idea that the frontier experience promoted American democracy. This 
included the increasing participation of immigrants in the political process 
and the expansion of opportunities for them in economic and cultural 
affairs. Curti chose Trempealeau County, Wisconsin, as the subject for 
his study at least partly because its frontier population included signifi-
cant numbers of German, Norwegian, and Polish immigrants. Thus 
Trempealeau provided a laboratory in which to verify Turner's metaphor 
of the frontier as a crucible in which the immigrants were to have been 
fused into a mixed race. Curti and his associates analyzed mobility data, 
indices of success in various occupations, changes in occupational structures, 
and measures of leadership, political participation, school attendance, 
and marriage patterns. He concluded that frontier conditions had in fact 
stimulated democracy in Trempealeau and that "decade by decade the 
foreign-born, including those from non-English speaking countries, were 
increasingly represented in political and also in cultural activities."B 
Whether these findings supported Turner's general position, as 
Curti claimed, is less clear. He had in fact merely demonstrated that 
"Americanization" had occurred in Trempealeau; he had not proved that 
this process occurred because of frontier conditions. It is possible that in 
an urban setting, for example, these same persons might have assimilated 
more rapidly than they did on the Wisconsin frontier. Moreover, the 
possibility remains that the frontier conditions masked, or were mistaken 
for, variables with greater power to explain the process by which ethnic 
groups gradually lost their distinctive character and became indistinguish-
able from the majority. What was missing in Curti's research design was 
a series of comparisons with other appropriate communities; what was 
needed was a conceptual framework to replace the powerful imagery of 
Turner's frontier thesis. 
If Schafer and Curti were microscopic in their approaches, another 
Turner student, Marcus Lee Hansen, was telescopic. Hansen's perspective 
was intercontinental as he shifted attention in immigration history from 
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the cultural contributions of immigrant leaders to the phenomenon of 
mass migration from Europe to America. This he achieved chiefly through 
two posthumously published books, The Immigrant in American History 
and The Atlantic Migration, 1607-1860. The latter book in particular 
laid the foundation for the sophisticated studies of the 1980s that treat 
migration chains and community formation in rural America. Like Schafer, 
Hansen was the son of an immigrant, a great advantage in assessing 
immigrant experience. 
Hansen's work represents a laudable accomplishment, but he was 
also a source of a misconception about immigrants on the frontier. 
Hansen taught that newcomers from Europe were not commonly found 
on the fringe of settlement because they lacked experience in coping with 
the problems of such an environment. The immigrant was not a frontiers-
man, wrote Hansen, and "had, in fact an innate aversion to the wilder-
ness with its solitude and loneliness and primitive mode of life .... Neither 
by experience nor temperament was the immigrant fitted for frontiering."9 
This notion is partly founded on the fact that from 1775 to 1830 
European immigration practically ceased. Hence few immigrants from 
any country could possibly have participated in the settlement of the 
American frontier as it existed in those decades. After the 1830s, however, 
immigration increased spectacularly. Thus when the trans-Mississippi 
West was settled, immigrants were present on the northern and western 
frontiers in proportions that were usually in excess of that registered for 
the United States as a whole. 
The purpose of this discussion about Turner, his students, and 
their treatment of ethnic history is to suggest, first that the frontier 
thesis is conceptually inadequate for the study of ethnic minorities 
because it assumes the dominance of environments over culture and 
therefore predisposes the historians to emphasize the rapid assimilation 
of immigrants. It does not offer a framework for the study of the fron-
tier as a place where environment and culture interact. 10 Instead, it 
postulates that the frontier is more powerful than the culture brought 
to it. It stimulates the consideration of evidence that supports the thesis 
and tends to ignore the rest. In effect, it makes a judgment before the 
evidence is brought forth. 
My second point is positive in character. Unlike the frontier thesis, 
Turnerian methodology fosters the search for interpretive frameworks-
alternatives to the frontier thesis-that encompass evidence for the per-
sistence of ethnic culture as well as its disappearance, for slow assimilation 
as well as rapid, for the study of masses of immigrants as well as their 
leaders, for inquiry into conflict as well as accommodation to established 
norms. Above alt Turnerian methodology encourages the study of ethnicity 
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in its relationships to environment, whatever they may be, rather than 
assuming the dominance of environment over ethnicity. 
III 
At about the same time that Marcus Lee Hansen was drafting his 
Atlantic Migration, Oscar Handlin was completing his doctoral disserta-
tion at Harvard under the direction of Arthur Schlesinger, Sr. Published 
in a revised form in 1941 as Boston's Immigrants: A Study in Acculturation, 
Handlin's work reflected the influence of social science-more sociology 
than the geography that was implicit in Turnerian thought. l1 Instead of 
rapid assimilation into American life as the Turnerians perceived it, 
Handlin emphasized conflict between immigrant groups and the receiving 
society. He focused on social process-the process of change that grew out 
of the interrelationships between immigrants and native stock. He made 
extensive use of aggregated census data and, like most recent students in 
this field, he concentrated on a local community, in this case, Boston. By 
any standard, Boston's Immigrants was an impressive achievement. 
Yet Handlin is best known for his Pulitzer Prize winner, The Uprooted, 
which was first published in 1951. Radically different from Boston's 
Immigrants, this book, which is based entirely on impressionistic sources, 
treats the effect of the immigrant experience on the individual.1 2 Although 
Handlin continued to draw on sociology, here he concentrated on the 
psychological dimension - how the individual immigrant experienced 
trauma and alienation, how immigrant culture crumbled and communal 
life disintegrated in the new social environment. He wrote ethnic history 
in terms of the ghetto model: rejected by the host society, the newcomers 
were more or less forced into segregated areas where they had to work 
out their own problems and gradually learn to adapt to American ways. 
The Uprooted is essentially a romanticized account, emphasizing tragedy 
and pathos in the lives of immigrants. Ultimately, however, Handlin's 
emphasis is on adjustment, accommodation, and assimilation-not on 
the persistence of ethnocultural forms and the retention of ethnic identity 
among countless Americans of the second and third generations. 
Throughout the 1950s Handlin's interpretation reigned unchallenged 
in immigrant historiography. Then, in the early '60s, important criticisms 
were published. In an influential article Rudolph Vecoli asserted that 
whatever validity The Uprooted had for other groups, it had little 
applicability to Italian immigrants. Their "Little Italies" were formed 
voluntarily, not forced by circumstances; their family and communal ties 
remained strong; their lives were not filled with trauma; they did not rely 
on the immigrant church as the one remaining pillar in their crumbling 
house of culture. In short, they did not feel uprootedJ3 Other critics 
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pointed out that Handlin's view, if valid, applied to urban settings and 
that it had little relevance for rural and small-town experience. Indeed, 
most studies of international migration and community formation pub-
lished in the 1970s and '80s describe a society fundamentally different 
from that outlined by Handlin. 
Handlin had not in fact solved the central historiographical prob-
lem in immigration history. The Turnerians had emphasized the experi-
ence of immigrants who had assimilated rapidly into American life and 
tended to ignore the rest. At the other extreme, Handlin had concentrated 
on individuals for whom immigration had been traumatic. What was 
needed was a new point of view that could encompass the full range of 
behavioral response - both extremes and the majority who fell between. 
Merle Curti's study of Trempealeau filled this prescription in methodology, 
but it was weakened by its Turnerian purposes and preconceptions. 
IV 
The most important new work in ethnic history published in the 
1960s and '70s emerged from other sources. Its roots lay in political 
history, for it was in this field that the implications of ethnocultural 
persistence could be most readily observed. In 1961 Lee Benson's Concept 
of Jacksonian Democracy: New York as a Test Case revealed that ideologies, 
specifically Jacksonian democracy, had relatively little to do with voting 
behavior when that phenomenon is observed on the local level. Instead 
of economic issues influencing voter decisions primarily, Benson found 
that ethnic and religious identities were paramount.1 4 In other words, 
cultural factors appeared to be more significant than class in explaining 
political history. 
The key to the new political history was the systematic analysis of 
data on the local level in which detailed comparisons could be made with 
related data in terms of space, time, and rate of change. Moreover, the 
emphasis was now placed on group behavior rather than on the attitudes 
of ethnic leaders. Immigrant voters, it was discovered, tended to vote 
with much consistency regardless of the changing issues. When issues on 
the local level were investigated, it was found that ethnoreligious con-
cerns were usually more salient than such economic questions as the 
tariff, trusts, and railroads-issues that dominated political discourse on 
the national level in the late nineteenth century. Issues that touched lives 
directly were debates over prohibition, women's suffrage, Sabbatarian 
legislation, naturalization laws, and the regulation of parochial schools. 
Probably no historian was more successful than Samuel P. Hays in 
bringing these matters to the attention of scholars. Through a series of 
theoretical articles Hays showed that ethnic groups maintained separate 
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identities and distinctive behaviors, sometimes for generations-and that 
they voted accordingly.1 5 During the late 1960s and '70s a new genera-
tion of historians put the ideas of Hays, Benson, and other scholars, 
including social scientists, to the test and produced many books treating 
the relationships of ethnic groups to the political history of various 
regions and states.16 
V 
Since the development of the ethnocultural school of American poli-
tical historians in the early 1970s, there has been a great expansion of immi-
gration studies, consisting of the usual dissertations, articles, monographs, 
and syntheses. Even though contemporary concerns focus mainly on the 
huge influx of Latin Americans and Asians, the majority of these works, as 
in the past, treat European groups in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. Like the political studies, they are usually informed by concepts 
and methods drawn from the social sciences, and therefore often incor-
porate comparative analyses as they pursue data relating to occupation, 
class, social mobility, family patterns, religion, education, assimilation, 
voluntary associations, and the development of ethnic group consciousness 
and strategies to succeed in a new social and economic environment. Some 
treat one ethnic group in one place; others effectively analyze the entire 
complex of immigrants comparatively in an urban setting and thus are more 
closely related to the concepts and methods of urban history than to those 
traditionally associated with immigration history. Still other historians 
include ethnic groups in their studies of American labor history. 
This substantial corpus of historical literature has been perceptively 
analyzed by John Higham. After briefly differentiating assimilationist 
historians from the pluralists, Higham distinguished "soft pluralists" 
from "hard pluralists." The former include historians whose books are 
categorized above. In most cases the family is identified as the conserving 
agent of cultural persistence, and immigrant groups usually are seen to 
cut vertically across the class structure. The latter group of historians, 
Higham observed, are radical in orientation and write from the perspec-
tives of labor history. Not interested in the preservation of ethnicity, the 
"hard pluralists" consider ethnic culture to be significant, not for its own 
sake, but for the way it functions as an impediment or a stimulus for class 
consciousness. Higham further pointed out that the two versions of 
pluralism lack a common theory of social integration and hence neither 
can provide a general synthesis of ethnic history in the United States.17 
Soon after Higham published that essay a new synthesis appeared-
The Transplanted: A History of Immigrants in Urban America, by John 
Bodnar. By conceptualizing ethnic history in a way that transcends the 
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agendas of pluralism, Bodnar has provided the best general interpretation 
of American immigration history since Maldwyn Jones's Turnerian 
American Immigration appeared in 1960.18 Although he limits himself 
to immigrants in urban settings, a field in which he personally excels as a 
historian, Bodnar bases his interpretation on the only commonly shared 
experience all immigrants in the cities had-finding a place in an unfamil-
iar economic order based on capitalism. 
Bodnar's interpretation allows him to leap the hurdles of both the 
hard and soft pluralist schools identified by Higham. He argues that the 
central commitment of immigrants was neither to their class nor their 
ethnic group, but rather "to secure the welfare and well-being of their 
familial or household base." In any industrial setting, ethnic communities 
were too deeply fragmented by social, economic, or cultural variables to 
command loyalty to anything else. At the same time, ethnic group 
culture, Bodnar contends, did not condition the immigrant's response to 
capitalism as much as did its continuous interaction with class experience. 
Instead of the traditional view of the immigrant progressing "from a 
premodern, holistic community to a modern, atomistic one" emerging 
from clashes between immigrant and American urban cultures, Bodnar 
sees "a process of social change" conditioned by class, ideology, and 
culture (including religion)-a continuum of interaction "between econ-
omy and society, between class and culture." Thus he goes beyond the 
idea of immigrants as clinging together as either aliens or workers to 
argue that immigration history emerges at all points "where immigrant 
families met the challenges of capitalism and modernity: the homeland, 
the neighborhood, the school, the workplace, the church, the family, and 
the fraternal hall."19 
Like some other writers in the field of immigration history, Bodnar 
chose a title- The Transplanted -that is entirely appropriate in itself, 
but nonetheless implicitly challenges Handlin's Uprooted and its empha-
sis on immigrant trauma and alienation.2o As bold as Handlin in his 
willingness to generalize, Bodnar offers a synthesis that is better balanced, 
more comprehensive, and more firmly grounded on scholarly research 
(as one should expect of a work written three decades later). But its 
greatest strength rests in its unity of conception. Structured on a carefully 
articulated foundation, the book includes nothing that fails to contribute 
to its thesis. Unlike countless textbooks, it casts no crumbs from the 
master's table to feed the dogs of special interest groups. 
Still, The Transplanted has its limitations. Its thesis is applicable to 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, not to the colonial era or the 
decades since World War II. It treats immigrant societies in urban settings, 
not in rural or small-town America, even though many of its observa-
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tions are applicable there. And like most recent works in ethnic history, 
whether organized in terms of assimilation, cultural persistence, urban 
history, or labor history, its treatment of spatial variables is incidental 
rather than systematic. Bodnar readily recognizes the importance of such 
relationships. For example, he differentiates ethnic ghettoes from other 
parts of the city and he observes that cities in different parts of the United 
States often offered contrasting milieux for immigrant success. Yet the 
assessment of space and place does not emerge naturally from his concep-
tual framework, as it did in Turnerian methodology and does in the work 
of recent students of international migration. 
VI 
Although intercontinental movement received its first effective treat-
ment fifty years ago in Marcus Lee Hansen's Atlantic Migration, 1607-
1860, it was not until the 1980s that this topic has received systematic 
treatment. Drawing their inspiration from the English historian Frank 
Thistlethwaite, and perhaps to a lesser extent from the Uppsala Univer-
sity project in Sweden headed by Sune .Akerman, a trio of scholars-
Jon Gjerde, Walter Kamphoefner, and Robert Ostergren-have analyzed 
patterns of transatlantic chain migration. Working primarily on micro-
cosmic scales and paying equal attention to conditions in communities of 
origin and of destination, they study intensively the process of emigra-
tion from specific communities in Norway, Germany, and Sweden, and 
their dispersion and reconstitution in states of the Midwest. 21 
These studies of international migration in the Thistlethwaitean 
mode illustrate additional possibilities for ethnic history when it is released 
from old agendas and conceptual schemes. The Turnerians emphasized 
the study of ethnicity in relation to the physical environment, but neither 
the ethnocultural political historians nor the pluralists, hard or soft, paid 
heed to the limitations imposed by place or space as they examined 
ethnicity in its social relationships. As suggested above, Bodnar's syn-
thesis offers a new conceptual scheme based on the ongoing interaction 
of ethnicity with class, ideology, and culture, but again spatial relation-
ships are not part of his model, even though he is mindful of the fact that 
urban geography was often conditioned strongly by ethnic values. 
But the "Thistlethwaiteans," if we may label them so, emphasize the 
need to understand immigrant societies as products of the interaction of 
their imported culture with both the physical and social environments of 
their new homes. Spatial relationships are central, especially in the work 
of Robert Ostergren, a historical geographer who charts patterns of 
movement and communication back and forth between two discrete 
places separated by an ocean, as well as the changes inspired in each 
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community by the axes of migration. 22 Ostergren, more effectively than 
any other contemporary student of immigration history, supplies the 
conceptual framework that was missing in the Turnerian schema. Like 
Bodnar, these students of international migration see history as emerging 
from a continuous interaction among variables of time and culture, but 
whereas Bodnar emphasizes ideology in his model, Ostergren integrates 
spatial relationships and the conditioning variables of specific physical 
environments. 
VII 
One may conclude from the work of these students of international 
migration that if ethnic groups in the United States are to be understood, 
the historian should employ a conceptual framework sufficiently broad 
to discover who the immigrants were, where they came from, and when 
and why they emigrated. One must comprehend the culture that immi-
grants brought with them-group values, attitudes, folkways, religions, 
and languages. The enormous variation possible with each group as well 
as among different groups must become part of the equation. Further, one 
must understand the physical and social environments in which the 
assimilative process occurred. 23 It was one thing, for example, for 
Norwegian immigrants to settle in the vast, sparsely populated prairies of 
North Dakota; it was quite another for them to join the Scandinavian 
stream to the Mormon Zion in the deserts of Utah; it was still another to 
participate in the development of Washington State, with its great forests 
and bustling seaports. In each environment Norwegian immigrants had 
different assimilative histories. Similarly, Ostergren demonstrates that 
the experiences of Swedish immigrant farmers from Rattvik parish in 
Upper Dalarna varied considerably between forested Isanti County in 
Minnesota and the grasslands of Clay County, South Dakota.24 
The mode of settlement is also an essential part of immigration 
history. Did the immigrants come individually or in colonies? Did they 
come directly or in stages, living temporarily elsewhere in the United 
States before permanent settlement? For example, the collective experi-
ences of the Germans from Russia, a large proportion of whom came 
directly to the Great Plains states in colonies, were significantly different 
from those of Germans from Germany, for whom the classic pattern of 
chain migration and resettlement was standard. What patterns of distribu-
tion in space where established by a given group? Were they farmers? 
Were they townsfolk? Were they overwhelmingly urban? To what extent 
were distributive patterns influenced by the physical environment and to 
what extent by immigrant culture? Among Black Sea Germans, for 
example, inheritance customs were such that a high proportion of immi-
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grants were enabled to reestablish themselves on farms on the Great 
Plains, but among the Volga Germans a different inheritance custom had 
the effect of reducing the number of potential farmers and forcing a large 
proportion to seek employment in cities, thereby creating a strikingly 
different settlement pattern.25 
The question of the density of ethnic population holds special 
importance for places where the small numbers of people are thinly 
spread over areas. In order for ethnocultural forms to be sustained over 
time, they must have the support of institutions such as churches, schools, 
and immigrant-language press, social and cultural institutions of all 
kinds, mutual benefit or insurance societies, and businesses that cater to 
the ethnic trade. A certain level of concentration in the ethnic population-a 
"critical mass" -must be attained before the supportive institutions can 
be generated. If they appear, ethnic language and culture will be maintained 
for a longer period of time. Without their support, immigrants will lose 
their ethnocultural characteristics and assimilate rapidly.26 Richard Etulain 
has shown, for example, that even among the Basques, a small group that 
has an unusually keen sense of identity, assimilation takes place more 
rapidly in small ethnic enclaves than in large ones.27 Obviously, the 
required auxiliary institutions cannot be easily created or maintained in 
areas where the physical environment dictates a sparse population. In 
this context the religious characteristics of a given group are especially 
important. Churches were commonly the easiest of immigrant institu-
tions to create. Often they were the only ones in rural areas, where they 
frequently provided the nucleus of ethnic life and functioned as substi-
tutes for the array of social and cultural societies that were available in 
urban centers. Moreover, they almost always functioned effectively as 
conservators of ethnocultural values. 
The degree of concentration necessary for the maintenance of eth-
nic language and culture is also related to the social distance perceived by 
an ethnic group between its own distinctive way of life and what it 
discerns as the culture of the host or receiving society. In the United 
States the core culture may be described as having emerged from English 
and pietistic Protestant origins. The greater the difference perceived 
between immigrant group characteristics and those of the mainstream 
society, the greater the tendency for clustering. For example, we may 
expect that late-nineteenth century Polish immigrants, as adherents of 
Roman Catholicism and speaking a Slavic tongue, tended to congregate 
more readily than Swedes, whose language is a Teutonic relative of 
English and whose Lutheran Protestantism in America savored strongly 
of pietism. If the cultural difference were accompanied by discernible 
differences in physical appearance, as among Japanese or blacks, then the 
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numbers of migrants required for the maintenance of ethnic language and 
culture will be reduced. 
"Critical mass" is thus also related to the internal cohesion of an 
ethnic group, its homogeneity, and its sense of peoplehood.28 English 
immigrants have almost no sense of themselves as an ethnic group, but 
the Chicanos speak of themselves as La Raza. Whereas one hundred 
ordinary German immigrants in a rural setting was rarely enough to 
produce a strong sense of communal identity, a hundred is near the 
maximum size of the colonies of German-speaking Hutterites, a radical 
Protestant group from Russia that still organizes itself into communally 
owned agricultural societies in South Dakota, Montana, and the Cana-
dian prairie provinces.29 Other variables also condition critical mass, 
among them a population large enough to permit a high level of marriage 
and family formation within the group. 
Finally, the greater the differences between immigrant and core 
cultures, the greater will be the potential for conflict. For this reason the 
Hutterites try to avoid contact (and hence conflict and assimilation) by 
living in isolated colonies in areas of low population density. Even so, 
historical accident is capable of shattering the communal peace, as it did 
in World War 1, when Hutterite pacificism clashed so intensely with 
American superpatriotism that a majority temporarily abandoned South 
Dakota for Canada. 3D 
VIII 
The history of an immigrant group in America is the story of its 
assimilation into the mainstream. Assimilation is an interactive process in 
which the both the immigrant and the receiving societies are changed. 
The phenomenon is infinitely complex and varies from time to time and 
from place to place as opportunities, economic and otherwise, are presented 
to the individual in both contexts or structures.31 So long as the ethnic 
group sustains a separate identity it will have an ongoing history. As 
individual identities are increasingly shaped by other variables, the iden-
tity of the group fades. When it disappears, all that remains is nostalgia. 
For some groups this process is remarkably brief, and it is shorter in some 
environments than in others. For other groups the process may be 
attenuated, and distinctive traits and behaviors may be retained over 
many generations. 
Research into ethnic minority history thus may profitably concen-
trate on how, why, and in what areas of life assimilative changes have 
taken place. One may ask how quickly or slowly the immigrant society 
adopts the dress, language, work habits, political behavior, marriage and 
family patterns, religion, and ultimately the values and attitudes of the 
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host society. The pressures exerted by the physical and social environ-
ments in stimulating or forcing ethnic group adaptation or conformance 
should be integrated into the research design. 
Most important, questions of the past should be framed in ways 
that permit comparisons in space and time. One must ask how a specific 
behavior of an immigrant group in a given place compared (1) to that of 
other groups, native- or foreign-born, in the same or comparable environ-
ment; (2) to that of the same group in other environments; and (3) to 
what it became later in time. It is possible, of course, for excellent 
histories of ethnic groups to be written without comparisons based on 
quantitative evidence. But since ethnic history is the study of change in a 
social grouping that is different from the larger society of which it is part, 
the evolution of these changes often may be discovered and analyzed 
most efficiently in this way. 
Since the mid-1960s there has been an enormous growth in the 
number and quality of studies treating historical aspects of ethnic minor-
ity life in the United States. Although much of this recent work bears 
similarities in its methods to what Frederick Jackson Turner taught in his 
famous seminars early in this century, its inspiration lies elsewhere. 
Turner provided the key to ethnic history in his methodology, but his 
students fumbled at the door. More attracted by the frontier thesis and its 
melting-pot corollary, they failed to integrate racial and ethnic minorities 
into their histories. For decades professionally trained historians left the 
field to amateurs and filiopietists. Only in the 1960s, when interest in the 
pluralistic character of American society flourished as it never had before, 
did the professionals turn to ethnic minority history. Almost none recog-
nized the intellectual debt to Turner, unless it was through his latter-day 
students Hansen and Curti. Instead, their formulations emerged from the 
"new social history," "the new political history," urban history, or cross-
disciplinary study in cultural geography, sociology, anthropology, and 
folklore. 32 Still others seem to have been stimulated by a new concern for 
local history and the changing character of life at the local level. The result 
of this interest is an array of carefully conceptualized books, the best of 
which examine the process of change over time in ethnic minority group 
culture as it interacts with other groups, native and immigrant, within a 
specific physical and social environment. 
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Several years ago the United States celebrated the 300th anniver-
sary of German immigration to America as marked by the settlement in 
1683 of thirteen Quaker and Mennonite families from Krefeld, Germany, 
in Germantown, a country village that long ago was absorbed by 
Philadelphia. The president of the United States duly appointed a tricen-
tennial commission, the Postal Service issued an attractive postage stamp, 
governors and mayors produced suitable proclamations, and across the 
country local communities staged a wide variety of observances-scholarly 
conferences, concerts, performances by dance and theater groups, and 
even picnics and parades, complete with fireworks.1 Although the tricen-
tennial celebrations seemed to lack popular enthusiasm, scholars-especially 
historians-responded gladly enough to invitations to lecture and to 
participate in conferences or symposia. 
Such celebrations are in themselves important source material for 
the study of ethnic group history. They tell us much about how people 
perceive themselves in relation to American society. For example, in the 
1930s, when two important national conferences of Americans of Ger-
man descent were held, one in New York and one a year later in Philadel-
phia on the occasion of 250th anniversary of the founding of Germantown, 
the tone set by the speakers and their topics was in sharp contrast to the 
one held in the City of Brotherly Love in 1983. A half century ago the 
conference participants met when the Great Depression was nearly at its 
worst. They retained fear-filled memories of persecution during World 
War I and its aftermath. Adolf Hitler's recent rise to power in Germany 
made some conferees jubilant, others troubled. 
The emphasis of the 1932 and 1933 conferences was on the magnifi-
cent contributions of German immigrants to America and its culture. 
Speakers were preoccupied with ethnic recognition and respect; they 
repeatedly complained that the German "element" had never been accorded 
its "rightful" place in American society. They were deeply concerned 
about the preservation of ethnic culture in America, which they saw as 
suffering devastating erosion. Topics not treated by speakers are also 
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instructive. They ignored the crisis in Germany at that time; they avoided 
questions of relations between the United States and Germany; and they 
said nothing of the problems faced by the 400,000 German immigrants 
who had arrived in the 1920s.2 
Fifty years later the celebrations conveyed a different mood. In 
contrast to the earlier meetings, when nonacademic ethnic group leaders 
(journalists, publicists, and the leaders of voluntary associations) domi-
nated the scene, the 1983 commemorative conferences were decidedly 
academic, and often included a strong representation of scholars from 
German universities. Although filiopietism was by no means absent from 
the latter-day festivities, contemporary scholars are not disposed to 
justify or defend the history of Germans in America. They display no 
earnest desire to elevate ethnic heroes for German Americans to admire. 
They seek to understand German-American history, whatever it was, 
good or bad. Today scholars in both Germany and the United States try 
to analyze the relations between the two countries dispassionately; they 
study German emigration as a social or economic phenomenon; they 
consider assimilation as a social process-a natural adjustment to the 
social environment-and they also analyze linguistic change within that 
context. Criticism of German-American literature is no longer inflated 
with undeserved praise; instead immigrant writings are studied as impor-
tant manifestations of American culture. German-American settlement 
patterns, social structures, and political behaviors are analyzed for the 
ways in which they illuminate the larger patterns of the nation's history.3 
No longer do scholars expand upon the contributions of such figures as 
Baron von Steuben or Carl Schurz in an effort to burnish the image of 
Germans in America (or perhaps to compensate for psychological 
insecurities, collective or individual). In short, German-American studies 
have finally come of age. 4 
Such changes in conceptualization have led to a restructuring of 
German-American history. In the pages that follow, I offer a highly 
condensed version of what historians have learned during the past quar-
ter century about German immigrants and their place in American history. 
Instead of focusing on ethnic group leaders and their various excellencies, 
or on the manifold contributions of German immigrants and their chil-
dren to the greatness of the United States, I use the familiar pattern of 
German immigration history as a framework to identify some of the most 
significant discoveries of recent historical research, beginning with the 
colonial period and continuing through to the substantial immigration of 
the post-World War II era. 
My overview is idiosyncratic in the sense that it reflects my sense of 
what constitutes satisfying ethnic group history; to treat all significant 
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aspects of German-American history would be discursive and distracting. 
I concentrate on social history, the conditioning effects of cultural and 
religious variables, and their consequences for political history. I inter-
pret German immigrants and their children, not as intrusive or foreign 
elements, but rather as integral parts of American society interacting with 
other groups, both immigrants and native, in various social processes, the 
end products of which are usually assimilative. They are thus thought of 
as full participants in the drama of American history, not probationaries 
who must complete an acculturation before first-class status can be 
achieved. Finally, this essay concludes with a brief discussion of the 
directions in which research in German-American history might go. 
II 
Let us begin with the thirteen families from Krefeld who founded 
Germantown three centuries ago. A mixed group whose origins were 
more Dutch than German, at least as those designations are understood 
today, these people were not the first Germans to settle in America. 5 A 
few other German-speaking persons had lived in one or another of the 
American colonies during the preceding half century, but they had come 
as individuals and did not form a distinctive settlement as did the 
Krefelders of 1683. 
The flow of German-speaking immigrants to the British colonies in 
America during the next century was unsteady, but by the time of the 
American Revolution about seventy-five thousand had arrived. Although 
this total was dwarfed by the massive movements of the nineteenth 
century, it was huge in relation to the size of the receiving population. In 
the four decades following the founding of Germantown, only a few 
Germans arrived, but after 1727 the movement was accelerated and 
regularized as merchants integrated the transportation of migrants into 
patterns of transatlantic trade. The high point was reached during the late 
1740s and early 1750s, when approximately thirty-seven thousand per-
sons disembarked within a six-year period, mostly at Philadelphia. There-
after the stream from Germany was slowed by reports of adversities 
suffered by immigrants indebted to merchants for their passage to America 
and by disconcerting news about Indian uprisings associated with the 
onset of the Seven Years War. 6 
The great majority of German-speaking migrants of the colonial era 
came from the Rhine Valley and in America at that time they were 
usually called Palatines. The Palatinate was indeed an important source 
of emigration but large numbers came also from Hesse, Baden, and 
Wiirttemberg. Still others emigrated from Alsace and Switzerland, as well 
as from lower Rhine districts, including the Netherlands. 
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The German colonists settled chiefly in Pennsylvania and in neigh-
boring New York, Maryland, and Virginia. Some drifted farther south to 
found communities in the Carolina Piedmont. Although the majority 
were farmers (as were most Americans at that time), some lived and 
prospered in the towns, where they were often shopkeepers and artisans. 
Although one must take care not to exaggerate its significance, 
religious belief formed an important element in the identity of these 
Germans. At first most were Mennonites, Moravians, Dunkards or 
Brethren, or members of other sects, and they attracted much attention 
because of their distinctive manners and beliefs. Later, especially during 
the 1740s and '50s, Lutherans and Reformed became numerically prepon-
derant and softened the image of the Germans as pietists and religious 
radicals. 
Few of these groups deliberately tried to preserve German lan-
guages and customs for their own sakes, but most considered them 
important for the preservation of the faith. Because the Germans had 
immigrated in large numbers and naturally tended to cluster together, 
their settlements often consisted of islands in a sea of English-speaking 
people. In Pennsylvania, where they were most numerous, their language 
continued to evolve and later came to be known as "Pennsylvania Dutch." 
Grammatically this was a Palatine dialect, but as new words were needed, 
it drew them from English rather than from standard German, as would 
have been the case had the immigrants remained in Europe. By the end of 
the colonial period the Germans were easily the largest non-English-
speaking group in the thirteen colonies. Albert B. Faust estimated their 
number at the time of the American Revolution to be 225,000.7 Accord-
ing to the first United States census, taken in 1790, persons of German 
birth or parentage constituted about eight or nine percent of a population 
of about four million persons. 
Despite their impressive numbers, most Germans immigrants assi-
milated rapidly into colonial society. They learned to speak English, at 
least well enough to get along, often as a matter of practical necessity. 
Most families were bilingual by the end of the eighteenth century, speak-
ing their German dialect in their homes and English in public settings. 
Many German names were quickly Anglicized or translated. Schmidt 
could become Smith, just as Jaeger might become Hunter, even though 
the bearers of these names might not have been well assimilated either 
linguistically or culturally.8 Still, some German communities founded in 
the eighteenth century retained immigrant traits for many generations, 
especially in rural areas, but many persons moved quickly into the 
mainstream because there were few institutions, other than the churches, 
for the preservation of language and custom. 
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III 
Following the American Revolution immigration from Europe almost 
ceased for a period of fifty years. Not until the 1830s did the numbers of 
newcomers from any source begin to swell significantly. The German 
states of the Rhine Valley then became a leading source again, but with 
the addition of many from Bavaria, Saxony, and Hanover. Unlike the 
earlier movement, this immigration included a large proportion of Catholics. 
Numerically it broke all earlier records, averaging at first about 20,000 
persons per year until the late 1840s, when it jumped to more than 
60,000. In the early 1850s the annual rate reached nearly 150,000 and 
then attained a spectacular record of 215,000 in 1854. Thereafter immi-
gration from the German states dropped sharply as news of economic 
depression and the Civil War restrained many people from leaving. 
The causes of this huge migration have been studied in great detail. 9 
Political unrest, economic deprivation, crop failures, overpopulation, 
marriage laws, letters from America, and religious persecution were all 
part of it, but these factors are hopelessly tangled when applied to 
individuals. Each adult immigrant had his or her own complex of reasons 
for wanting to leave and they often included family considerations as 
well as psychological needs, few of which can be sorted out. 
Many older accounts of German emigration ascribed much impor-
tance for this early nineteenth century movement to inheritance laws and 
customs. In most of the German states, impartible inheritance (Anerben-
recht) was the rule. That meant that a parcel of land could not be divided 
among its owner's potential heirs; law or custom dictated that all of it 
was to go to the eldest son (or youngest, as the case may have been). But 
in the southwestern German states and later in much of Hesse and the 
Rhineland-major sources of German emigration-partible inheritance 
(Realteilung) or the division of inherited land among all heirs prevailed. 
This presumably resulted in the spliritering of peasant holdings and, as 
plots became too small to support a family, thousands of farmers were 
forced to leave, either to the cities of Europe or overseas to America.1o 
But recent research has demonstrated that rates of emigration were 
also extremely high in some districts where impartible inheritance was 
the custom. Obviously, other variables were also at work. Emigration 
was not merely a result of the mechanical operation of inheritance 
patterns or, for that matter, of purely economic forces. The American 
historian Walter Kamphoefner has revealed its complexity by analyzing 
certain local districts in Westphalia. He has shown that in the neighbor-
hood of Osnabrock a well-developed cottage industry had developed in 
which linen cloth was woven by rural folk who owned no land. During 
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the second quarter of the nineteenth century, this cottage industry was 
wiped out by machine competition in the cities, especially in England, 
northern Ireland, and later Germany itself. Moreover, linen cloth itself 
came to be replaced by cotton during those same years. By the mid-1840s 
this decline in linen weaving had reached catastrophic proportions and 
pushed many thousands of rural lower-class persons to America,11 
Such landless families of few resources constituted the majority of 
emigrants from the German states in the pre-Civil War decades. Kamp-
hoefner, among other historians, has also shown that these newcomers 
were generally less prosperous than had been assumed previously; they 
were "poor but not destitute."12 Thus the measure of socioeconomic. 
success that they achieved in America appears all the more dramatic. 
Most German immigrants entered the United States at New York, 
Philadelphia, or Baltimore, but New Orleans also developed as a major 
port of entry as many newcomers traveled up the Mississippi to settle in 
the recently organized states of Missouri, Illinois, Iowa, and Wisconsin. 
Still others moved west to Texas. Although New York never lost its 
position as the city with the largest number of German-born inhabitants, 
midwestern cities such as Chicago, St. Louis, Cincinnati, and Milwaukee 
became centers of huge German-American populations,13 By 1860, just 
before the onset of the Civil War, the Census Bureau reported that there 
were 1,276,000 German-born persons resident in the United States, 
about four percent of the total population of 31,500,000. Of course, this 
estimate includes neither the American-born children of the immigrants 
nor German-speaking persons who emigrated from Switzerland, France 
(chiefly Alsace), or Austria. 
Whatever their number, they, together with the many Irish Catho-
lics who had arrived during the preceding two decades, seemed to repre-
sent a frightening challenge to the guardians of the dominant value 
system of the American society, which was clearly rooted in Anglo 
Protestantism. Their xenophobic fears were briefly but nonetheless intensely 
translated during the 1850s into the politics of Know Nothingism, a 
nativist movement that was more anti-Catholic than anti-immigrant. 
The Germans responded defensively. Their leaders, including many 
of the highly educated, articulate political refugees of the Revolution of 
1848 in Europe, now self-consciously sought to develop a common 
German ethnic identity founded on cultural characteristics shared by the 
diverse contingents of peasants, artisans, and laborers from the several 
German states of the Rhineland. Their rhetoric contrasted German ideal-
ism with American materialism, to the magnification of the former and 
the denigration of the latter. Moreover, as Kathleen Neils Conzen has 
pointed out, this definition of German ethnicity in cultural terms tran-
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scended linguistic, political, religious, and socioeconomic distinctions of 
German Kleinstaaterei and stimulated the growth of cultural associations 
and organizations (rather than political or nationalistic) to the end of the 
nineteenth century. Thus the ethnopolitical conflicts of the 1840s and 
'50s and the concomitant development of a German-language press 
stimulated the emergence of a self-conscious German identity that con-
tinue to grow until the end of the century.14 
Although the American Civil War caused a sharp drop in emigra-
tion from the German states, it did not cease entirely, and starting in 
1865 it quickly returned to earlier levels. Then, in response to the Panic 
of 1873, it dropped abruptly to about thirty thousand per year before 
breaking new records in the early 1880s. The peak year was 1882, when 
two hundred fifty thousand arrived. Thereafter the rate declined until the 
end of the century, when it dropped to less than twenty thousand per 
year. In all, approximately five million Germans had emigrated to the 
United States by 1900. In the first half of the nineteenth century, when 
sailing vessels were in use and transatlantic travel was an ordeal, few 
immigrants ever returned to Europe. But after 1860, when steamships 
became common, there was an increase in the number of returnees and a 
decrease in the proportion of families emigrating from Germany. In other 
words, there was an increase in the proportion of single adult young 
males who, after a year or two of working in America, could return to 
Germany with some ease, either to stay or to bring a bride back to the 
United States. 
IV 
By the beginning of the twentieth century the number of first- and 
second-generation Germans in the United States had expanded to about 
eight million persons-more than ten percent of the entire population. 
Most Americans tended to think of the Germans in their midst as a 
unified group with more or less common characteristics. The fact is, 
however, that the Germans were an extraordinarily heterogeneous group. 
Provincial differences, linguistic variations, religious divisions, and social 
and political distinctions were usually lost on native-born Americans, 
who tended to lump the Germans all together on the basis of their 
presumably common language. Since Germany did not exist as a unified 
state until 1871, a German was simply someone who spoke the German 
language. 
In contrast to this stereotype, careful study of census data reveals 
striking differences in the provincial origins of Germans in America. For 
example, Wiirttembergers were heavily concentrated in Philadelphia, but 
they could scarcely to be found in Milwaukee. In contrast, Mecklenburgers 
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were strongly attracted to Milwaukee, but few settled in Philadelphia. 
Similarly, Hanoverians were common in Cincinnati and St. Louis but 
relatively uncommon in Wisconsin or Michigan. Lutherans from Franconia 
(northern Bavaria) settled Frankenmuth, Michigan; Holsteiners concen-
trated in Grand Island, Nebraska; Nassau was disproportionately repre-
sented among the Germans of central Texas; and Oldenburgers clustered 
in Cincinnati, where they were seven times more numerous proportion-
ately than in the United States generally. IS The list of such examples 
might be extended indefinitely. What is clear about this evidence is that, 
as the German historian Wolfgang Helbich has observed, common region 
or even neighborhood may have been more important to the immigrants 
than common language or even religion.16 
The pattern was the same for both cities and the countryside. 
Stanley Nadel has examined data from the four wards of Kleindeutschland 
in New York City over three decades to show that important variations 
were evident even on that level and that changes in provincial origins 
occurred over time. Nadel also demonstrated that in New York City provin-
cial origins are strongly related to various social and cultural characteristics 
such as marriage patterns, family structures, and occupation.17 In study-
ing data from rural Missouri, Kamphoefner has shown that nearly 20 
percent of all the Germans in Warren County came from the tiny German 
principality of Lippe-Detmold. At the same time, there were practically 
no Lippe-Detmolders in St. Charles County, another heavily German 
county located a few miles to the east.IS Similar distributions are evident 
wherever nineteenth-century Germans settled in the United States. 
How did such concentrations develop? Where the first emigrants 
from a given region in Germany happened to settle in the United States 
was sometimes purely a matter of chance. Other times migrants were 
influenced by propaganda. For example, Missouri was popular in the 
1830s and 1840s because of a widely read book by Gottfried Duden 
published in Germany. During those years emigration was especially 
heavy from northwestern German states; hence the unusually large con-
centration of Hanoverians and Brunswickers in Missouri. Later on, in the 
1870s and 1880s, state boards of immigration, often working cooperatively 
with western railroad companies with land to sell, convinced thousands 
of northern Germans to settle in the states of the Great Plains-Kansas, 
Nebraska, and the Dakotas. German-language materials were prepared 
and widely distributed by German-speaking agents working both in 
Germany and in American seaports.19 
In other cases clergymen provided leadership, as, for example, 
among the Saxon Lutherans in St. Louis and the Prussian Lutherans in 
Milwaukee, both of which groups arrived in the late 1830s.20 In other 
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instances, clergymen were merely instrumental. Knowing that many of 
his parishioners were determined to migrate to America, a Catholic priest 
or a Protestant pastor in Germany would direct his people to a certain 
community in the United States where he knew there was a church or a 
pastor who would minister to his people. Outstanding leadership in a 
local German-American settlement also attracted more immigrants, as 
many articles in the literature of German-American history testify. Similarly, 
immigration societies such as the Adelsverein, which brought the first 
Germans to Texas, did much to stamp German-American communities 
with provincial origins. 
But the most important factor in determining the location of settle-
ment in America was the pattern of chain migration. For one reason or 
another, one immigrant and his family would settle in a certain place. 
Assuming he prospered there, he would write glowing letters to relatives 
and friends in his hometown about life in America. Helbich, who con-
siders "America letters" to be of preeminent importance in the emigrant's 
final decision to leave, estimates that about 100 million such letters were 
dispatched from the United States to Germany in the nineteenth century,21 
Soon the early immigrants would be followed by others and gradually a 
remarkable concentration would develop in a community. Such informal 
migration, usually by families, constituted the bulk of German immigration. 
German emigration societies, even though they have received much 
attention from historians, were much less important.22 
Much of this movement of German immigrants, especially to rural 
and small-town America, was closely connected to churches. This is not 
to say that the churches were the organizing agents, but rather that 
immigrants, having generally come from the same place in Germany, 
tended therefore also to have the same religion. Such patterns help to 
explain the religious affiliations of many Americans today, not only on 
the local level but on the state level as well. Wisconsin, for example, has 
proportionately many more Catholics of German origin than does 
Nebraska. Wisconsin was settled earlier in the nineteenth century, when 
the sources of German emigration were concentrated in western and 
southern German states, where Catholics are numerous. Nebraska was 
settled later, in the 1870s and '80s, when emigration from the Protestant 
provinces of northern Germany-Holstein, Mecklenburg, Pomerania-
was more important. 
This tendency of German immigrants to settle among others of 
their own kind was by no means unusual. All the immigrant groups did 
it. But while at least some Germans could be found in all states of the 
Union, they were concentrated in the Middle Atlantic states-New York, 
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Maryland-and in the North Central 
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states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin, plus Missouri, 
Iowa, and Minnesota. By the end of the nineteenth century, about 85 
percent of all German immigrants lived in these states. About 65 percent 
lived in cities and towns compared to 40 percent for the United States 
population as a whole at that time. Still, they were strongly attracted to 
agriculture. By 1900, one-fourth of all gainfully employed German Ameri-
cans were in farming, a proportion exceeded only by the Scandinavians 
and the Czechs. They were especially attracted to dairy farming, so much 
so that they were actually underrepresented in other kinds of farming. 
Americans generally perceived the Germans as excellent farmers. 
Their reputation for industry and frugality was firmly established already 
in colonial times. Although they generally did not settle on the best land 
(often it was not available or was beyond their means), they were eager to 
own rather than to rent their farms. Unlike many native-born Americans, 
they valued land, not as a speculative investment, but as a permanent 
home. Proximity to others who shared their language and culture was 
important. Hence German-American rural life frequently centered on 
their churches as the easiest and most enduring of institutions that could 
be created and sustained in such an environment. They rarely made any 
efforts to duplicate European village patterns-the force of American 
land law was too strong for that - and their cropping practices were also 
quickly adapted to locally prevailing norms. 23 
Mobility among German-American farmers was high, but not as 
high as that registered by the native-born. Much of the movement was 
accounted for by the out-migration of adult children of the immigrants. 
This means that the ethnoreligious character of particular German rural 
settlements has been sustained through several generations to the present 
time. This persistence has been weakened only in recent decades by 
technological changes in transportation, communication, and agricul-
tural practice. 24 
In her study of inheritance customs among rural Germans of Stearns 
County, Minnesota, Kathleen Conzen has demonstrated that a variety of 
strategies were developed to keep the "home place" within the family, but 
when that was not possible, they preferred to sell to persons of their own 
ethnoreligious group.2S In general, the self-containment and isolation of 
such family-oriented rural communities nurtured profound conservatism-
social, economic, and political. 
V 
Life in the cities was dramatically different.26 According to the 
nineteenth-century stereotype, the typical German immigrant was a skilled 
practitioner of a craft-a baker, carpenter, brewer, or shoemaker. But 
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that was actually true of only about one-third of the Germans by the end 
of the century. They were also well represented among the merchant class 
and among professional people, but until recently the extent of their 
presence among common or unskilled laborers has been underestimated. 
In fact, by 1900 more than 40 percent of the gainfully employed among 
the German-born were in the unskilled worker class, and they were 
rather more numerous in midwestern cities than in the East. 27 
The importance of ethnicity for urban and labor history has been 
slighted by many historians. Marxist historians in particular have tended 
to treat ethnic culture as a negative force that sapped class solidarity in 
the struggle against capitalist oppression. However, recent historians of 
German workers in American cities, especially Hartmut Keil and John 
Jentz, have affirmed the vital importance of German ethnicity in labor 
history and have sought to define its role in the evolution of working-
class culture. Working with evidence from Chicago, they have aimed to 
comprehend the everyday experiences of immigrant German workers 
and to understand their adaptations to a new urban and industrial world. 
In sum, they have analyzed the conflicts that naturally occurred when the 
verticality of German ethnicity crossed the horizontality of class. 28 
Other studies have concentrated on occupational structures that 
permit the comparison of Germans with other ethnic groups, notably the 
Irish, in the nineteenth century. In general, they show that Germans 
generally fared better than the Irish, although not usually by comparison 
to native-born Americans. Although the Germans inevitably were under-
represented in occupations that demanded a good command of the 
English language, they more than most immigrant groups displayed a 
balanced representation in the occupational structure of most cities.29 
Evidence drawn from Poughkeepsie, New York, suggests that, by com-
parison to most other groups, German shopkeepers and skilled workers 
experienced exceptional rates of upward mobility, but German immi-
grants who entered the work force at the unskilled level were less fortunate. 
Their sons, however, were able to find employment in skilled and white-
collar jobs more frequently than were the sons of either Irish-born or 
native-born laborers. 30 
The distribution of Germans across the occupational spectrum, 
combined with their huge numbers, permitted urban Germans to create 
ethnic communities that were virtually self-contained. 31 New York had 
its Kleindeutschland, just as Cincinnati its "Over the Rhine" district. 
Scores of other American cities had similar enclaves of first- and second-
generation German immigrants. The members of such communities could 
always find a German grocer, carpenter, banker, or doctor; they could 
often find German employers; they could always attend a German church, 
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read a locally published German-language newspaper, and participate in 
the affairs of German voluntary associations, which often were familiar 
forms developed in Germany by middle-class urbanites who transferred 
them to American cities. In nineteenth-century Milwaukee, Kathleen 
Conzen has shown, only the German ethnic group had the range and 
heterogeneity necessary for the development of a genuinely ethnic com-
munity with a full complement of supportive functions independent of 
the host society.32 
The remarkably heterogeneous German ethnic community in Mil-
waukee, as elsewhere, functioned effectively as a means to ease the 
process of adjustment to American life. The very success of first-generation 
immigrants drew the second generation into the mainstream of American 
society. That meant that the continued survival of the ethnic community 
depended upon a continuous stream of new immigrants from Germany. 
But that flow was dramatically reduced in the 1890s, and at the same 
time, urban mass transit systems were being developed that permitted 
upwardly mobile second-generation German Americans to scatter through-
out the cities and their suburbs. Although it is true that there were 
strongly German neighborhoods or wards in most large cities of the 
United States, the Germans were generally also well distributed by the 
end of the century.33 
VI 
The Germans were thus remarkably diverse, not only in residence 
patterns, occupations, and provincial origins, but they also were highly 
varied in their religious identities. 34 Attitudes, values, and behavior 
patterns were closely related to religious belief and for many people were 
more important than economic status. Of all European peoples, the 
Germans were probably the most deeply divided in religious matters. 
Naturally they brought their prejudices with them to America. This 
meant that as concentrations of German Catholics, Lutherans, Mennonites, 
Evangelicals, or Reformed developed here and there, each group had 
surprisingly little to do with the others. Of course, this was not univer-
sally true, especially during the frontier period, but each group still 
tended to go its own way and to develop its own religiously oriented 
institutions-schools and colleges, publishing houses, hospitals, and social 
organizations for the laity. 
The Catholics constituted the largest single religious group among 
the Germans, accounting for about a third of the total. Although large 
and important concentrations of German Catholic immigrants could be 
found in rural areas, the majority lived in cities. According to Jay Dolan, 
they formed important parts of each stratum of Catholic society, most 
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numerous on the bottom, but present also in the middle and upper levels, 
although the second generation predominated in the latter category.35 
They were underrepresented, however, in the Catholic hierarchy, and the 
struggles of German-speaking Catholics with their Irish bishops over 
issues of governance, language, and property form a familiar part of 
American Catholic history. German Catholic clergymen were among the 
strongest advocates of parochial schools, believing that the preservation 
of the faith required the maintenance of the German language and culture 
by this means. 
In no single city have German Catholics been studied with greater 
sophistication than in New York, where Jay Dolan has compared them to 
Irish Catholics on parish level in the mid-nineteenth century. Because the 
Irish used the same language as the host society, their devotion to the 
ethnic parish as a solution to the problem of religion and nationality was 
less intense than among the Germans. There were also distinctive styles 
of worship, with the Germans displaying more pageantry and ceremony 
than the Irish. Auxiliary ethnoreligious organizations, which reinforced 
the sense of community and separatism, seemed to have special promi-
nence for the Germans. Differences also existed in the relationships of 
priests to people. Whereas the Germans maintained a respectful social 
distance from their pastors, the Irish developed warm personal and 
familial bonds with theirs.36 Despite their impressive numbers, the Ger-
man Catholics displayed fierce antagonisms against anything that seemed 
to infringe upon their rights. Inevitably this served to create a heightened 
sense of identity and to promote a conservative, defensive mentality. 
German Lutherans were even more separatistic than the Catholics. 
They organized themselves into autonomous congregations clustered in a 
bewildering array of synods, each going its own way, and each representing 
a different shade of conservatism. They tended to cling tenaciously to the 
use of the German language and some of the more conservative synods 
encouraged congregations to establish parochial schools. As late as World 
War I, about half of the two million German Lutherans in America still 
conducted worship services exclusively in the German language. Although 
some of the synods were thoroughly assimilated organizations that had 
long ago lost their German characteristics, others remained essentially 
immigrant institutions dedicated to the in-gathering of German new-
comers and their children. 
Other German Protestant church bodies were smaller in size. Among 
them were the Reformed and Evangelical synods, Mennonite and Method-
ist conferences, and many smaller groups, including German Baptists and 
Presbyterians. Some, such as the Amish, were profoundly separatistic; a 
few, most notably the Hutterites of the northern Great Plains, organized 
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themselves in self-contained rural colonies or communes. But most were 
ecumenical in spirit and gradually merged with or were absorbed by 
English-speaking equivalent organizations, a process that was accelerated 
in the two decades between the world wars. 
The German Jews in the United States were like the various Chris-
tian groups in many respects. Numbering perhaps two hundred thousand 
by the 1880s, they also established their own educational agencies, 
publications, benevolent institutions, and other auxiliary organizations. 
Rather more than the conservative Christian sects, the Jews tended to 
participate actively in German-American institutional life and often pro-
vided important leadership. Their loyalty to German language and cul-
ture was at least as strong as that of any other German-American 
ethnoreligious group, even though their struggles with problems arising 
from their dual identity were inevitably more difficult. Generally their 
relations with other Germans in America were positive, as one should 
expect of groups so inextricably bound together. Examples of anti-Semitism 
among German Americans can be found, but what is striking, Stanley 
Nadel has observed, is how little of it there actually was. 37 
VII 
In general, the church Germans, who were often former peasants or 
craftsmen, focused their lives around the church and its related activities 
and took relatively little interest in the broader affairs of the community. 
In this respect they were quite different from the so-called club Germans, 
whose values and attitudes tended to be secular. Usually urban in resi-
dence and strongly middle class, the latter were often liberal in their 
politics. But their ranks did not include urban working-class Germans, 
whose radical ideology placed most "club Germans" and urban "church 
Germans" in the enemy camp of capitalist oppressors. 
Their organizations were rather more diverse than those supported 
by the churches. They included singing societies, shooting or marksman 
clubs, fire companies, and veterans organizations. There were benevolent 
associations for the assistance of the poor and the most recently arrived 
immigrants. A multitude of mutual benefit societies with primitive insur-
ance programs developed in many cities. There were also clubs for the 
social elite. Reading societies sprang up whose main goal was the develop-
ment of subscription libraries of German-language books. Many cities 
had associations for various professional and business groups. There 
were lodges as well; some were affiliated with national organizations such 
as the Masons and the Odd Fellows, others were strictly German, notably 
the Sons of Hermann and the German Order of Harugari. Still other 
societies were organized on the basis of the German state or province 
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from which its members had emigrated. As Kathleen Conzen has observed, 
these were the people who defined, for both themselves and outsiders, 
what the characteristics of German immigrant culture were. It was they 
more than the church people who gave coherence and content to what 
became identified as the German life-style, and who defined the German-
American political agenda.38 These were the people who, in most 
nineteenth-century American cities with substantial German populations, 
inspired and directed the pageantry of the great German celebrations, 
with their festive parades, celebratory speeches, dramatic performances, 
concerts, and balls.39 
The "club German" mentality also dominated the German-language 
press. There were exceptions, of course, chiefly among the religious and 
the socialist newspapers, but most of the nearly eight hundred German-
language newspapers and journals published in the United States by 1890 
created a semblance of unity in the German-American community that in 
fact did not exist. Generally, the publishers and editors were recent 
immigrants, well educated, and liberal in their politics. Most German-
language daily newspapers and many of the weeklies differed little in 
form, style, and content from English-language papers. In this way the 
press was a highly effective agent of Americanization. It explained Ameri-
can ways to the newcomers and kept them informed of developments in 
America, thereby easing the adjustment to life in a strange land.40 
At the same time, however, the German language became the chief 
agent for the perpetuation of immigrant cultural forms. Especially after 
the drastic reduction in number of new arrivals from Germany at the end 
of the nineteenth century, the press endeavored to sustain its readership 
among second-generation Germans, few of whom were dependent in a 
linguistic sense on the German language. The device used by the press to 
hold its readers was the promotion of German-Americanism, that is, a 
self-conscious identity among German Americans as participants in a 
subsociety that was expressive of a superior culture. This meant that the 
press tended to lose the earlier, critical character that it had when it was 
dominated by refugees of the Revolution of 1848. Early in the twentieth 
century, it tended to give full, uncritical support to the institutions of the 
ethnic community, to all efforts aimed at the maintenance of German 
language and culture, and to political measures and movements that 
could be defined as being in the German-American interest.41 
The diversity and fragmentation of German ethnic society in America 
also guaranteed political weakness. The variety reflected in the press, 
voluntary associations, the churches, occupational structures, wealth 
patterns, and provincial origins meant that ordinarily the Germans could 
never be rallied behind one political party. Only for brief periods and in 
172 Germans in the New World 
times of special stress could they be provoked to effective political action 
as an ethnic group. Unlike the Irish, who were overwhelmingly Democratic, 
or the Norwegians, who were strongly Republican, the Germans tended 
to divide between the two major parties. The result was that they were 
often perceived as being politically apathetic. 
Only when issues impinged directly on the interests of the Germans 
did they respond with a high level of political unity. In the pre-Civil War 
era, when the reform impulse expressed itself in nativism, German-
American voters, particularly the Catholics, often felt that their language 
and culture were under attack. The Democratic party, with its Jeffersonian 
emphasis on minimal government, seemed the more congenial. Still, the 
Democratic party condoned slavery at that time, and most Germans 
perceived that institution as morally repugnant. Many were temporarily 
attracted by Abraham Lincoln and the Republican party during the Civil 
War era, but they tended to return to the Democratic fold later in the 
century in those places where prohibition, Sabbatarianism, and uniform 
public schooling were prominent issues. 42 
Early in the twentieth century there was a concerted effort to 
achieve united political action among Germans in America through the 
creation of the National German-American Alliance. Essentially a middle-
class organization led by businessmen, journalists, clergymen, and 
professors, it was unable to attract the active participation of most 
church organizations. German labor leaders and the socialists generally 
were disdainful of its program. Supported financially by brewing and 
liquor interests, the National Alliance was especially interested in fighting 
prohibition and in promoting German-language instruction in the public 
schools. As World War I approached, it became a vehicle for much 
pro-German propaganda. It ultimately fell victim to the hatred generated 
by World War I, like thousands of other German-American voluntary 
associations.43 
World War I was a time when the American people were swept up 
in a wave of anti-German feeling. In effect, there was a war against 
German language and culture for a short time, as individual citizens of 
German origin were harassed and persecuted. This phenomenon is partly 
explained by the behavior of German-American cultural chauvinists who 
took extravagantly pro-German positions during the period of American 
neutrality from 1914 to 1917. Then, when the United States declared war 
on Germany in 1917, many Americans of German birth or descent found 
themselves under suspicion of disloyalty. The climate of hate produced 
such outrages as a ban on German-composed music and the public 
burning of German-language books during patriotic exercises. Foods, 
streets, and towns, as well as countless persons were renamed to remove 
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the taint of Germanness. There were vandalism, beatings, arrests for 
unpatriotic utterances, and even a lynching of a German alien in Illinois. 
German-language instruction in the public schools was restricted or 
eliminated, hundreds of German-language newspapers ceased publication, 
and many German-American churches made a rapid transition to the use 
of the English language.44 
VIII 
Following World War 1, there was a dramatic resumption of immi-
gration of Germans to the United States. Beginning in the early 1920s, it 
reached a high point of 75,000 persons in 1924. It continued at nearly 
50,000 per annum until 1929, when federal legislation limiting immigra-
tion took effect. In general, the German immigrants of the 1920s tended 
to be somewhat better educated, more highly skilled, and more urban 
than their nineteenth century predecessors. In the 1930s, the proportion 
of both agricultural and industrial workers among the emigrants declined 
significantly as the unemployed increased. 45 
During the 1920s some German-American leaders made efforts to 
revive German ethnic life in the United States, but they were not very 
successful. Filled with bitterness and resentment after the trauma of the 
war with Germany, some leaders sought to regain respectability through 
united political action. After this strategy failed repeatedly in the 1920s, 
they shifted to an emphasis on culture. But this effort also failed because 
it was founded on elitist values at variance with those of the average 
German immigrant of the time. Then, during the Great Depression of the 
1930s, the German-American Nazis captured public attention with a 
strategy of blood. This racist quest for ethnic unity was morally repug-
nant to the vast majority of German Americans and attracted support 
chiefly among some of the post-World War I immigrants. 46 
When Adolf Hitler came to power in 1933, German immigration 
dropped to its lowest point in a century, save for the World War I period. 
A resurgence followed thereafter, peaking in the American neutrality 
period of 1939 to 1941, as Hitler intensified his anti-Semitic policies. 
Approximately 100,000 refugees from Germany arrived during those 
years, at least 80 percent of whom were Jewish. Had it not been for a 
variety of restrictions imposed or retained by the United States government, 
the number would have been much larger. In any case, this was an 
extraordinary immigration. The proportion of academics and indepen-
dent scientists, mathematicians, physicians, authors, artists, musicians, 
and composers, as well as lawyers and businessmen, was unprecedented.47 
When the United States entered the Second World War against 
Germany in 1941, the government carefully avoided the mistakes it 
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made in the earlier conflict. German-American ethnicity had not been 
reawakened by the Nazisi there was no repetition of the repression of 
1917 and 1918. 
The last great wave of German immigration to the United States 
followed World War II. Modest at first, it swelled rapidly to nearly 
130,000 persons in 1950. In all, nearly a million more German-speaking 
persons arrived during this period, most of them victims of war who 
hoped to escape the problems associated with economic, social, and 
political reconstruction of Europe and to find a better life in America. 
Like the German-Jewish emigration, which had reached its apex in 1939, 
the postwar movement included a disproportionately large number of 
scientists, technicians, and other well-educated persons. Others were the 
brides of American soldiers in GermanYi still others were "displaced 
persons" -ethnic German refugees from eastern Europe who fled to the 
West before the armies of the Soviet Union in 1945. 
Like the immigrants of the 1920s and '30s, this last great wave of 
German-speaking immigrants has consisted of persons who have been 
much interested in being drawn into American society and culture as 
rapidly as possible. Few have wanted to perpetuate German language and 
culture in the way that the proponents of an organized Deutschtum did 
in the pre-World War I era. But German ethnicity continues to be 
fostered in an organized way in the local Vereine that may be found in 
major centers of German-American population. A few are organized for 
political purposes, not on the local level, but rather to oppose the 
communism that engulfed their homelands in central and eastern Europe 
at the end of World War II. But such organizations attract the participa-
tion of only a small fraction of German-speaking immigrants in the 
United States. Most are social or sporting associations and provide 
opportunities for persons to fraternize and to meet others of similar 
backgrounds. 
IX 
The total effect of 300 years of German immigration to the United 
States has been enormous. According to the census of 1980, approxi-
mately 52 million persons in the American population of 226 million are 
descended from German immigrants. They are the largest single group, 
exceeding both the Irish and the English. Although it is arguable whether 
that statistic is significant, the fact remains the Germans have had a 
profound impact on American history. I do not here refer to men and 
women of towering importance in political, economic, social, and cul-
tural affairs. One need not recount ad nauseam the contributions of 
famous Americans-statesmen, military leaders, scientists, financiers, 
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industrialists, artists, novelists-of German birth or descent. Instead, 
I suggest that the admixture of millions of German immigrants and their 
children in American society has made it into something that it would 
not otherwise be-that the American character is partly explained, not 
only by its frontier experience, its plenteous resources, or whatever, but 
also by the fact that a huge ethnocultural component has German roots. 
The same thing can be said, of course, of other major ethnic groups 
in American society. The United States is culturally what it is because of 
the people who came here from other parts of the world. Frederick 
Jackson Turner's famous frontier thesis notwithstanding, the powerful 
forces of the American physical and social environments have not blended 
immigrants into an undifferentiated mass. Moreover, present-day Ameri-
can attitudes and behaviors would be different if, let us say, the French 
had immigrated to the United States in the same numbers as the Germans, 
or conversely, if the German influx had been as limited as the French. 
How can such an ethnic influence be measured or analyzed? Possi-
bilities abound, but none are easy. Although some historians of ethnicity 
have made good use of the social scientist's tool box of measurement 
techniques and quantitative devices, they have not exploited data pub-
lished by sociologists over the past two decades to assess the persistence 
of ethnicity, German or other, in American life. 48 Much information of 
this kind, together with survey research data gathered by the Gallup 
organization and other pollsters, are wonderfully suggestive of opportuni-
ties for useful historical analysis. 
In any case, the descendants of German immigrants constitute a 
major ingredient in the American stew, especially in the Midwest, and 
their importance for recent history remains to be estimated. In Nebraska, 
for example, nearly half of all inhabitants trace their ancestry to German-
speaking immigrants - more than twice the proportion registered by the 
English, who rank second. Does this knowledge help to explain the stolid, 
conservative, unadventurous, and perhaps unimaginative character that 
is part of the Nebraska stereotype? Does the fact that the German 
proportion in Nebraska's population doubles that of Kansas help to 
explain the differences that persist between these two states, especially in 
politics, despite their superficial similarities?49 Although studies of such 
questions must begin on the state and local level, they must eventually be 
transferred to the national level if they are to acquire lasting significance. 
The persistence of German ethnicity and culture in contemporary 
society is largely terra incognita, except for limited work in folklore, 
material culture, and architecture.5o Similarly, few scholars have under-
taken serious study of German immigration in the post-World War II 
period. Historians in both the United States and Germany have been 
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preoccupied with the nineteenth and early twentieth century migrations; 
sociologists and political scientists, when they study race and ethnicity in 
American life, properly consider problems associated with blacks, Asians, 
American Indians, and the Spanish-speaking groups. Few students of the 
German language and literature in the United States have considered any 
topics pertaining to the last four decades. 51 
If one were to produce a list of research possibilities or needs, basic 
study of the post-World War II immigration would be at the top. 
Monographic studies of German-speaking immigrants of this period by 
historians or social scientists scarcely exist. Except for the most general-
ized sorts of information, we know practically nothing precise about 
whence these people came, when and how they arrived in the United 
States, or where they settled and where they have moved since their 
arrival. Our knowledge of their socioeconomic status, educational levels, 
religious affiliations, occupational distributions, and associational activi-
ties are similarly limited. 52 Yet they too are a major part of the history of 
Germans in the United States. 
But much more needs to be done with the recent decades. Some-
times maps suggest the range of possibilities. For example, when the 
largest ancestry groups are mapped by congressional district (based on 
1980 census data), the Germans blanket the north-central section of the 
country. The area includes all of Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, North and 
South Dakotas, Nebraska, Wyoming, and Montana, plus eastern Colorado, 
most of Kansas, and much of Missouri, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, 
and Pennsylvania.53 The implications of this for Midwestern values and 
attitudes, or for legislative behavior in Congress, have never been explored, 
presumably on the untested assumption that the ethnicity of groups such 
as the Germans and other north Europeans is no longer important. But 
does the Midwest today still reflect a residue of German immigrant 
values? Are contemporary demands for public morality and concomitant 
emphases on family values, self-help, and work for its own sake distilled 
from this source, among others? 
The importance of German ancestry for electoral or voting behav-
ior since 1940 also remains unexplored, despite the fact that such 
nonhistorians as Samuel Lubell and Kevin Phillips long ago have identi-
fied its significance or that Michael Parenti, among other political scientists, 
emphasized two decades ago that, appearances to the contrary, ethnicity 
continues to condition political behavior, usually unconsciously, among 
persons who are from families long ago totally assimilated into American 
life.54 The argument is not that, for example, German Catholic voters in 
southern Indiana are anything like German Catholic voters in southern 
Bavaria, but rather that their values, attitudes, and behaviors are modi-
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fied in infinitely subtle and complex ways by their ethnoreligious anteced-
ents and that, in their voting habits, they may well be discernibly different 
from other voters with different cultural roots. 
If German immigration in recent decades has been neglected, the 
same may be said for the colonial period. Research in this era is more 
extensive than for the 1950s, but some of it lacks the sophistication of 
concept and method that characterizes the studies that professional histo-
rians have produced on German immigration in the nineteenth century. 
X 
As for the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, much research 
in German-American history remains to be undertaken. Although a 
systematic review would no doubt reveal a different list, I prefer merely 
to cite several interrelated topics that seem to me to be worthy of 
investigation. They concern the German immigrant churches, their auxil-
iary institutions, their rivals, and their relationships to American and 
German-American society and politics. 
Jay Dolan, in his study of Irish and German Catholic churches in 
New York City, has shown us the way. Writing from the perspective of 
the pew rather than the pulpit, he has demonstrated the possibilities for 
comparative analysis in time and place. Dolan's doctoral student, Joseph 
White, has shifted the focus from Catholics to German immigrants gener-
ally in his examination of relationships between religion and community 
in Cincinnati. 55 Other cities, notably Pittsburgh and Buffalo, have been 
studied, but more needs to be done if the relationship of German churches 
to urban immigrant life is to be understood.56 A related topic concerns 
the spread of German-immigrant churches as institutions in space and 
time. 57 
The relationship of church people to urban labor in particular 
needs exploration. In their study of urban working-class culture in Chicago, 
Hartmut Keil and John Jentz (and other historians as well) find that the 
German immigrant churches had no part in it. This, of course, is to be 
expected because of the militant anticlericalism of German labor leaders 
and their publications in the late nineteenth century. Yet common laborers 
were also on the rolls of the urban churches. We need to know more 
about such persons. Were they in fact only a tiny proportion of the 
German-American urban working class? What was their relationship to 
working-class culture? How do German workers in their relationships to 
the churches compare to other immigrant worker groups, such as the 
Poles, Slovaks, or Italians? 
Our knowledge and understanding of the auxiliary institutions 
erected by German-American churches is at best fragmentary. Small-
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town and rural churches rarely had the resources (or the need, for that 
matter) to create much more than choirs, ladies' societies, men's clubs, 
and occasional social events such as church suppers and picnics. But in 
the city there was in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
strong competition from secular organizations for individual loyalties. 
How the churches responded to this challenge needs study. Philip Gleason 
has examined the German Catholic Central-Verein in great detail, but we 
could learn much from studies of other organizations that emerged in 
German Protestant settings.58 Similarly, how church-based fraternal bene-
fit associations evolved into modern insurance companies is imperfectly 
understood. A sophisticated study of the laity in the Lutheran Church-
Missouri Synod has been produced, but professional studies of laymen 
and their organizations in other German-origin churches would improve 
our understanding of immigrant institutions. 59 Indeed, we know very 
little about either German-American fraternal organizations such as the 
Sons of Hermann or about German-speaking chapters in the Masonic 
and other orders, which the churches often viewed as competitors.60 
But the most important of the auxiliary agencies established by the 
churches were their schools. Although a useful literature exists on Ger-
man Catholic and Lutheran parochial schools, much of it fails to address 
seriously questions concerning the social and cultural functions of the 
schools (intended or otherwise), the social and professional characteris-
tics of the teachers and their roles in the churches, or the relationship of 
the schools to public education.61 Similarly, there are histories of individ-
ual colleges established by German immigrant church bodies, but no 
historian has made the effort to study their origins and development 
collectively and to find their place in the larger history of higher educa-
tion in the United States. 
The schools of the German immigrant churches also should be 
placed in the context of political history. Language controversies are 
reasonably well understood, but control of state governments over curric-
ula and teacher certification, for example, needs careful study.62 The 
cooperative effort of Catholics and German Lutherans in Wisconsin to 
repeal the Bennett law of 1889 in Wisconsin is well known. But this 
unsuccessful attempt to require all schools, public and private, to use 
English as the language of instruction in reading, writing, arithmetic, and 
United States history was only a part of a larger, national campaign to 
obstruct and restrict education in immigrant religious institutions. Its full 
history remains to be written. 
Conversely, little is known of the extent to which German Ameri-
cans were able to convert public schools on the local level into de facto 
ethnoreligious institutions by virtue of their electoral control of district 
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school boards and therefore over the hiring of teachers. Such dominance 
was not infrequent in Wisconsin, Minnesota, and North Dakota. In many 
of the Russian-German Hutterite colonies of the northern Great Plains, 
school officials to this day have accommodated idiosyncratic customs 
and values in precisely this fashion. 63 
Indeed, the German-American churches themselves have not been 
studied in terms of political history.64 They must be viewed as integral 
parts of American society and their representatives as legitimate partici-
pants in the political process. They must be analyzed by means of 
comparisons to other appropriate identifiable religious groups. Place 
must also become a part of research design. For example, we should not 
expect German Protestants who in the 1850s lived in the St. Louis or 
Cincinnati areas at the border between slave and non-slave states to have 
the same partisan preferences as their counterparts in Chicago, Detroit, 
or Buffalo. Political activity, whether defined as partisan voting or as 
attitudes toward issues, must be placed within a developmental context 
and analyzed as interaction with other elements in society.65 
Further, the relationships of German immigrant church member-
ships to patterns of wealth, occupation, marriage, family, fertility, and 
land inheritance strategies have heretofore received only fragmentary 
attention.66 Similarly, research into patterns of horizontal mobility (or 
persistence) should include relocation movements by church groups, as 
when, for example, Catholic Germans from Stearns County, Minnesota, 
established daughter settlements in North Dakota. 67 One sociological 
study of agriculture among German Catholics and "Yankees" in Illinois 
has demonstrated that the former operate smaller farms, are more highly 
motivated to sustain family ownership, and are less driven by entre-
preneurial considerations. Yet neither this study nor another, a venture in 
historical sociology that analyzes German-Russian farmers in Kansas and 
reveals a positive association of German ethnicity with persistence, con-
trols data for religion or church affiliation.68 
For many years church historians have been intrigued by the process 
of assimilation in German-American denominations and have produced 
a substantial literature treating evolutionary change in theology and 
governance. Similarly, students of language have traced the transitions 
from German to English in worship services, church periodicals, educa-
tional institutions, and conventions. Nevertheless, these manifestations 
of assimilation have not often been analyzed systematically in terms of 
social history. Dennis Engbrecht has demonstrated some of the possibili-
ties in his model study of assimilational change in the Kansas General 
Conference Mennonites. He has examined transitions in Mennonite 
education, church customs, architecture, and music, in addition to lan-
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guage usage and such" ordinances of faith" relating to baptism, communion, 
and footwashing. 69 Similar studies of other German-American church 
bodies will make new generalizations possible about the role of religion 
in ethnic history. 
Much more remains to be done in other aspects of German-American 
history. The work of scholars in fields other than history-geography, 
the fine arts, sociology-suggests some possibilities. Terry Jordan and 
D. Aidan McQuillan have shown us what can be done in agricultural 
history. Russel Gerlach has broadened German-American studies through 
his examination of German-American landscapes in the Ozarks. Charles 
van Ravenswaay has brilliantly opened the field of German-American 
architecture and folk arts. Diane Barthel, in her study of the Amana 
colonies in Iowa, has demonstrated how the process of secularization can 
be studied in a radical German religious colony,70 
During the past two decades scholars in several fields have discovered 
much about the three centuries of Germans in America. This history is 
long and complicated, often perplexing in its diversity. From a tiny 
settlement of a few families of Dutch and German origins in Pennsylva-
nia in 1683, the Germans have grown to their present status as the 
immigrant group in the United States with the largest number of descen-
dants. But how important is that, considering the degree of assimilation 
that also has occurred in 300 years? 
In the nineteenth century German Americans, especially their leaders, 
took great pride-often chauvinistic-in their language and culture. They 
tended to exaggerate their own unity and their importance for national 
history, as they attempted to participate in political affairs and to claim a 
part of America's heritage. In the twentieth century, however, the natural 
processes of assimilation were augmented by the negatives that attended 
the American assault on German culture in World War I and the shame 
of Hitlerian fascism, anti-Semitism, and international aggression. For 
many Americans, German ancestry and ethnicity was now perceived as a 
source of social deprivation. German ethnic consciousness virtually 
disappearedj German-Americans ceased to function as an ethnic group. 
Yet behaviors and attitudes rooted in German ethnicity remained. 
Unidentified or submerged, they moved silently into the behaviors and 
attitudes of middle-class America, especially in the states of the Midwest 
from Ohio west to the Great Plains. To understand three centuries of 
Germans in America is to understand ourselves. The German ingredient 
flavors the whole American pie. 
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